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 ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the drivers of mandatory and voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure within annual reports of publicly listed firms in Bangladesh 
(an emerging economy), Malaysia (a developing economy) and Australia (a 
developed economy).  Using agency and institutional theories as the theoretical 
framework, the final usable sample provides 600 firm-year observations for analysis 
over the period 2006 to 2010. The study develops a comprehensive corporate 
governance disclosure score for both mandatory (regulated) and voluntary disclosure 
requirements for each country.  
The findings for mandatory disclosure requirements show compliance levels 
of 54% for Bangladeshi firms, 83% for Malaysian firms and 97% for Australian 
firms. For voluntary disclosure, Bangladesh continues to lag both other countries at 
63%, however Malaysian (89%) and Australian (88%) companies exhibit almost 
identical levels of disclosure. Empirical findings reveal factors that are impacting the 
level of disclosure. They suggest that firm level governance characteristics and firm 
characteristics may impact differently, dependent on the stage of development of the 
country. For both mandatory and voluntary disclosure, emerging economies such as 
Bangladesh, with underdeveloped markets and regulation rely heavily on stakeholder 
groups to enforce disclosures. In this case shareholder and debt-holder activism 
appears to drive disclosure. For developing counties such as Malaysia with more 
established regulation, firm level governance arrangements are most significant. 
Finally for developed economies such as Australia with very high levels of 
mandatory disclosure (97%), voluntary disclosures are most impacted by company 
size and age. 
 Results of the study have implications for regulators, and scholars in terms of 
understanding how economic and country characteristics may affect disclosures. 
They should assist in determining regulations to strengthen the corporate governance 
mechanisms of firms contingent on the level of economic development within 
countries. 
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 CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background  
This thesis examines, using both cross-sectional and panel data, the drivers of 
voluntary and mandatory corporate governance disclosure within annual reports of 
publicly listed firms in Bangladesh (an emerging economy), Malaysia (a developing 
economy) and Australia (a developed economy).1 The extent of disclosure is one of 
the key platforms of corporate governance and has a significant influence on 
corporate governance reporting quality. Empirical research suggests that disclosure 
has come under increased attention from researchers (Chau and Gray 2002; Eng and 
Mak 2003; Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Ho and Wong 2001; Ibrahim, Haron and 
Ariffin 2000; Aktaruddin et al. 2009; Hongxia and Qi 2008; Brownlee 1990; Alam 
1989). In spite of the prolonged existence and alleged significance of corporate 
governance disclosure, this leading accounting principle has been frequently 
criticized by capital market regulators, accounting standard-setters and scholars alike 
(Inchausti 1997; Naser, Alkatib and Karbhari 2002). However, the recent global 
financial crisis (GFC) has resulted in improvements in corporate governance 
disclosures worldwide in order to reform the global economy (Alsaeed 2006; Bujaki 
and McConomy 2002; Chau and Gray 2002). 
Issues of corporate disclosures and corporate governance have generated 
increasing attention from scholars, policy makers, regulators and investors from 
emerging, developing and developed economies (Healy and Palepu 1993; Wallace 
and Naser 1995). Furthermore, the 1997 East Asian Financial Crisis and the recent 
post-2000 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) clearly highlights to regulatory bodies, 
1 The economy of each country (i. e., Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Australia) is classified in accordance with the World Bank 
country classification; low income, middle income, and high income (i. e., based on gross national income per capita) 
index. The GDP per capita for Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Australia are respectively, $1,700; $14,700; and $41,000 (The 
World Bank Country Classification 2014). 
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 investors and the business community the vital importance of corporate transparency 
and disclosure. This is particularly so given that corporate disclosures are critical to 
both the development of a firm and the growth of capital markets in a country 
(Akhtaruddin and Haron 2010; Wallace and Naser 1995).  
Due to wide-spread corporate collapses in recent years (for example, Enron 
and WorldCom, HIH, One-Tel and Parlamat), countries across the world have come 
to recognise the importance of an effective corporate governance regime (Bushman 
and Smith 2001; National Association of Corporate Directors 1996; New York Stock 
Exchange and National Association of Securities Dealers 1999). As a result, 
regulators universally have introduced regulations/recommendations (for example, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States of America 
(US) and OECD principles) expected to improve the quality of corporate governance 
structures within companies. 
The quality of a firm’s corporate governance structures is dependent upon the 
institutional mechanisms within a country including both economic and political 
factors, legal, regulatory and enforcement standards and the strength of its capital 
markets. Such a framework recognises that a firm’s compliance in corporate 
governance matters can reduce the expropriation costs in the governance process and 
partly compensate shareholders for the inefficiency in the institutional arrangements 
of a developing economy. According to an economic approach to corporate 
governance, better firm-level corporate governance not only reduces the agency 
costs, but also enhances the investors’ optimism in the firm’s future cash-flows and 
growth prospects. This, in turn, reduces the rate of return expected by the investors 
leading to low costs of equity capital available to the firm. Likewise, a reduction in 
the agency costs is likely to cause improved operating and investment performance 
2 
 
 of the better-governed firms. The reduced cost of equity and the improved operating 
performance eventually enhance both the firm’s ability to access equity and debt 
finance ultimately increasing firm value. Therefore, the institutional framework 
within countries, including its economic development, can have a significant impact 
on firm operations, including its corporate governance quality, including related 
disclosures. 
The mandatory and voluntary disclosure of information in corporate annual 
reports and their determinants have attracted  considerably more research attention in 
developed countries than developing ones (Akhtaruddin 2005; Barako and Dulacha 
2007), leading to compliance mechanisms being revamped especially in the 
European Union (EU).  They have also assisted the government in issuing directives 
that facilitate the harmonization process and invariably bring all community 
companies up to a reasonable level of disclosure. Only a few studies have been 
carried out in developing countries relating to issues of disclosure and the corporate 
attributes influencing it (Akhtaruddin 2005; Barako and Dulacha 2007; Dulacha 
2007). 
Published annual reports are required to provide various users such as 
shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, financial analysts, stockbrokers, 
management, and government agencies with timely and reliable information useful 
for making prudent, effective and efficient decisions (Barako, Hancock and Izan 
2006; Barako 2007).The extent and quality of disclosure within these published 
reports vary from company to company and also from country to country. Empirical 
evidence suggests that corporate governance disclosure benefits users of a firm’s 
accounting reports in a number of ways (Aktaruddin et al. 2009; Alam 1989; 
Brownlee 1990; Chau and Gray 2002; Eng and Mak 2003; Haniffa and Cooke 2002; 
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 Ho and Wong 2001; Hongxia and Qi 2008; Ibrahim, Haron and Ariffin 2000). For 
example, disclosure can control management’s opportunistic behaviour in reporting 
accounting measures used in a contract (Ahmed and Courtis 1999). Another benefit 
of disclosure is that accurate, relevant and reliable disclosures are seen as a way of 
enhancing corporate image, reducing the cost of capital, and improving marketability 
of shares (Chau and Gray 2002). Consequently, the value of the firm increases as a 
result of high-quality information disclosure and also  encourages management to 
appropriately account for their resources (Naser, Alkatib and Karbhari 2002). Thus, 
disclosure acts as a significant prompt to the growth and development of capital 
markets, which are fundamental to the smooth running of any economy. It is  
believed that successful performance of capital markets significantly depends on the 
effective flow of information between the company and its stakeholders (Meek, 
Roberts and Gray 1995). 
A number of study have focused on corporate disclosure and capital market 
development (Akhtaruddin 2005; Barako 2006; Bujaki and McConomy 2002; Buzby 
1975; Camfferman and Cooke 2002; Chau and Gray 2002; Chow and Wong-Boren 
1987; Cooke 1989, 1992; Depoers 2000; Eng and Mak 2003; Ferguson, Lam and Lee 
2002; Firth 1979; Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Ho and Wong 2001; Inchausti 1997; 
McNally, Eng and Hasseldin 1982; Naser, Alkatib and Karbhari 2002; Owusu-Ansah 
1998a; Singhvi and Desai 1971; Street and Gray 2001; Wallace and Naser 1995; 
Wallace, Naser and Mora 1994). In light of these corporate collapses, there is an 
increased appreciation of the significance of corporate transparency and disclosure. 
Information disclosure is seen as a means to improve the marketability of shares, to 
enhance corporate image, and to reduce the cost of capital (Meek, Roberts and Gray 
1995). Companies also make available information  in the view that such disclosure 
4 
 
 will not harm the company (Choi 1973). It is seen that a company discloses 
information in line with legislative frameworks (Alam 1989; Karim 1996). The study 
developed a comprehensive corporate governance disclosure score (CGDS) for firms 
operating in three countries at different stages of economic development: (1) an 
emerging economy (specifically Bangladesh), (2) a developing economy 
(specifically Malaysia), and (3) a developed economy (specifically Australia). 
Analysis is undertaken both cross-sectionally and over time for the period 2006-
2010; a five-year observation window transcending the GFC. Key predictor variables 
hypothesised to impact on the level of CGDS exhibited by firms in the 
aforementioned countries are formulated and regressed. 
The following sub-sections briefly discuss governance related features of the 
three markets (i.e., Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia) which are covered in the 
study; with in-depth discussions provided in Chapter Two. 
1.1.1 Bangladesh 
Bangladesh, a developing south-Asian country, is one such country in which 
corporate governance reforms have been enacted. The capital market in Bangladesh 
is at a premature stage and the corporate environment is characterized by a 
concentrated ownership structure, bank financing, a poor legal framework and lack 
of monitoring (Siddiqui 2010).2 The country has two stock exchanges: the Dhaka 
Stock Exchange (DSE) and the Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE). Although the 
DSE was established as far back as the early 1950s, the capital market in Bangladesh 
has not flourished in comparison with other South Asian countries (Siddiqui 2010). 
In terms of corporate governance regulations, Bangladesh has two major initiatives, 
2 In spite of having a regulatory framework underpinning corporate governance practices in Bangladesh, the current structure 
in Bangladesh does not provide sufficient legal, institutional, or economic motivations for stakeholders to either encourage 
or enforce effective corporate governance practices (Bhiuyan and Biswas 2007b; Hossain and Khan 2006a; Karim 1996c). 
As a result, the poor functioning of capital markets, opaque, unethical or illegal business practices (1) raise the cost of 
doing business within the economy; (2) distort domestic investment decisions; and (3) impede foreign investment in 
Bangladesh. 
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 the objective of which is to protect the investors, promote and develop capital 
markets, and regulate the securities market (Hossain, Hossain and Rahman 
2005).The first enacted legislation in Bangladesh was the 2004 Code of Corporate 
Governance for Bangladesh (CCGB). The CCGB regulations are mandatory for 
private sector firms, financial institutions, state owned enterprises and non-
governmental  organisation in Bangladesh (Taskforce on Corporate Governance 
2004). A number of key bodies contributed towards the formulation of the CCGB 
(for example, the Securities Exchange Commission of Bangladesh (SECBD), the 
Bangladesh Bank (BB), the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh 
(ICAB) and perhaps most importantly, the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) 
etc.).3 The second legislation enacted in Bangladesh occurred in 2006 when the 
SECBD (the corporate regulator) in Bangladesh issued an order recommending all 
publicly listed firms in Bangladesh comply with CG Guidelines issued by the 
SECBD. The CG Guidelines were issued on a ‘comply or explain’ basis providing 
publicly listed firms in Bangladesh with time to determine the suitability and related 
costs and benefits associated with such adoption. 
1.1.2 Malaysia 
Corporate governance is not a new concept in Malaysia. Following the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997, the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) was 
introduced in 2000 and, upon the renaming of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange in 
January 2001, became part of the Listing Rules of the now re-badged Bursa 
Securities Malaysia Berhad (BSMB).4 All publicly listed firms on the BSMB are 
encouraged to comply with the CG Guidelines issued by the MCCG. In fact, similar 
to firms in Bangladesh, the CG Guidelines were issued on a ‘comply or explain’ 
3 The BEI was the key entity at the forefront of the development and issuance of the CCGB in Bangladesh. 
4 The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange became a demutualized stock exchange in 2004 and was re-named Bursa Securities 
Malaysia Berhad. 
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 basis. There had been efforts to strengthen the aspects of good governance practices 
long before the Asian financial crisis in 1997; however, the efforts were done in a 
piecemeal  way (Abdul Rahman 2006). In 1998, the High Level Finance Committee 
formed by the Malaysian Securities Commission conducted a detailed study on 
corporate governance which subsequently led to the introduction of the Malaysian 
Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) to Malaysian listed companies in January 
2001.  
The market for corporate control is not widespread in Malaysia (Faccio, 
Masulis and McConnell 2006), thus the external corporate governance mechanism is 
largely dependent on regulatory bodies such as the Banking and Financial Institution 
Act, the Securities Commission Act, the Future Industry Act, the Company 
Commission of Malaysia and the Financial Reporting Act. An important feature in 
the Malaysia corporate governance landscape is the close links of large publicly-
listed firms with the government and politicians (Gomez and Jomo 1999). The 
relationship between big business and government often results in politically-linked 
firms having exclusive arrangements with state-owned firms and have preferential 
access to major government contracts and loans (Abdul-Wahab, How and Verhoeven 
2007; Gomez and Jomo 1999). The rise of these politically linked firms is the results 
of the country’s New Economic Policy Plan of 1970 designed to help native 
Malaysians. Malaysia has undergone a progression of important regulatory regime 
and governance changes since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Malaysian financial 
reporting practices were governed by a merit-based regulatory regime until 1997 
when the new reporting framework and disclosure-based regime were phased in. In 
addition, the Malaysian regulatory bodies initiated more corporate governance 
reforms emphasising enhanced transparency. 
7 
 
 1.1.3 Australia 
Australian firms are regulated pursuant to the Australian Corporations Act 2001 
(Corporations Act). Other relevant rules and regulations include the ASX Corporate 
Governance Council’s Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations, (Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council 
2007,), accounting standards which have the force of law and the Australian 
government’s Corporate Law Economic Reform  Programme 2004 (CLERP) and the 
Australian Stock Exchange Listing Rules. Pursuant to Section 769 of the 
Corporations Act, the ASX develops or adopts listing rules in the interests of the 
public thus making the ASX part of the regulatory regime within which listed firms 
disclose required financial information. The ASX prescribes the form and nature of 
corporate disclosures through listing rules and a continuous disclosure regime backed 
by the Corporations Act. Specifically, the ASX Corporate Governance Council 
developed industry-wide corporate governance guidelines for Australian listed 
companies in March 2003.5 These guidelines were one of the first regulatory 
attempts to restore investor confidence after a series of corporate failures in Australia 
and overseas (e.g. HIH Insurance, WorldCom).Whilst there is no single universally 
agreed upon model of what constitutes good corporate governance, the ASX 
Corporate Governance Council developed ten principles believed to constitute good 
corporate governance (ASX Corporate Governance Council 2003 ) 
In addition to the ten best practice corporate governance principles, the ASX 
Corporate Governance Council developed 28 supporting recommendations. The best 
practice recommendations cover corporate governance disclosures, director’s 
expertise, the link between executive pay and company results and whether the 
board’s performance is evaluated. The ASX recommendations serve as reference 
5 ASX Corporate Governance Council issued the revised version (i.e., second edition) of the corporate governance guidelines 
in 2007. 
8 
 
                                                          
 points on board and management accountability, and represent a major enhancement 
of corporate accountability and practice in Australia (Taylor et al. 2008). The 
recommendations are consistent with the objective of enhancing accountability, 
highlighting the Council’s drive for greater emphasis on financial reporting 
disclosure (ASX Corporate Governance Council 2003 ) 
However, as is the case for both Bangladesh and Malaysia, compliance with 
the ASX CGC’s Principles of Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations 2003 is encouraged but not mandatory. The following sub-
sections provide greater information on the institutional and economic details of each 
of the three countries examined, namely Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia so that 
there is a greater appreciation of how one country’s corporate governance can affect 
its stock market development. 
1.2 Institutional Background 
1.2.1 Bangladesh 
Bangladesh's economy has grown roughly 6% per year since 1996 despite its 
political instability, poor infrastructure, corruption, lagging economic reforms, and 
the global financial crisis and subsequent recession. Although more than half of its 
GDP is generated through the service sector, almost half of Bangladeshis are 
employed in the agricultural sector with rice as the single-most-important product. 
Garment exports, the backbone of Bangladesh’s industrial sector and 80% of total 
exports, surpassed $21 billion last year, 18% of GDP (Afroze, Sadia and Mossammat 
2005; Hossain, Salat and Al-Amin. 2005). The economy of Bangladesh is a rapidly 
developing market-based economy and its per capita income in 2010 was an 
estimated US$1,700 (adjusted by purchasing power parity (PPP)). According to the 
International Monetary Fund, Bangladesh ranked as the 43rd largest economy in the 
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 world in 2010 in PPP) terms and 57th largest in nominal terms, with a gross domestic 
product of US$269.3 billion in PPP terms and US$104.9 billion in nominal terms. 
The economy has grown at the rate of between 6% to 7% per annum over the past 
several years (Rouf 2012; World Bank 2009). 
Bangladesh aspires to become a middle-income country by 2021, and will 
need to increase its growth rate to 7% to 8% in an inclusive and sustainable manner 
to achieve this goal. Sustained economic growth and inwards investment have 
contributed to a gradual increase in the relative weighting of manufacturing in GDP 
and a decline in agriculture's weighting. However, Bangladesh remains a largely 
agricultural economy, with agriculture contributing around 20% of GDP and 
employing around 48.5% of the 54 million strong labor force. Bangladesh has a 
liberal foreign investment regime, offering opportunities in the energy, power, 
telecommunication and infrastructure sectors (Al-Amin. and Mohammad 2006 ; 
Anup and Shahnag 2013). Foreign direct investment inflows have risen steadily over 
the past five years; however weak infrastructure, skills shortages and the governance 
environment are constraining growth.  
1.2.2 Malaysia 
Malaysia, a middle-income country, has transformed itself since the 1970s 
from a producer of raw materials into an emerging multi-sector economy. Malaysia 
is attempting to achieve high-income status by 2020 and to move farther up the 
value-added production chain by attracting investments in Islamic finance, high 
technology industries, biotechnology, and services (Abdul-Wahab, How and P. 2007; 
Bursa Malaysia Berhad 2001; Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance; Wan 
Izyani Adilah and Zunaidah 2010). Nevertheless, Malaysia is vulnerable to a fall in 
commodity prices or a general slowdown in global economic activity because 
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 exports are a major component of GDP. Following a period of severe and prolonged 
recession, the Malaysian economy has returned to growth aided by a relaxation of 
monetary and fiscal policies and by increased export demand, particularly in the 
electronics sector. While the world economic slowdown was more severe than 
expected and the unprecedented September 11 events in the United States had 
widespread implications for all economies, Malaysia was able to insulate itself from 
a major economic contraction and GDP growth for the year remained positive. 
However, given the openness of its economy and trade accounting for about 200% of 
GDP, Malaysia was not spared from the negative effects of the United States 
economic slowdown. Nevertheless, the government’s initiation of strong monetary 
and fiscal policies to stimulate economic growth through accelerating domestic 
economic activities and reducing the over-dependence on exports helped the nation 
to sustain a positive real GDP growth (Best Practices in Corporate Disclosure 2004; 
High Level Finance Committee 2000; Shamser and Annuar 1993).  
The Malaysian economy is well placed to strengthen further in the near 
future. However, some risks need to be addressed as the strength of global recovery 
is still uncertain and external demand may not be as strong as it was during the 1999-
2000 period. The current economic upturn is taking place amidst global excess 
capacity, particularly in the information and communication technology sector. 
Malaysia, therefore, needs to ensure that the economic recovery gathers momentum 
and that the downside risks are minimized. Malaysia's economy is the third-largest in 
South-East Asia behind Indonesia and Thailand with real GDP growth in 2012 was 
5%, following growth in 2011 of 5% (Wan Izyani Adilah and Zunaidah 2010).  
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 1.2.3 Australia 
The Australian economy has experienced continuous growth and reflects low 
unemployment, contained inflation, very low public debt, and a strong and stable 
financial system. By 2012, Australia had experienced more than 20 years of 
continued economic growth, averaging 3.5% a year. Demand for resources and 
energy from Asia and especially China has grown rapidly, creating a channel for 
resources investments and growth in commodity exports. The high Australian dollar 
has hurt the local manufacturing sector, while the services sector is the largest part of 
the Australian economy, accounting for about 70% of GDP and 75% of jobs 
(Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) 2009; Psaros 2009). Australia was comparatively 
unaffected by the global financial crisis as the banking system has remained strong 
and inflation under control. Australia has benefited from a dramatic surge in its terms 
of trade in recent years, stemming from rising global commodity prices. Australia is 
also a significant exporter of natural resources, energy, and food. Australia's 
abundant and diverse natural resources attract high levels of foreign investment and 
include extensive reserves of coal, iron, copper, gold, natural gas, uranium, and 
renewable energy sources. A series of major investments, such as the US$40 billion 
Gorgon Liquid Natural Gas project, will significantly expand the resources sector 
(Collett and Hrasky 2005; McKinnon and Dalimunthe 1993; O’Sullivan, Percy and 
Stewart 2006).  
Australia is an open market with minimal restrictions on imports of goods 
and services. The process of opening up has increased productivity, stimulated 
growth, and made the economy more flexible and dynamic. Australia plays an active 
role in the World Trade Organization, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 
the G20, and other trade forums. Australia has bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) 
with Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand, and the US, has a regional 
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 FTA with ASEAN and New Zealand, is negotiating agreements with China, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, as well as with its Pacific neighbours 
and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries . Given Australia’s strong economic 
performance and its flow-on affects, its governance structures are well developed and 
in many areas, aspects of its corporate governance represent global best practice 
(Beekes and Brown 2006; Deegan and Gordon 1996; Taylor et al. 2011). 
Operational definitions of key words are provided below in Table 1.1 below. 
Table 1.1: Operational Definitions  
Corporate Governance Disclosure Corporate governance disclosure can be defined as 
the release of information by firms through their 
annual reports for traditional user groups such as, 
shareholders, creditors, and financial analyst groups, 
to provide information for investors, as investor 
found this information useful prior to making 
investment decision. 
Corporate Governance Characteristics Corporate governance characteristics refer to some 
specific characteristics of corporate governance 
mechanism that contributes towards an effective 
corporate governance structure. 
Firm- specific Characteristics Firm Characteristics refers to particular features of 
firms that differentiate one firm from another.  
Country-specific Characteristics  Country characteristics refer to some specific 
institutional, cultural, or legal attributes that 
distinguish one country from another. 
Big Four Audit Firms  Refer to the four largest audit firms in Bangladesh, 
Malaysia and Australia. 
International Financial Reporting 
Standard (IFRS)  
 
IFRS refer to a body of accounting and financial 
reporting standard promulgated by the International 
Accounting Standard Board (IASB); it includes 
standards and interpretations adopted by the IASB. 
Mandatory Disclosure Refers to the information companies are obliged to 
disclose by the country’s regulations. 
Voluntary Disclosure Refers to the discretionary release of information that 
is not prescribed by country’s regulation. 
Listed Company Refers to the companies that are listed in the stock 
exchange of Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia 
Annual Report An annual report is a comprehensive report on a 
company's activities throughout the preceding year. 
Annual reports are intended to give shareholders and 
other interested people information about the 
company's activities and financial performance. 
Disclosure Index Disclosure index measures the extent to which 
investors are protected through disclosing of 
information 
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 1.3 Objectives, Aims and Research Questions 
The objective of the study is to examine levels of both mandatory and 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure within annual reports by publicly listed 
firms in Bangladesh (an emerging economy), Malaysia (a developing economy) and 
Australia (a developed economy) with corporate governance recommendations 
endorsed in their respective countries. In addition, the study seeks to determine the 
key drivers that will influence the level of both mandatory and voluntary disclosures. 
The study focuses on three factors which influence the level of corporate governance 
disclosures: corporate governance characteristics; firm characteristics: and country-
specific characteristics.  
The capital market and economic development of a country can exert 
significant influence on the firm by imposing certain rules and regulations relating to 
the firm’s governance practices. Whilst the legal and regulatory structures are 
essential, economic development and, by association, capital markets with adequate 
transparency and accountability in place, can ultimately reward or punish firms for 
their governance practices (Drobetz, Schillhofer and Zimmermann 2004). A 
country’s economic parameters can therefore largely influence its governance role in 
mitigating the agency problems by disciplining management and consequently 
improving the firm’s overall governance and therefore performance. 
This thesis aims at providing empirical evidence on the disclosure practices 
of listed companies in Bangladesh (an emerging economy), Malaysia (a developing 
economy) and Australia (a developed economy) with corporate governance 
recommendations endorsed in their respective countries, specifically, the research 
objectives are to; (1) Empirically determine the extent of compliance publicly listed 
firms in Bangladesh (an emerging economy), Malaysia (a developing economy) and 
Australia (a developed economy); (2) Determine the factors influencing the extent of 
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 information disclosure in the annual reports of listed companies in Bangladesh, 
Malaysia and Australia. Consistent with the research objectives, the study will seek 
to answer the following research questions: 
RQ1: What is the relative extent of disclosure (as measured by the level of corporate 
governance voluntary and mandatory disclosures in annual reports) by publicly listed 
firms in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia with the corporate governance 
guidelines enacted in the respective countries? 
RQ2: What are the corporate governance-specific characteristics which influence the 
extent of voluntary and compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements by 
publicly listed firms in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia? 
RQ3: What are the firm-specific characteristics which influence the extent of 
voluntary and compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements by publicly listed 
firms in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia? 
RQ4: What are the country-specific characteristics which influence the extent of 
voluntary and compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements by publicly listed 
firms in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia? 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
The study is significant as it makes several contributions to the extant 
literature on corporate governance. First, the study provides a contemporaneous 
update of the extent of disclosures by firms in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia 
with the Corporate Governance Guidelines issued in their respective countries. The 
update reflects upon the progress in Bangladesh and Malaysia in terms of 
emerging/developing economies with sound corporate governance principles and 
processes. However, the corporate governance role of the capital is less likely to be 
effective in a developing economy. As Iskander and Chamlou (2000) observe, the 
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 capital markets in developing countries provide little incentive for better corporate 
governance primarily because of the dominance of a few large firms, low trading 
volumes and liquidity, absence of long-term debt instruments and inactivity of 
institutional shareholders. Moreover, the cause and effect relationship can work in 
the opposite direction e.g. the state of country as well as firm level corporate 
governance might have a significant influence on the development of the capital 
market. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that a firm is likely to get external finance 
not only because of the reputation of the capital market and excessive investor 
optimism, but also due to assurances provided by the corporate governance system. 
Second, the results will shed light on the determinants of disclosure of listed firms in 
the three aforementioned countries with their respective Corporate Governance 
Guidelines thereby providing important insights into the characteristics of firms 
either complying or not complying with their respective Corporate Governance 
Guidelines (after controlling for economic differences between the three countries). 
In addition, results also provide evidence concerning the existence, extent and 
variation of corporate governance practices across economic jurisdictions over time. 
Third, given that the study adopts a unique corporate governance disclosure score 
which differs from published studies utilising a composite dichotomous score, results 
will provide important methodological contributions to the corporate governance 
literature. Fourth, given that the study uses a richer dataset across three countries at 
different stages of economic development, results will have cross-country and cross-
economic contributions (and therefore, higher generalisability). Fifth, given that the 
study adopts institutional theory as the primary underpinning theoretical framework, 
results provide evidence about institutional theory’s relevance in influencing the 
extent of corporate disclosure. In the context of corporate governance disclosure it 
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 has been observed that corporate governance mandatory and voluntary disclosure are 
significantly associated with actual corporate governance and firm characteristics. 
The results indicate that companies with high governance quality are more likely to 
disclose more information. Given that results also suggest that all of the variables 
utilized in the study are significantly associated with corporate governance disclosure 
(both cross-sectionally and using panel data), this, in turn suggests regulators, 
investors and scholars can apply the results to scrutinize other significant corporate 
governance mechanism which may play a vital role in increasing the extent of 
disclosure. Overall, the aforementioned contributions of the study will therefore 
benefit other emerging economies, regulators, capital market participants, scholars, 
management, key stakeholders such as shareholders and debt holders and other 
existing key corporate governance mechanisms such as the board of directors, audit 
committees, internal audit function and the external audit attestation functions. 
1.5 Limitations of the Study 
While the study has a number of strengths, it is not without limitations. First, 
based on the nature of this research, data for the dependent, independent and control 
variables are collected from publicly available information, specifically annual 
reports. The annual report (content analysis) research entails a sample of companies 
listed in the stock exchange of Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. The companies 
are generated from non-financial sectors. It is conceivable that other (and perhaps 
better) measures for proxy usefulness exist within firms and that the proxies could be 
collected via interviews and questionnaires. Reliance on data from annual reports 
about the extent of disclosure also raises a question about the correctness and totality 
of the information disclosed by the authors of annual reports.  
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 Second, the study uses data only from public listed firms. Private firms are 
excluded from the sample. For the study listed firms are selected from the stock 
exchanges of Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. Therefore, the results of the study 
may not be generalisable to non-listed firms and to countries with different 
institutional settings. Third, as the observation window for the study spans 2006 to 
2010, the results may not be generalisable to periods prior to 2006 and post-2010.  
Fourth, for the purposes of the study, the sample firms will be the same for 
each of the calendar years examined. This advances a potential independence of 
samples issue (Hair et al. 1995). However, almost all of the past literature (in both 
accounting and finance fields) using firm-year observations for multivariate testing 
accept the fact that independence of samples may be of concern but that there is no 
other parsimonious way to undertake such panel analysis where changes in the 
selected firms’ results are of interest to the researcher/s. Firm year dummy variables 
are included to minimise this effect. While the limitations are acknowledged, the 
strength of the study and the potential importance of the findings are not diminished  
1.6 Thesis Outline 
Chapter One is to provides an overview of the study. Key research objectives 
and the significance of the study are presented. The concluding discussion of the 
chapter focuses on the limitations of the study. The remaining Chapters in this thesis 
are organised as follows. 
Chapter Two discusses the development of institutional backgrounds in 
Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. Chapter Three provides a detailed literature 
review on corporate governance disclosure. The regulatory framework and 
determinants of factors that influence the extent of corporate governance disclosure 
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 is provided in this chapter. An explanation of mandatory as well as voluntary 
disclosures within a corporate governance perspective is also summarised.  
Chapter Four details the theoretical framework used in the study. The chapter 
begins by outlining the theoretical framework of corporate governance and discusses 
two main underlying theories (that is, institutional theory and agency theory). A 
literature review of the proxies underlying corporate governance disclosure which 
provides the foundation for the development of the testable hypotheses of the study is 
also discussed. A conceptual schema is then developed.  
Chapter Five outlines the research methods adopted in the study. The sample 
collection and selection process the selection of time period and details of the 
primary research methodology utilised, namely the use of multiple regressions is 
outlined. In particular, measurement for dependent variables (mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure), independent variables (corporate governance characteristics, 
firm characteristics and country characteristics) and use of control variables are 
detailed.  
Chapter Six reports on the descriptive analysis of the data points, specifically, 
sample descriptive statistics such as mean, median, minimum, maximum and 
standard deviation etc. are provided. Chapter Six concludes with an initial analysis of 
the results. Chapter Seven provides the results of the regressions to determine the 
main predictors of both mandatory and voluntary corporate governance disclosures 
in the three countries. Additionally, the results of a One-Way ANOVA test are 
provided to determine if there are significant differences in the independent variables 
between Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. Chapter Eight, details the robustness 
and sensitivity tests. Specifically, the full sample of the study are partitioned by the 
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 variables found in Chapter Seven to have significant explanatory power in explaining 
the variation of either mandatory or voluntary corporate governance disclosure.  
Chapter Nine summarizes the key findings, implications, contributions and 
limitations of the study. Finally, the entire study and major findings are reviewed 
concluding with suggestions for future research directions. 
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 CHAPTER TWO 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 Overview of the Chapter 
Chapter One provided the background and motivation to this study. The key 
research questions, objectives and the significance of this study were identified 
followed by a discussion of the study’s limitations. 
This chapter provides the institutional background to the development of 
corporate governance frameworks in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. Section 
2.2 discusses the development of a regulatory framework in Bangladesh; Section 2.3 
provides an overview of the development of a corporate governance regulatory 
framework in Malaysia and finally Section 2.4 provides similar details of the 
Australian corporate governance regulatory framework. A summary of the chapter is 
then provided. 
2.2 Corporate Governance Initiatives in Bangladesh 
To understand the corporate environment in Bangladesh, an evaluation of the 
legal requirements concerning corporate entities is essential. The corporate legal 
environment in Bangladesh comprises certain ordinance, rules, laws and regulations. 
The following subsections provide these details. 
2.2.1 Corporate Governance Regulatory Framework in Bangladesh 
In Bangladesh, the enforcement of corporate and securities laws is generally 
shared by the Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC), the Dhaka 
Stock Exchange (DSE) regulations, the Companies Act 1994, professional 
accounting bodies and the judiciary. Figure 2.1 shows the corporate governance 
regulatory framework in Bangladesh. 
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 Figure 2.1: Corporate governance regulatory framework in Bangladesh 
2.2.2 Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission Act 1993 
In Bangladesh, companies were not statutorily required to report and disclose 
all the requisite information on corporate governance before the promulgation of the 
BSEC6 notification in February, 2006. After circulation of the BSEC 
notification, has become mandatory to report the status of corporate governance in 
line with set conditions imposed by BSEC as to compliance and to explain instances 
of noncompliance, by the listed companies in annual reports issued after February, 
2006. The BSEC regulates the securities market through the Securities and Exchange 
Ordinance of 1969 and the Securities and Exchange Rules of 1987. The BSEC play 
an important function in observing and ensuring the level of disclosure and 
compliance of listed companies. The Commission was founded in 1993 in line with 
the requirements of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969. The purposes of 
the Commission are to; (1) protect the interests of securities investment;(2) develop 
and maintain fair, transparent and efficient securities markets;  (3) ensure proper 
issuance of securities and compliance with securities laws. The BSEC has 
promulgated different orders and notification from time to time to ensure good 
7 The Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) was established on 8th June, 1993 as the regulator of the 
country’s capital market through enactment of the Securities and Exchange Commission Act 1993.  Through an 
amendment of the Securities and Exchange Commission Act 1993 on December 10, 2012, its name has been changed as 
Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission from the previous Securities and Exchange Commission.  
 
 
 
Comply or Explain 
 Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission Act 1993 
Voluntary Framework 
 Companies Act 1994 
 Dhaka Stock Exchange Listing Requirements 
 Code of Corporate Governance 
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 corporate governance practices in the listed publicly limited companies. The main 
aim of BSEC is to issue orders and notifications for complying with a number of 
governance codes.  
The BSEC also recommends penal provisions for non-compliance. This 
consists of excluding the auditor who carried out the non-complying audit from 
performing as an auditor for a listed company for a period of up to five years, and 
punishing the auditor and the company representative up to one thousand TK. for 
non-compliance with the specific provision under the CA. The BSEC also monitors 
and enforces compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements. The most 
important objective of checking company annual reports is to inspect whether listed 
companies are complying with regulatory frameworks. The BSEC has the authority 
to postpone companies or eliminate their listing rights if they do not meet the terms 
of the listing requirements. The authority to recompense the reporting body is also 
set, in the enforcement practice.  
The BSEC issued its “Corporate Governance Guidelines which sought to 
improve internal corporate governance by requiring listed firms in Bangladesh to 
comply with several governance conditions on the size, composition, and leadership 
of the board; employment of a chief financial officer (CFO), head of internal audit 
(HIA), and company secretary (CS); the establishment, size, composition, and 
activities of an audit committee (AC); and restrictions on the employment of 
statutory auditors in some activities (Securities and Exchange Commission 2006). 
According to the Guidelines, the board size should be between five and twenty 
members with at least one-tenth (a minimum of one) being an independent director; a 
clear division should exist between the roles of chairman and chief executive officer 
(CEO), with a clear definition of their respective roles; and listed companies in 
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 Bangladesh should appoint a CFO, a HIA and a CS and articulate their respective 
roles, responsibilities and duties (Securities and Exchange Commission 2006). In 
relation to board committees, the Corporate Governance Guidelines require the 
establishment of an audit committee to “assist the board of directors in ensuring that 
the financial statements reflect a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the 
company and in ensuring a good monitoring system within the business” (Securities 
and Exchange Commission 2006). In Bangladesh, a listed company’s audit 
committee should comprise three members with at least one independent director. 
The Guidelines require a professional qualification on the part of the Chairman of the 
audit committee but do not specify any similar requirement for the other committee 
members (Securities and Exchange Commission 2006). The Guidelines require the 
audit committee to play an important role in ensuring a sound corporate governance 
system within the firm. In addition to its regular reporting to the board, the audit 
committee is required to report immediately any findings of a conflict of interest, 
deficiency in internal control systems, suspected infringement of laws and 
regulations, and any other matter the committee considers appropriate (Securities and 
Exchange Commission 2006). The committee is also authorized to report its findings 
to the BSEC when the board fails to act upon the committee’s findings within a 
reasonable time (after reporting to the board three times or nine months from the date 
of first reporting to the board, whichever is earlier).  
In relation to internal control, the Corporate Governance Guidelines require 
the board to be responsible for implementing and monitoring an effective system of 
internal control. As such, the board needs to declare that the system of internal 
control is sound in design and has been effectively implemented and monitored 
(Securities and Exchange Commission 2006). To ensure independence of the 
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 external auditor(s), the Guidelines restrict listed companies from employing statutory 
auditors in a number of other capacities, such as appraisal or valuation services or 
providing fairness opinions, accounting information system design and 
implementation, or other accounting related services, broker-dealer services, 
actuarial services, and internal audit services (Securities and Exchange Commission 
2006). Also, the BSEC has prohibited the appointment of an auditor for more than 
three consecutive years (Condition (b) in BSEC 2002b). However, in exercise of the 
power conferred by Section 2CC of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969, 
companies listed in Bangladesh were required to meet certain further conditions in 
order to enhance corporate governance in the interest of investors and the capital 
market. 
The BSEC issued revised CG guidelines in 2012 along the other regulations 
and standards that the government and regulators put in place. The revised CG 
guidelines were issued in July 2012 provides greater transparency. The changes in 
2012 are detailed in Table 2.1 below. 
Table 2.1: Difference between CG guidelines 2012 and CG guidelines 2006 
CG Area CG Guidelines of 2012 CG Guidelines of 2006 
Board Effectiveness  Separation between the Chairman 
and CEO roles is required 
 Separation between the Chairman 
and CEO roles is proposed 
 At least one fifth independent 
directors (IDs)  
 At least one tenth independent 
directors (a minimum of one)  
 The definition of ID has been 
expanded by including additional 
criteria 
 Specific criteria for a director to 
be considered IDs 
 Specific qualification criteria for IDs  No qualification criteria for IDs 
 IDs need to be nominated by the 
Board of Directors (BOD) and 
approved by the shareholders at the 
Annual General Meeting (AGM)  
 IDs need to be appointed by the 
appointed directors 
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  The post of an ID cannot remain 
vacant for more than 90 days 
 No such requirement 
 Code of conduct for all board 
members and annual compliance 
with the same 
 No such requirement 
 The normal tenure of an ID is three 
years which can be extended for 
another one term only 
 No Such Requirement 
Audit Committee (AC) 
Affairs 
The AC Chairman shall be an ID Professional qualification 
requirement for the Chairman of 
the AC only 
Specific roles of AC have been 
identified 
No specific requirement for the 
independent AC member(s) to 
present in the AC meetings 
Professional qualification 
requirement for all members of the 
AC 
No specific requirement for the 
AC 
The Chairman of the AC must 
present at the AGM 
No such requirement 
The company secretary shall be the 
secretary of the AC 
No such requirement 
The AC must report any material 
finding to the SEC after expiry of six 
months from the date of its first 
reporting to the BOD or after 
reporting to the board three times, 
whichever is earlier 
The AC must report any material 
finding to the SEC after expiry of 
nine months from the date of its 
first reporting to the BOD or after 
reporting to the board three times, 
whichever is earlier 
Auditor 
Independence 
Neither any partner nor any 
employee of the external audit firm 
should hold any share of the client 
firm during the term of the audit 
assignment 
No Such Restriction 
Additional 
Statements 
by the BOD 
Industry outlook and possible future 
developments in the respective 
industry 
No such requirement 
Segment-wise or product-wise 
performance 
No such requirement 
Different risks facing the 
organization and related concerns 
No such requirement 
Discussion on the cost of goods sold, 
gross profit margin and net profit 
margin of the company 
No such requirement 
Discussion on continuity of any 
extra-ordinary gain or loss 
No such requirement 
A statement of all related party 
transactions including the basis of 
such transactions 
No such requirement 
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 Application of funds raised from 
public issues, rights issues or 
through other instruments 
No such requirement 
An explanation when the company's 
financial results deteriorates after 
major events such as the Initial 
public offering (IPO), Repeat Public 
Offerings (RPO), Rights Offer 
Reasons for significant deviation 
between quarterly financial 
performance and annual financial 
performance need to be discussed 
No such requirement  
 
Remuneration to the board members 
and Key operating and financial data 
of a minimum of last five years shall 
be summarized 
No such requirement 
 
Disclosure of the directors' 
biographical information including 
their expertise and positions held in 
different committees and 
directorship held in other 
organisations 
No such requirement 
 
Governance of the 
Subsidiary Company 
The board composition of the 
subsidiary company shall be the 
same as the holding company 
No such requirement 
 
The holding company shall appoint 
one of its IDs to be the director of 
the subsidiary company 
No such requirement 
 
The minutes of the subsidiary 
company's board meeting shall be 
placed to the board meeting of the 
holding company for review 
No such requirement 
 
The minutes of the board meeting of 
the holding company shall state that 
the board has reviewed the affairs of 
the subsidiary company 
No such requirement 
 The AC of the holding company 
shall review the financial statements 
of the subsidiary company including 
any investment made by the 
subsidiary. 
 
Certification by the CEO 
and CFO to the Board 
The financial statements do not 
contain any materially untrue 
statement or omit any material fact 
or any misleading statement  
No such requirement 
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  The statements present a true and 
fair view of the company's financial 
affairs and are in compliance with 
existing laws and accounting 
standards 
No such requirement 
Reporting and 
Compliance of CG 
The company shall obtain a 
certificate from a professional 
accountant or Chartered Secretary 
regarding compliance of conditions 
of CG guidelines 
No such requirement 
 The company shall send the 
compliance certificate along with the 
annual report to the shareholders on 
a yearly basis 
No such requirement 
Mode of 
Implementation 
Listed companies must comply with 
the guideline conditions and report 
their compliance statements in the 
annual reports, meaning that both 
compliance and reporting of 
compliance statement is mandatory 
Listed companies must disclose 
their compliance report in their 
annual reports 
mentioning the specific provisions 
they have complied with and the 
reasons for noncompliance with 
the remaining provisions 
Overall, the revised CG guidelines examine the changes made in the current 
guidelines from the one issued on 2006. It is found that a number of key changes are 
made in the guidelines, particularly in the areas of independent director requirement, 
board’s statements, CEO and CFO certification on financial statements, subsidiary 
company governance, and reporting and compliance of corporate governance. In 
doing so, the BSEC has been given the authority for regulating the capital market. 
The BSEC has the power to contact companies to obtain more information, to 
request explanations of accounting items and for other reasons such as an abnormal 
share price. The BSEC, in case of any default by a company, has the power to 
impose penalties. The BSEC also oversees the operating affairs of the stock 
exchanges in Bangladesh. For example, the stock exchanges are required to consult 
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 the BSEC before the appointment or removal of their CEOs. The BSEC also keeps a 
close eye on the daily affairs of the capital market.7 
2.2.3 Dhaka Stock Exchange  
The capital market in Bangladesh is at an early period of development and the 
corporate structure in Bangladesh is characterised by a concentrated ownership 
structure, bank financing, poor legal framework and a lack of monitoring (Siddiqui 
2010).8 The Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) is the main stock exchange of Bangladesh 
and regulates companies through its Listing Regulations of 1996. It was set up in 
1954 and is registered as a limited liability company. The DSE itself is regulated 
under the Securities and Exchange Commission Ordinance 1969, Securities and 
Exchange Commission Act and the Companies Act 1994. Stock exchange companies 
are obliged to release company records, details of business, summaries of top 
employees, information about directors, information on resources, changes in 
dividend capital, number and forms of shareholders, audited financial statements, 
consolidated reports, post-balance-sheet events, along with information about 
subsidiary companies. The DSE ensures ongoing disclosure as well as reporting 
requirement. Therefore, this Security Exchange Authority has an strong role in 
shaping the process of disclosure in company reports (Wallace and Naser 1995). In 
terms of corporate governance regulations, the purpose of the DSE is to safeguard 
the investors, encourage and build-up capital markets, and control the securities 
market (Hossain, Hossain and Rahman 2005).  
8 SEC being advised and financed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the SEC encouraged stock exchanges to reform 
the daily transaction system. The Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) introduced an automated, on-line, screen-based trading 
system like their Western counterparts in 1998. In 2004, the Central Depository System (CDS) for electronic settlement of 
share trading made its debut in the DSE. These reforms were to achieve transparency and enable rapid transactions.   
9  In spite of having a regulatory framework underpinning corporate governance practices in Bangladesh, the current 
structure in Bangladesh does not provide sufficient legal, institutional, or economic motivations for stakeholders to either 
encourage or enforce effective corporate governance practices (Bhiuyan and Biswas 2007b; Hossain and Khan 2006a; 
Karim 1996c). As a result, the poor functioning of capital markets, opaque, unethical or illegal business practices (1) raise 
the cost of doing business within the economy; (2) distort domestic investment decisions; and (3) impede foreign 
investment in Bangladesh. 
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 2.2.4 The Company Act 1994  
The Company Act 1994 plays a major role in corporate governance, which 
governs incorporated entities in Bangladesh. All domestic companies in Bangladesh 
are incorporated under this Act. It governs the relationship between shareholders and 
a company, audit systems, transparency, disclosure procedures and the jurisdiction of 
the courts in relation to companies. On 1st January 1995, the new Companies Act of 
1994 was introduced which implemented provisions for disclosure. It defined the 
rights of not only majority shareholders but also minority shareholders. The Act 
allowed shareholders to be present at meetings, employ and remove directors, and to 
obtain economic information as well as approve the financial statements yearly. It 
also designed a range of methods for shareholders to ensure these rights, the most 
important being the right to engage in litigation under Section 233 of the Act 
(Afroze, Sadia and Mossammat 2005). The report of the director in the annual report 
is organized under Section 184 of the Companies Act 1994, with various issues 
regarding the appointment, removal or vacation of directors addressed through 
Section 90 to 110 with issues relating to management and administration addressed 
through Section 77-89. 
The Act (1994) has some integral protection for shareholders, such as listed 
companies being required to file periodic proceeds with the registrar of joint stock 
companies (RJSC).9 If a firm is unable to do so, the directors and management of the 
defaulting company are exposed to a variety of consequences such as fines, or 
imprisonment. The Act has specific provisions for protecting the interest of minority 
shareholders. By law, the board of directors is also responsible to the shareholders 
for the overall affairs of the business (Companies Act, 1994, Schedule 1 Section 
104). According to Section 90(1) of the Companies Act 1994, every publicly limited 
10 The Registrar of Joint Stock Companies (RJSC) is responsible for registering companies under the Company Act 1994. 
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 company, and every private company that is a subsidiary of a publicly limited 
company, must have at least three directors representing the shareholders. 
Nevertheless, in reality, the membership of boards and overall accountability of these 
boards to general shareholders are dominated by family dynamics as expected from a 
traditional society (Weber, 1978). 
The Act (1994) also states that listed companies must hold at least one 
general meeting of its shareholders annually. Articles of association or holders of not 
less than 10% of the shares of a company are able to hold an extra-ordinary general 
meeting. In addition, the Act (1994) enforces certain responsibilities and rights 
requiring directors who are interested in any contract or arrangement entered into by 
or on behalf of the company to disclose their interest and, in some cases, to refrain 
from voting on any such decision. However, the penalty for non-compliance is a fine 
not exceeding Tk$5,000, a fine which cannot be considered a sufficient deterrent. 
The board of directors of the company is obliged to submit to shareholders a balance 
sheet together with the profit and loss account at every annual general meeting 
(AGM). The company’s auditors must audit the financial statements and the 
auditor’s report must also be attached. The board’s report must also be included and 
it should make available information regarding the company’s affairs, the amount the 
board proposes to keep in the balance sheet, the amount recommended to be paid out 
as a dividend and any material changes and commitments which may change the 
financial position of the company. 
The information that is required to be disclosed by a Bangladeshi company to 
its shareholders and to members of the public in accordance with the law is 
practically the only tool shareholders and investors have to assess the performance of 
a company and monitor the activities of the directors and management. A company’s 
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 auditors, as per the Companies Act, must be chartered accountants and are appointed 
at the AGM. The auditors should have access to all books and papers whether kept at 
the registered office or elsewhere. The scope of inquiry of the auditors has been 
elaborately spelt out in the Companies Act as well as the nature of the certification 
the auditors must provide. An auditor must specifically state whether, in his opinion 
and to the best of his information and according to the explanation given to him, the 
accounts provide a true and fair view of the company’s affairs. 
The above discussion suggests that, in Bangladesh, the development of the 
corporate governance initiatives is influenced by a number of domestic bodies. Like 
many countries, Bangladesh has adopted International Accounting Standards (IAS) 
and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The local name of IAS is 
Bangladesh Accounting Standards (BAS) and IFRS is Bangladesh Financial 
Reporting Standards (BFRS). As of 15 December 2011, Bangladesh has adopted 28 
IASs and 8 IFRSs (ICAB 2011). Under the Securities and Exchange Rules 1987, the 
financial statements of listed company shall be prepared in accordance with the 
requirements laid down in the Schedule and the International Accounting Standards 
as adopted by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh [Rule 12(2)] 
(Hossain 2000).  
2.2.5 The Code of Corporate Governance for Bangladesh 2004 
In August 2003, Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) invited a number of 
prominent individuals from the private sector, the government, NGOs and other 
relevant bodies to begin the process of formulating a Code of Corporate Governance 
for Bangladesh (CCGB). The CCGB regulations are voluntary for listed companies 
in Bangladesh (Taskforce on Corporate Governance 2004). A number of key bodies 
contributed towards the formulation of the CCGB (for example, the Bangladesh 
32 
 
 Securities Exchange Commission of Bangladesh (BSEC), the Bangladesh Bank 
(BB), the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB) and perhaps 
most importantly, the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) etc.).10 
Convening this Taskforce on Corporate Governance was an outcome of 
BEI’s ongoing research and advocacy work on strengthening corporate governance 
in Bangladesh. Members of the Taskforce provided important guidance and direction 
to the development of the Code. The Code of Corporate Governance, therefore, set 
down the principles, procedures and process through which better corporate 
governance practices may progressively be introduced. As such, the Code is 
organized into Principles and Guidelines. Companies can set up better corporate 
governance practices by first acknowledging the Principles of Corporate Governance 
and then by integrating them into their own business strategies. Many of the best 
companies in Bangladesh already have practices and procedures in line with the 
provisions of the Code. However, the Code is also a mechanism to disseminate these 
best practices to all companies nationwide. Moreover, the best corporate governance 
practices (as enshrined in the Code), are likely to improve overall accountability and 
performance throughout the public sector as implementation signifies full 
compliance by listed companies. 
The Code is organized into sections on specific topics. Within each section, 
the Code sets out a number of principles and guidelines. Each principle explains the 
underlying value of corporate governance practices. These Principles of Corporate 
Governance may be applied in different organization by various different methods. 
Thus, while the Guidelines suggest specific methods for application, the Code as a 
whole allows for each organization to apply the principles in their own way. 
Organizations solely implementing the Corporate Governance Principles by their 
11 The BEI was the key entity at the forefront of the development and issuance of the CCGB in Bangladesh. 
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 own method, nevertheless, should provide explanations to shareholders and the 
public as to how exactly these are applied in their practices, policies, regulations and 
procedures. To fully comply with the Code, however, organizations should comply 
with both the principles and guidelines. 
The Code recently focused on corporate governance and monitoring 
mechanisms like the composition of the board of  directors, the duties and 
responsibilities of the executive directors, regular monitoring by shareholders, voting 
rights of shareholders, reporting and auditing and detailed disclosure of company 
information that are material for decision making by interested parties. Shareholders 
should have the right to participate in, and to be sufficiently informed on decisions 
concerning fundamental corporate changes. The equitable treatment of all 
shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders should be ensured in 
corporate governance mechanisms. Stakeholders, including individual employees 
and their representative bodies, should be able to freely communicate their concerns 
about illegal and unethical practices to the board and their rights should not be 
compromised as a result. Another important responsibility of corporate governance is 
timely and accurate disclosure of all matters regarding the corporation. Information 
should be prepared and disclosed in accordance with high quality standards of 
accounting, financial and non-financial disclosures. Board members should act on an 
informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence and care, and in the best interest of 
the organization and shareholders. 
Part 1 of the Code identified a set of principles to assist companies to inform 
their approach for corporate governance. Principles 1-9 address board of director’s 
issues. According to the Code of Corporate Governance, the boards of directors are 
the central entity in a functioning corporate governance system since it is the 
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 governing body of any organization. Management is accountable to the board, and 
therefore information systems that provide relevant, transparent, and material 
information to the board are imperative (The Code of Corporate Governance for 
Bangladesh, Mar 2004, BEI). Duties of the board are articulated in Principal 2. 
According to the Code, the board of directors should define its role and 
responsibilities adequately and completely. Principle 3 required board of directors to 
be qualified to carry out their duties and according to Principle 4, before nominating 
new directors, the board and shareholders should consider the mix of director 
characteristics, experience, diverse perspectives and skills that is most suitable for 
the organization. Principle 5 identified directorship as a professional appointment 
and indicated that directors should be provided with opportunities and funds for 
training and development. In Principal 6, the Code stated that the position of the 
chairman of the board and CEO should be occupied by different individuals. In 
Principal 7, the board size should be optimal considering diverse expertise and 
experience and the board should periodically review its size and composition. The 
companies listed in Bangladesh should comply with these conditions or explain the 
reasons for non-compliance. However, the CCG also emphasizes the importance of 
independent directors on the board. All companies should encourage effective 
representation of independent directors on their board so that the board, as a whole, 
includes core competencies considered relevant in the context of each company. 
Principle 8 and 9 addressed issues related to board compensation and board meeting 
agenda. In Principle 10, the type, structure and responsibility of the committees are 
also addressed.  
In conclusion, a good corporate governance mechanism undoubtedly 
contributes towards increased transparency and disclosure (Akthtaruddin and Haron 
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 2010). In the case of Bangladesh, there are some pioneer bodies working to ensure 
better corporate governance disclosure in the country(Mazumder and Abul 2006). 
The state and nature of corporate governance in Bangladesh are guided by several 
factors and the effective impact of these factors results in good corporate governance 
practices. 
2.3 Corporate Governance Initiatives in Malaysia 
Corporate governance is not a new concept in Malaysia. Following the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997, a number of steps have been taken by the government to 
reform the corporate sector in Malaysia. Since 1998, the government and private 
sectors have chosen to improve corporate law in order to improve the quality of 
corporate governance in the country. 
2.3.1 Corporate Governance Regulatory Framework in Malaysia 
In 1999, under the Ministry of Finance, a high level financial committee on 
corporate governance was formed. The committee was responsible for reviewing the 
corporate framework and make recommendations to improve the level of corporate 
governance in the country. The committee pointed out that there were severe 
corporate limitations especially in the following areas; transparency and disclosure 
requirements, corporate monitoring responsibilities, and accountability of the 
company directors including the rights of minority shareholders (Das 2000). The 
government of Malaysia and the regulatory bodies have promulgated different 
reforms and notifications to existing laws to ensure good corporate governance 
practices by the listed publicly limited companies. These includes the Securities 
Commission Act 1993 (SCA), Securities Commission (Amended) Act 2000, 
Securities Industry Act 1983 (SIA), Securities Industry (Compliance with Approved 
Accounting Standards) Regulations 1999, The Malaysian Code on Take-over’s and 
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 Merges 1998, and Companies (Amendment) Act 2007 (Tie 2003). Figure 2.2 shows 
corporate governance regulatory framework in Malaysia. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Malaysian corporate Governance Framework 
A notable feature in the Malaysian Corporate governance landscape is the 
close links of large publicly-listed firms with the government and politicians (Gomez 
and Jomo 1999). The relationship between big business and government often results 
in politically-linked firms having exclusive arrangements with state-owned firms and 
have preferential access to major government contacts and loans (Abdul-Wahab, 
How and Verhoeven 2007; Gomez and Jomo 1999). The rise of these politically 
linked firms is the results of the country’s New Economic Policy Plan of 1970 
designed to help indigenous Malaysians. 
2.3.2 The Companies Act 1965  
The Companies Act (CA) 1965 also plays a major role in ensuring better 
corporate governance for Malaysia. The CA 1965 is basically designed on the United 
Kingdom (UK) Companies Act 1948 and the Australian Uniformed Companies Act 
1961. The major feature of CA 1965 includes details on; pre-incorporation, 
incorporation, operation and duties of companies and their directors, the rights and 
obligations of shareholders and directors. The CA 1965 also regulates the registration 
of companies under the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs. 
Mandatory Framework 
 Securities law 
 Companies Law 1965 
 Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements 
Comply or Explain 
 Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance. 
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 The CA 1965 sets the legal foundation on which companies are shaped, 
activated and administered. It also sets the rules on how directors and shareholders 
can put into effect their rights as well as how their authority should be accounted. 
Since its enactment in 1965, the CA 1965 has been restructured through 35 
amendments, the most recent being the Companies (Amendment) Act 2007. 
In general, the Companies (Amendment) Act 2007 effective 15 August 2007, 
made considerable amendments to the corporate governance framework. In relation 
to the board of directors, the Companies (Amendment) Act 2007 introduced amongst 
others, the business judgment rule in which interested directors were not permitted to 
participate or vote. Furthermore, amendments were made to the disclosure of 
interests in contracts and the functions and powers of the board have been 
strengthened. 
2.3.3 The Securities Industry Act 1983 
The Securities Industry Act (SIA) 1983 and the Securities Commission Act 
1983 (SCA) also play a key role in ensuring better corporate governance practices in 
Malaysia under the authority of the Ministry of Finance. The SIA 1983 and SCA 
1983 include certain provisions such as protecting shareholder rights, disclosing 
substantial shareholding to the company and to the Stock Exchange of Malaysia, 
protecting investor’s interests, regulating the operations of dealers, and prohibiting 
artificial trading and market chains. As a result of the effective actions of the SIA 
1983 and SCA 1983, the Malaysian legal and regulatory frameworks are well 
defined.  
Malaysian securities laws view the disclosure or dissemination of information 
which is false, misleading or deceptive, or from which there is a material omission as 
illegal. Individuals are also forbidden from engaging in, and aiding or assisting 
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 conduct which they know to be misleading or deceptive, or likely to mislead or 
deceive, in association with the matter, offer or sale of securities in Malaysia. Those 
convicted of such offences may be subject to fines, imprisonment or both (Bursa 
Malaysia Berhad 2001). 
However, the securities laws were amended in 2007 and under the amended 
laws, CEOs and directors of publicly listed companies are required to disclose their 
interests in the company or any associated company to the Securities Commission. A 
person who fails to make this disclosure commits an offence and is liable on 
conviction to a fine of one million ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 10 years or both.11 The Commission has the authority to submit an 
application to court for exclusion of chief executives and directors of listed 
companies where they have been convicted of offences under securities laws for 
breach of listing rules or civil action for breach of the insider trading or market 
manipulation provision (Bursa Malaysia Berhad 2001). 
2.3.4 Bursa Securities Malaysia Berhad  
The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange was renamed Bursa Securities Malaysia 
Berhad (BSMB) in January 2001. Bursa Securities Malaysia Berhad (BSMB) listing 
requirements have also played a major role in efforts to enhance corporate 
governance in Malaysia. For example, Chapter 15 addresses issues of corporate 
governance and one of the major requirements is that a listed company must ensure 
that its board of directors discloses the level of compliance and explains any 
deviation from the MCCG’s recommendations in its annual report (Bursa Malaysia 
Berhad 2001). These revised listing requirements became effective in 30 June 2001 
making reporting against the MCCG requirements mandatory. In July 2004, BSMB 
12 A similar provision may be found in section 135 Companies Act 1965 except that the disclosure is to be made to the 
company for purposes of the register of director’s shareholding under section 134 Companies Act 1965. Also the penalty 
for failure to comply is considerably lighter – Imprisonment for three years or a fine of fifteen thousand ringgit. 
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 launched the Best Practices in Corporate Disclosure (BPCD) with the aim of raising 
the standards of corporate governance amongst Malaysian companies. All the listed 
companies in Malaysia are required to disclose their financial status, shareholders 
structure and loan position on a quarterly basis and a company’s manager is subject 
to penalty or imprisonment if that person fails to comply with the rules.  
In Malaysia, listed companies are required to comply with the listing 
requirements of BSMB and the BSMB conducts front line monitoring of publicly 
listed companies through monitoring their announcements, market trading policy, the 
media in general and an internal review of documents furnished (World Bank 2005). 
With respect to the disclosure and requirements, a publicly listed company (PLC) is 
required to publish quarterly financial statements within two months after its month-
end and its annual audited accounts, auditors and directors reports within four 
months from the close of each financial year including its balance sheet, income 
statement and explanatory notes. The annual report will disclose the PLC’s financial 
performance, financial position as well as its cash flows. Under the continuous 
disclosure requirements, listed companies must release the information to the public 
to ensure investor confidence. Non-compliance with the listing requirements may 
result in listed companies, their directors, and officers incurring penalties under the 
Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements (BMLR) and Securities Industry Act (SIA) 
1983 requirements. A number of actions and penalties can be undertaken by the 
BSMB for breach of these rules. These include the issuance of caution letters, 
reprimands, fines (not more than MYR$1 million), directions for rectification, 
imposition of conditions for compliance, non-acceptance of applications or 
submission, mandated education or training programmes for directors and 
management, suspension of trading and de-listing (Bursa Malaysia Berhad 2001).  
40 
 
 The BSMB launched the Best Practices in Corporate Disclosure (BPCD) in July 
2004 with the aim to enhance the standards of corporate governance for Malaysian 
publicly listed companies. A set of guidelines were introduced through BPCD to help 
publicly listed companies comply with the required level of disclosure so that listed 
companies could improve their disclosure. Compliance with the BPCD is voluntary 
however, BSMB strongly recommended that companies adopt these BPCD and apply 
them into their own disclosure practices, policies and procedures. The intentions of 
the BPCD are to aid in building and maintaining corporate credibility and investor’s 
confidence in Malaysia’s capital markets (Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad (BMSB) 
2006). Under the BSMB listings requirements, all listed companies are required to 
disclose to the public all factual information that is essential for knowledgeable 
investing. In this regard, reasonable steps should be taken to ensure that everyone 
who invests their securities has equal access to information. Under the BSMB 
listings requirements, disclosure may temporarily be withheld in some special 
circumstances and these include the following: 
• where instant disclosure would prejudice the company’s capability to pursue 
its corporate objectives; 
• where the facts are subject to rapid changes; and 
• where company or the securities laws limit the level of acceptable disclosure 
before or during a public offering of securities or a solicitation of proxies. 
The ongoing disclosure obligations must be observed by all listed companies 
unless they have been specifically exempted from doing so. A breach may expose the 
company or its director and officers to penalties under the listing requirements and 
the Securities Industry Act, including: 
• A fine not more than RM 1 million; 
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 • Postponement of trading of the company’s securities; 
• Delisting of its securities. 
In addition, Bursa Malaysia’s Listing Requirements were amended in 2007 with 
an objective to raise the corporate governance standards amongst listed issuers and 
enhance investor confidence. The key amendments were:  
• Requiring all audit committee members to be non-executive directors  
• Mandating the internal audit function in listed issuers and requiring the 
internal audit function of listed issuers to report directly to the audit 
Committee  
• Enhancing disclosure in the annual reports of listed issuers to include 
information pertaining to the internal audit function  
• Expanding the functions of the audit committee to include the review of the 
adequacy of the competency of the internal audit function  
• Setting out the rights of audit committee to convene meetings with external 
auditors, internal auditors or both, excluding the attendance of other directors 
and employees of the listed issuer  
• Clarifying that Bursa Securities may “approve” such other requirements 
relating to the financial-related qualifications or experience that must be 
fulfilled by at least one audit committee member and the signatory to the 
statutory declaration in relation to the accounts  
• Requiring listed issuers to submit a copy of written representation or 
submission of external auditors’ resignation to Bursa Securities as provided 
under section 172A of the Companies Act 1965. 
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 2.3.5 Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance and the Minority 
Shareholders Watchdog Group 
The development of corporate governance in Malaysia is also supported by 
the Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG)12 and the Minority 
Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG).13 The MICG was established in March 
1998 by the High Level Finance Committee of Corporate Governance. The objective 
was to raising awareness and practice of good corporate governance. In August 2000, 
the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group was established to encourage the 
company to comply with the principles of corporate governance and the appropriate 
method to enforce their rights. Members of this committee were from the 
government fund institution such as Employees Fund Authority (EFA), Armed 
Forces Fund Authority (LTAT), Pilgrims Fund Board (LUTH), Social Security 
Organization (SOSCO), and Permodalan National Berhad (PNB) (Yusof 2000). 
2.3.6 The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2000 
The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) was introduced in 
2000, which included principles and best practices in corporate governance. The 
main aim of the MCCG was to encourage transparency and disclosure by providing 
relevant information to the investors to enable them to influence the company’s 
direction. It is also a guideline for board of directors on how to discharge the their 
rights and responsibilities (Jaggi and Low 2000). The MCCG principles for corporate 
governance consist of four main parts including; board of directors, director’s 
remuneration, shareholders, and audit and accountability. All publicly listed firms on 
13 The MICG was established under the Company’s Act 1965 in March 1998. The principle members of the MICG were the 
federation of public listed companies (FPLC), Malaysian Institute of Directors (MID), Malaysian Institute of Accountants 
(MIC), Malaysian Institute of Certified Public Accountants (MICPA), and Malaysian Association of the Institute Chartered 
Secretaries and Administrators (MAICSAI). The objective of the MICG is to improve corporate governance system in 
Malaysia and also encourage awareness of corporate governance principles among different stakeholder group and increase 
shareholder value on an ongoing process.  
14  In 2009, 185 of general meetings of public listed companies were supervised by the MSWG. The main aim was to focus on 
corporate governance issues analysis listed companies’ financial performance. The four main services of MSWG include: 
proxy advisory service, proxy voting service, writing issues related to corporate governance matters, and value added 
service which are delivered for the benefit of minority shareholders.  
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 the BSMB are encouraged to comply with the corporate governance guidelines 
issued by the MCCG. In fact, similar to firms in Bangladesh, they were issued on a 
‘comply or explain’ basis. The MCCG sets out principles and best practice on 
structures and processes in order to achieve the governance framework. However, the 
listing requirements of the Bursa Securities Malaysia Berhad (BSMB) have been 
amended in line with the MCCG as listed companies have to disclose in their annual 
reports the extent to which they have complied or provide an explanation for non-
compliance. Non-compliance with the listing requirements could expose listed 
companies, their directors, and/or officers to penalties under the listing requirements 
or the Securities Industry Act 1983.  
MCCG consists of three parts; 13 principles in Part 1 outlining the four 
factors that the listed companies are required to disclose in their annual reports. 
These four elements indicate whether the companies have good corporate 
governance mechanisms in place. The four elements are: (i) directors, (ii) directors’ 
remuneration, (iii) shareholders, and (iv) accountability and audit. Along with the 
items to be disclosed are the size of the board, remuneration of the board and the 
internal control systems in place. The 13 principles of the Code are also mirrored by 
the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements. Paragraph 15.25(a) and Paragraph 
15.25(b) also articulates the extent of compliance with the 33 Best Practices of the 
Code. The objective of the principles is to provide companies with flexibility in 
applying the principles according to their varying circumstances. 
The MCCG was revised in 2008 along the other regulations and standards 
that the government and regulators put in place. The revised MCCG as amended in 
October 2007 provides greater transparency. The changes in 2008 are detailed in 
Table 2.2 below  
44 
 
 Table 2.2: Principal differences between MCCG 2000 and MCCG 2007 
Corporate Governance 
Matters 
MCCG 2000 MCCG 2008 
Task of nominating 
committee 
The board should implement a 
process, to be carried out by the 
nominating committee annually 
for assessing the effectiveness of 
the board as a whole, the 
committees of the board and for 
assessing the contribution of each 
individual director.  
The revised Code places 
importance on the process carried 
out by the nominating committee 
in evaluating members of the 
board, including the independent 
non-executive directors and chief 
executive officer. 
Appointments of the 
board 
The board of every company 
should appoint a committee of 
directors composed exclusively of 
non-executive directors, a majority 
of whom are independent, with the 
responsibility for proposing new 
nominees to the board and for 
assessing directors on an ongoing 
basis. The Code does not specify 
the qualification of appointed 
board directors.  
MCCG 2008; specify the 
qualification of appointed board 
directors. In the revised Code the 
nomination committee should 
consider the candidates’ skills, 
knowledge, expertise, and 
experience; professionalism and 
integrity. The nominating 
committee should also evaluate 
non-executive independent 
directors’ ability to discharge such 
responsibilities. 
Board structures and 
procedures 
The board should meet regularly, 
with due notice of issues to be 
discussed and should record its 
conclusion in discharging its duties 
and responsibilities. The board 
should disclose the number of 
board meetings in a year and the 
details of attendance of each 
individual director.  
The revised Code requires the 
board of directors to properly 
record not only decisions made but 
also all the issues discussed in 
arriving at the decisions. This 
serves to provide a historical 
record and insight into those 
decisions. The Code is amended 
by putting greater disclosure in 
term of the issues discussed in the 
board’s meeting. 
Members of audit 
committee 
The board should establish an 
audit committee of at least three 
directors, a majority of whom are 
independent, with written terms of 
reference which deal clearly with 
its authority and duties. The 
chairman of the audit committee 
should be an independent non-
executive director.  
The revised Code requires the   
members of audit committee 
should be able to read, analyse and 
interpret financial statements that 
they will be able to effectively 
discharge their functions. Audit 
committee must comprise of non-
executive directors, with majority 
independent. This increases the 
frequency of meetings from at 
least once a year or at least twice 
per financial year among the audit 
committee and the external auditor 
excluding the presence of 
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 executive directors.  
Number of meetings with 
external auditors 
The finance director, the head of 
internal audit (where such a 
function exits) and a representative 
of the external auditors shall 
normally attend meetings. Other 
board members may attend upon 
the invitation of the audit 
committee. However, at least once 
a year the committee should meet 
with the external auditors without 
executive board members present. 
MCCG 2008 increased the number 
of meetings from once a year to 
twice a year.  
Continuous engagement 
between chairman of audit 
committee, senior 
management and external 
auditors 
The audit committee should meet 
regularly, with due notice of issues 
to be discussed and should record 
its conclusion in discharging its 
duties and responsibilities.  
The revised Code requires 
continuous engagement between 
the chairman of the audit 
committee and senior management 
of the company as well as the 
external and the internal auditor. 
The objective is to bring relevant 
issue to the attention of the audit 
committee in a timely manner. 
Director’s training The board should disclose in an 
informative way, details of the 
activities of audit committees, the 
number of audit meetings held in a 
year and details of attendance of 
each individual director in respect 
of meetings.  
The revised Code requires that the 
disclosure should also include 
details of relevant training 
attended by each director. 
Internal audit function MCCG 2000 highlights the role of 
internal audit if such function 
exists; the companies have to 
disclose other means of reviewing 
and/or appraisal of the 
effectiveness of the system of 
internal controls within the 
company. 
It is required for the company to 
establish an internal audit function 
and identify a head of internal 
audit who reports directly to the 
audit committee. The head of 
internal audit will be responsible 
for the regular review and/or 
appraisal of the effectiveness of 
the risk management, internal 
control, and governance processes 
within the company. 
The above table indicates that the review of the Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance in 2008 promotes the importance of five main areas which are expertise, 
communication, independency, disclosure and the role of internal audit. Malaysia has 
adopted an effective corporate governance mechanism with an aim to build a strong 
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 corporate environment. In conclusion, the corporate governance regulatory 
framework in Malaysia has improved in recent years. A number of laws, rules, and 
regulations have been introduced for listed companies over the past decade to 
enhance a good corporate regulatory regime. The main objective was to build a 
strong capital market and provide listed companies with direction. Due to the 1997 
Asian economic crisis there was a need to improve the quality of corporate 
governance standards in Malaysia. As a result a number of changes have been made 
with an aim to support more responsible, and transparent management in line with 
international best practice.  
2.4 Corporate Governance Initiatives in Australia 
The corporate governance regulatory framework in Australia consists of 
legislation, Australian Securities Exchange Listing Rules (ASX), accounting 
standards which have the force of law and Australian Stock Exchange Corporate 
Governance Council.  
2.4.1 Corporate Governance Regulatory Framework in Australia 
The aim of Australia’s corporate governance regulatory framework is to 
ensure greater disclosure, accountability of directors and involvement of 
shareholders. The framework is based on a mix of regulations, ‘comply or explain’ 
guidelines issued by the ASX Corporate Governance Council and advisory 
guidelines as shown in Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3: The regulatory and governance framework in Australia 
2.4.2 Australian Securities Exchange Listing Rules 
In Australia, disclosure requirements have developed through the ASX listing 
rules. Under ASX listing rule 4.10.4, all listed companies in Australia are required to 
disclose in its annual report, the central corporate governance practices the company 
has in place for the year. ASX listing rules also require listed companies to state in 
their annual reports whether they have an audit committee. In addition, the ASX 
listing rules requires companies to immediately disclose specific information to the 
market. In particular, listing rule 3.1 requires that: 
3.1 Once an entity is, or becomes, aware of any information of concern that a 
reasonable person would expect to have a material effect on the price or value of the 
entity’s securities, the entity must immediately tell ASX. The rule does not apply to 
particular information in the event of the following: 
3.1.1 A reasonable person would not expect the information to be disclosed. 
3.1.2 The information is confidential. 
In this regard, the ASX may suspend a company’s securities quotation or 
remove the company from the official list if it does not comply with or breaks a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comply or Explain 
Australian Stock Exchange Listing Rules 
 Corporation Act 
 
Australian Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Council’s 
Principles  
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 listing rule. The ASX may also suspend the listed company if the information is 
likely to affect the value or price of the company’s security. 
Furthermore, if the ASX believes that a person has committed, or is about to 
commit a serious breach of the listing rules or the corporation laws, it is under an 
obligation to lodge a statement with the Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (ASIC) providing particulars of the matters. More generally, where 
listed companies provide information to the ASX and the ASX make the information 
available to the market, the ASX is also under an obligation to provide the 
information to ASIC as soon as possible. 
2.4.3 Australian Corporations Act 2001 
Australian firms are regulated pursuant to the Australian Corporations Act 
2001 (Corporations Act). The Corporations Act is the principal legislation regulating 
companies. The Act is broader in its coverage and includes the framework 
surrounding the information of companies as well as duties of the directors. The 
Corporations Act 2001 also requires companies to prepare their annual financial 
report in accordance with applicable accounting standards. Sanctions for breaches of 
the Corporation Act involve fines and, in some cases, imprisonment. The provisions 
in the Corporation Act relating to disclosure have strengthened over time and in 
particular, disclosure requirements have increased to develop transparency and 
accountability.  
The Corporation Act also provided shareholders with the authority to elect 
directors. For example, under Section 203D, directors may be removed by an 
ordinary resolution of the company and this resolution needs to be passed by a five 
percent vote of the shareholders in the AGM or one hundred shareholders under 
Section 249N. The Corporations Act provides a statutory basis for the formation of 
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 private and public companies, corporate regulation and the regulation of the 
securities and futures industries. Although the Australian Constitution provides that 
the states have jurisdiction over corporations, the states and territories have formally 
transferred their powers on firms and their securities to the Commonwealth. These 
arrangements are supported by the intergovernmental Corporations Agreement 2002. 
The agreement requires consultation with the states and territories and, in some 
cases, voting on amendments to the Corporations Act and related legislation (through 
the Ministerial Council for Corporations). The coverage of the Corporations Act is 
wide ranging, including: 
• Registration of companies 
• Membership and internal management (including the duties of directors) 
• Financial reporting and disclosure 
• Takeovers 
• Fundraising  
• Financial services and markets. 
These provisions apply in differing degrees to private and public companies 
and to some partnerships and managed investment schemes. In relation to executive 
remuneration, the role and composition of boards and termination benefits are 
regulated. For listed companies, the Corporations Act regulates disclosure through 
the remuneration report and voting on remuneration. With respect to executive 
remuneration, the Corporations Act has provisions relating to the role, 
responsibilities and structure of boards; termination payments; disclosure (through 
the remuneration report) and voting on remuneration. The Corporations Act also 
requires companies to prepare their annual financial report, including the 
remuneration report, in accordance with the applicable accounting standards. 
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 2.4.4 ASX Corporate Governance Council’s Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance and Best Practice Recommendations 
Other relevant rules and regulations include the ASX Corporate Governance 
Council’s Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations (ASX Corporate Governance Council 2003 ), accounting 
standards which have the force of law and the Australian Government’s Corporate 
Law Economic Reform Programme (CLERP) and the Australian Stock Exchange 
Listing Rules. Pursuant to Section 769 of the Corporations Act, the ASX develops or 
adopts listing rules in the interests of the public thus making the ASX part of the 
regulatory regime within which listed firms disclose required financial information. 
The ASX prescribes the form and nature of corporate disclosures through listing 
rules with a continuous disclosure regime backed by the Corporations Act. 
Specifically, The ASX Corporate Governance Council developed industry-wide 
corporate governance guidelines for Australian listed companies in March 2003.14 
These guidelines were one of the first regulatory attempts to restore investor 
confidence after a series of corporate failures in Australia and overseas (e.g. HIH 
Insurance, WorldCom).Whilst there is no single universally agreed upon model of 
what constitutes good corporate governance, the ASX Corporate Governance 
Council developed ten principles believed to constitute good corporate governance 
(ASX Corporate Governance Council 2003 ). In addition to the ten best practice 
corporate governance principles, the ASX Corporate Governance Council developed 
28 supporting recommendations. The best practice recommendations cover corporate 
governance disclosures, director’s expertise, the link between executive pay and 
company results and whether the board’s performance is evaluated. Listing rule 
15 ASX Corporate Governance Council issued the revised version (i.e., second edition) of the corporate governance guideline 
in 2007. 
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 4.10.3 requires that from 2003 a statement disclosing the extent to which a company 
has complied with the recommendations by the ASX corporate governance council.  
The ASX recommendations serve as reference points on board and management 
accountability and represent a major enhancement of corporate accountability and 
practice in Australia (Taylor et al. 2008). The recommendations are consistent with 
the objective of enhancing accountability, highlighting the Council’s drive for greater 
emphasis on financial reporting disclosure (ASX Corporate Governance Council 
2003 ). However, as is the case for both Bangladesh and Malaysia, compliance with 
the ASX CGC’s Principles of Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations 2003 is encouraged but not mandatory.  
In addition, the objective of ASX Corporate Governance Council Principles 
and Recommendations is the collation and examination of disclosures made in 
annual reports. The ASX corporate governance principles and recommendations are 
mainly focused on disclosure principles. In Principal 1, it is stated that companies 
should recognize and disclose the respective roles and responsibilities of the board 
and management. The company’s framework should be designed to enable the board 
to provide strategic guidance for the company and effective oversight of 
management, clarify the respective roles and responsibilities of board members and 
senior executives in order to facilitate board and senior executives’ accountability to 
both the company and its shareholders and ensure a balance of authority so that no 
single individual has unfettered powers. Principle 2 addresses the requirement for a 
board of directors to have an effective composition, size and commitment to 
adequately discharge its responsibilities and duties. An effective board is one that 
facilitates the effective discharge of the duties imposed by law on the directors and 
adds value in a way that is appropriate to the particular company’s circumstances. In 
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 Principal 3, companies need to regard their legal obligations and the interests of a 
range of stakeholders including shareholders, employees, business partners, 
creditors, consumers, the environment and the broader community within which they 
operate. It is important for companies to demonstrate their commitment to 
appropriate corporate practices and decision making. Principal 4 requires the 
company structure to independently verify and safeguard the integrity of their 
financial reporting. This requires companies to put in place a structure of review and 
authorization designed to ensure the truthful and factual presentation of the 
company’s financial position.  
In Principle 5, timely and balanced disclosure are identified such as; investors 
should have equal and timely access to all factual information including its financial 
position, performance, ownership and governance; company announcements need to 
be presented in a clear and balanced way, and companies should disclose and 
establish written policies and procedures to ensure compliance with ASX Listing 
Rule disclosure requirements. Under Principal 5, it is also important to address 
continuous disclosure policies and procedures to identify the type of information that 
needs to be disclosed; internal notification and decision-making concerning the 
disclosure obligation, the roles and responsibilities of directors, officers and 
employees of the company in the disclosure context. In Principal 6, companies are 
required to respect the rights of shareholders and facilitate the effective exercise of 
those rights. According to Principle 7, listed companies need to establish a sound 
system of risk oversight, risk management and an internal control system. With 
regard to Principal 8, the director and chief executive should encourage and enhance 
performance to discharge their responsibilities effectively. Principal 9 requires 
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 companies ensure fair and responsible remuneration. With regards to the Principal 
10, companies are required to recognize the legitimate interest of stakeholders. 
Australian listed companies are required to establish and disclose how they 
apply the principles in their company. Application of the ten principles will usually 
also results in the compliance of 28 best practice recommendations. ASX Listing 
Rule 4.10.17 requires a company’s annual report to include a review of operations 
and activities. Although not specifying the contents of that report, the rule endorses 
the Group of 100 publications, Guide to Review of Operations and Financial 
Conditions which is reproduced in ASX Guidance Note 10 - Review of Operations 
and Activities. Listed companies should make available information designated in 
the guide on all of the above principles with an explanation of any departures from 
these principles should be included in the corporate governance section of the annual 
report. The policies and procedures designed to guide compliance with Listing Rule 
disclosure requirements should be made publicly available by posting them to the 
company’s website in a clearly marked corporate governance section. 
If a company considers that a recommendation is not appropriate or not 
applicable to its particular situation, it has the choice not to adopt it but needs to 
explain why. Under the ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3 companies are required to provide a 
statement in their annual report disclosing the extent to which they have followed the 
recommendations in the reporting period. Where companies have not followed all the 
recommendations, they must identify the recommendations that have not been 
followed and provide an explanation. Annual reporting does not limit the company’s 
requirement to make available disclosure under ASX Listing Rule 3.1. However, in 
some circumstances the company is required to set out relevant disclosure in a 
separate corporate governance section of the annual report. For example, where the 
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 Corporation Act requires particular information to be included in the directors’ 
report, the company has the option to include a cross reference to the relevant 
information in the corporate governance section. 
The ASX Corporate Governance Council also plays a major role in corporate 
governance. Its purpose is to promote and maintain investors’ confidence. The ASX 
set up the ASX Corporate Governance Council in 2002 with the objective to improve 
recommendations which emulate international best practice. The ASX Corporate 
Governance Council encourages companies to follow principles of corporate 
governance that are suitable for their business. It suggests that companies provide a 
well-reasoned explanation to a particular recommendation not adopted. This 
includes: 
• Identifying the recommendations the company has not followed 
• Giving an explanation about why the company has not followed the 
applicable recommendation 
• Explaining how the company practices in accordance with the relevant 
principle. 
 The ASX Corporate Governance Council encourages companies to make use 
of the ’if not, why not’’ approach and other market participants also support this 
approach citing a ‘one size does not fit all’ approach. The need for disclosure is even 
more important when providing corporate governance information in the annual 
report for different user groups. In this regard, the Council conducted a user survey 
of professional and private investors in late 1995 and released feedback in March 
2006. Results included: 
• Previous information could be clearer and more concise 
• Past information could be more available  
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 • More details were required about the board including the experience of 
directors; their independence and affiliations; commitments; share trading; 
also information about committees including their composition; policies and 
review process  
• Information about director and  senior executive remuneration  
• A summary statement of whether companies are adopting ASX corporate 
governance principles and recommendations. 
In conclusion, corporate governance initiatives in Australia have brought 
greater disclosure over time, increased the accountability of directors and 
involvement by shareholders. The framework is based on a mix of regulations; 
‘comply or explain’ guidelines issued by the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 
Corporate Governance Council, and other mandatory guidelines. Companies and 
investors are encouraged to provide feedback on the impact and implementation of 
these recommendations to the Council or to any of its member bodies. The ASX 
Corporate Governance Council continues to review these principles and 
recommendations by examining the disclosures made in the annual report and also 
considering feedback from companies and investors. 
In the context of the above discussions, it is clear that there are major 
differences between the corporate governance principles and regulations enacted in 
Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. These differences have the possibility of 
influencing the effective corporate governance framework in each of these three 
countries. Table 2.3 summarizes the key differences of corporate governance 
principles and regulations enacted in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. 
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 Table 2.3: Summary of major differences of corporate governance principles and 
regulations enacted in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia 
Corporate 
governance 
Principle  
Bangladesh Malaysia Australia 
Stage of 
Development 
Emerging Country Developing Country Developed Country 
Laws, Regulations 
and Rules on 
Corporate 
Governance 
The companies Act 
1994 
Companies Act of 1965 Australian 
Corporations Act 2001 
Existence of 
corporate governance 
code 
Yes. Enacted in 2006 Yes. Enacted in 2000  Yes. Enacted in 2003 
Policy making, 
regulating, 
supervising, and 
enforcing authorities 
 Securities & Exchange 
Commission Act 1993 
 Companies Act 1994 
 Securities Commission 
 Companies 
Commission of 
Malaysia 
 Bursa Malaysia Berhad 
 Commonwealth 
authorities and 
companies (CAC 
bodies) 
The existence of an 
agency or ad-hoc 
entity that coordinates 
Corporate 
Governance policies 
within government 
No Yes Yes 
The existence of 
'Special Courts' to 
litigate or challenge 
matters related to 
Corporate 
Governance 
No Yes.  
Commercial Division of 
the High Court; 
Sessions  
Yes. The High Court of 
Australia 
The existence of a 
body that is 
empowered to 
mitigate or arbitrate 
disputes matters 
related to Corporate 
Governance 
Yes. The Securities & 
Exchange Commission 
Act 1993 
No No 
Non-profit 
institutions that 
promote better 
Corporate 
Governance practices  
 Bangladesh Enterprise 
Institute Centre for 
Corporate Governance 
of Dhaka University. 
 
 Malaysian Institute of 
Integrity (MII 
Malaysian Institute of 
Corporate Governance 
(MICG) 
 Australian Institute of 
Company Directors 
 Australian Council of 
Super Investor 
 Australian Securities 
and Investment 
Commission 
Shareholder 
Information Listed 
companies require to 
provide 
 Annual reports 
 
 Annual reports 
 Quarterly financial 
statements 
 Annual reports 
 Quarterly financial 
statements 
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 2.5 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter discusses the development of corporate governance in 
Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia and their institutional settings. The discussions 
indicate that the three countries have different institutional settings under which 
listed companies are regulated. The next chapter will review the prior literature 
relating to corporate governance disclosure in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia.  
 
information must be 
contained in the 
company's annual 
report 
 
 General information on 
the company 
 Audited annual 
financial statements 
 Financial report 
 Directors report 
 Consolidated financial 
report 
 Information on 
corporate governance 
 Management decision 
& analysis 
 Related party 
transaction 
 Share ownership 
 Share held by the 
controlling shareholder 
 General information on 
the company 
 Audited annual 
financial statements 
 Financial report 
 Directors report 
 Consolidated financial 
report 
 Information on 
corporate governance 
 Management decision 
& analysis Related 
party transaction 
 Share ownership 
 Share held by the 
controlling shareholder 
 General information on 
the company 
 Audited annual 
financial statements 
 Financial report 
 Directors report 
 Consolidated financial 
report 
 Information on 
corporate governance 
 Management decision 
& analysis 
 Related party 
transaction 
 Share ownership 
 Share held by the 
controlling shareholder 
Shareholders' 
Participation  
 
Time of notice (days 
before meeting) 
AGM: 14 days (Extra 
ordinary general 
meeting 21 days) 
Time of notice (days 
before meeting) 
AGM: 14 days 21 days  
when special resolution 
is proposed 
Time of notice (days 
before meeting) 
AGM: 14 days or 30 
days.  
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 CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Overview of the Chapter 
Chapter Three provides a literature review relating to corporate governance 
disclosure. This chapter is presented as follows: Section 3.2 begins with a definition 
of corporate governance with Sections 3.3 and 3.4 providing definitions of both 
mandatory and voluntary corporate governance disclosures respectively. Section 3.5 
then provides a detailed literature review on the determinants of corporate 
governance disclosures with Table 3.1 outlining these studies. Subsequently, prior 
disclosure studies in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia are outlined in Sections 3.6 
to 3.8. Section 3.9 then briefly discusses developments in international corporate 
governance. A summary of the chapter is then provided in the concluding section. 
3.2 Definition of Corporate Governance  
Corporate governance has been defined in various ways (Gay and Simnett 
2007). Broadly, corporate governance encompasses process-based systems in which 
firms continue their operations (Du Plessis, McConvill and Bagaric 2005). 
According to the definition of Sir Adrian Cadbury, the Chairperson of Cadbury and 
Cadbury Schweppes, corporate governance is concerned with maintaining the 
balance between profitability and individual as well as collective goals (Cadbury 
1995). The corporate governance framework should be able to facilitate an effective 
distribution of power surrounded by depositors, the board of administrators, as well 
as the executive (Centre for Policy Dialogue Financial Sector Reforms 2001). An 
effective corporate governance system engages relationships among the firm’s 
executive, its board, investors along with other stakeholder groups (Dye 2001). This 
broad view is supported by the Centre for Financial Market Integrity, a non-
governmental organization, which defines corporate governance as inside powers 
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 and actions through which individual firms are managed and directed. It offers a 
structure that describes the rights, responsibility, and dependability of different 
stakeholder groups in the company or organization(Centre For Financial Market 
Integrity 2005). Shleifer and Vishny (1997 ) frame  corporate governance more from 
a shareholder perspective in which investors expect a return from their investment 
from a properly formulated corporate governance structure. Similarly, Gay and 
Simnett (2007) see corporate governance as the method through which firms are 
directed and controlled through the board of administrators, management, and 
shareholders.  
In essence, there is no generally accepted definition of corporate governance. 
It commonly refers to the implementation of policy through which corporations are 
managed and controlled. Perhaps the broader views of governance offer the most 
insight. Sheridan and Kendall (1992) consider that good corporate governance 
involves a structure of forming, working and implementing to meet the company’s 
broad goals and to act in accordance with important laws and regulation for the 
greatest wellbeing of stakeholders. 
3.3 One-tier versus two-tier corporate governance systems 
Boards of directors play an important role in the governance of companies by 
having the authority to remove executive directors, set CEO compensation and ratify 
major strategic decisions and financial statements. The board is a key internal 
mechanism to monitor and discipline management (Baysinger and Hoskisson 1990; 
Johnson, Ellstrand and Daily 1996; Neville 2011; Oba, Ozsoy and Atakan 2010). The 
board of directors is deemed necessary as the separation of corporate control from 
corporate ownership potentially gives executive directors flexibility to pursue their 
own interests at the expense of the owners of public corporations (Eisenhardt 1989; 
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 Lan and Heracleous 2010; Muth and Donaldson 1998). However, the global financial 
crisis and well-known international scandals such as Enron, Parmalat and WorldCom 
have highlighted that even reputable boards may struggle to effectively monitor 
executive directors. The causes of failed supervision range from critical information 
asymmetries on boards to the inability of non-executive directors to monitor 
powerful CEOs. Consequently, regulators and practitioners have promoted board 
independence in corporate governance codes and corporate legislation as a means to 
improve board control (Cormier et al. 2010 ; Daily, Dalton and Cannella 2003; 
Finegold, Benson and Hecht 2007; Zattoni and Cuomo 2010). Typical measures 
include discouraging CEO-chairperson duality, increasing the outsider director 
ratios, and establishing board monitoring committees (Bezemer et al. 2007; Westphal 
and Zajac 1997).While the effectiveness of board independence measures has been 
documented extensively in the literature, surprisingly little is known about the 
internal processes by which boards, and in particular non-executive directors, attempt 
to improve the monitoring potential of their boards. Prior research has shown the role 
and importance of regular boardroom evaluations in approving the effectiveness of 
boards of directors (Conger, Finegold and Lawler 1998; Minichilli, Gabrielsson and 
Huse 2007). There is scant evidence, however, about the interventions non-executive 
directors use to actually solve emerging issues in the boardroom. 
Despite these challenges, non-executive directors emphasise that they remain 
sceptical about the one-tier board’s potential to solve boardroom issues associated 
with two-tier boards, suggesting that the origins of many boardroom challenges go 
beyond the choice of a certain board model to govern executive directors. Boards of 
directors operate in a variety of systems to monitor management. Whereas non-
executive directors in some countries (i.e. US, UK, Japan) operate in one-tier boards, 
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 on the other hand non-executive directors in other countries (i.e. Germany, The 
Netherlands, China and Indonesia) supervise executive directors in two-tier boards 
(Adams and Ferreira 2007). While one-tier boards integrate decision-management 
and decision-control in one organisational body, two-tier boards provide for a formal 
separation of both roles. In two-tier boards, executive directors (i.e. the management 
board) are responsible for the daily operations of the company and non-executive 
directors (i.e. the supervisory board) are responsible for the supervision of executive 
directors (Jungmann 2006; Maassen 1999; Millet-Reyes and Zhao 2010). Scholars 
have debated the comparative strengths and weaknesses of one-tier and two-tier 
boards. In essence, the main underlying difference between board models relates to 
the central question whether it is desirable to have independent monitors involved in 
decision-management. With fewer organisational layers, the one-tier model may 
create fewer information asymmetries and alleviate bureaucratic hurdles that may 
hamper the decision-making process of non-executive directors on two-tier boards 
(Hooghiemstra and Van Manen 2004 ; Jungmann 2006; Maassen 1999). On the other 
hand, the structure of one-tier boards in which executive and non-executive directors 
operate on one board may expose the board’s ability to monitor executive directors 
and provide independent advice to management. Moreover, insider dominated boards 
might miss business opportunities, as independent outsiders may offer alternative 
views on environmental developments (Jungmann 2006; Millet-Reyes and Zhao 
2010). Accordingly, proponents of the two-tier board model have emphasised the 
advantages of having non-executives involved in decision-control only. 
Scholars and practitioners have not reached a consensus on the monitoring 
potential of the board models (Adams and Ferreira 2007; Jungmann 2006; Millet-
Reyes and Zhao 2010; Rose 2005). Major corporate governance scandals have 
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 occurred in firms using both one-tier and two-tier boards. Moreover, the literature 
suggests that boardroom problems exist in both board models, ranging from 
information asymmetries and dominant CEOs to group decision-making and other 
issues related to group dynamics (Conger and Lawler 2009; Hooghiemstra and Van 
Manen 2004 ; Maassen and Van Den Bosch 1999; Pettigrew and McNulty 1995). In 
this regard, Conger et al. (1998) remark that all boards need to have knowledge, 
information, power, motivation and time to adequately execute their roles. 
Whereas the literature suggests that non-executive directors on one-tier and two-tier 
boards may face multiple boardroom challenges, the separation of decision-
management from decision-control in the two-tier board model may generate 
additional obstacles to non-executive directors to monitor management. Fewer joint 
meetings between executive and non-executive directors of two-tier boards compared 
to one-tier boards (Spencer Stuart 2013) may make it more difficult for directors to 
build trust relationships, thereby potentially undermining the communication and 
flows of information between both boards. Furthermore, the absence of insider 
information may make it more difficult for non-executive directors on a supervisory 
board to fully understand and ratify strategic initiatives of the management board, 
thereby possibly frustrating decision-making processes. In addition, the distance of 
supervisory board members from the decision making processes may make it more 
difficult for non-executive directors to provide resources to the firm, thereby missing 
value-creation opportunities. As such, although both one-tier and two-tier boards 
operate, neither structure has proved to be superior to the other. 
3.4 Definition of Mandatory Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Mandatory corporate governance disclosure is essentially a legal requirement 
and refers to release of required information in corporate annual reports that is 
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 prescribed through the regulatory authorities of a country. This can include a 
country’s stock exchange rules, its laws and regulations. Mandatory corporate 
governance disclosure occurs where companies are obliged to disclose stipulated 
information in order to meet regulatory requirements (Adhikari and Tondkar 1992). 
Such regulation is often justified on the basis that it safeguards the welfare of 
ordinary investors (Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Taplin, Tower and Hancock 2002). 
Regulators require companies to disclose information that companies may wish to 
hide (Darrough 1993) with an aim to redistribute information between informed and 
uniformed investors by requiring a minimum level of disclosure (Healy, Hutton and 
Palepu 1999). Furthermore, the credibility of the information in capital markets is 
improved with companies’ compliance to the regulatory requirements (Al-Htaybat 
and Napier 2006). 
Disclosures are most commonly made in company annual reports and notes to 
the accounts (Ahmed and Nicholls 1994). The annual report is considered to be the 
most important source of information to numerous of user-groups (Marston and 
Shrives 1991). However, each of the items in the annual report is not equally 
important to all stakeholders (Akhtaruddin 2005). The income statement is preferred 
by investors who focus on profitability, while the cash flow statement and balance 
sheet are considered the most useful sections to bankers and creditors who are 
interested in ongoing viability (Eccles and Mavrinac 1995; Ho and Wong 2001). 
Mandatory reporting is therefore viewed by regulators as a necessary tool for an 
efficient market since it minimizes the information asymmetry problems between 
insiders and outsiders of the firm. 
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 3.5 Definition of Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosure 
 In general, voluntary disclosure is the act of releasing information in firm’s 
annual reports not required by regulations such as Corporation Law, accounting 
standard or stock exchange regulations. In other words, it can be said that voluntary 
disclosure extends beyond required level of mandatory disclosure. It is therefore 
optional on the part of corporate executives to make available additional information 
to various user groups of the annual reports. As such, firms may choose to release 
information voluntarily to investor groups to assist them in their investment choice 
decisions (Buzby 1975; Meek, Roberts and Gray 1995). This may also extend to 
consumer groups (Cooke 1989).  
In terms of actual definitions, according to the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB), voluntary disclosure essentially refers to releasing 
information not openly mandated by accounting policy or principles (FASB 2001). 
However, researchers have defined voluntary disclosure in different ways. Meek et al 
(1995) describe voluntary disclosure as presenting additional information applicable 
to the assessment desires of consumers. External investors do not have as much 
information compared to internal managers regarding firm performance (Healy and 
Palepu 2001). In the actual business world where the market is not perfectly efficient, 
it is believed that managers use voluntary financial disclosures to balance the choices 
they formulate to the outside shareholders. Prior studies also indicate that voluntary 
disclosures are common among developed nations (Chau and Gray 2002; Eng and 
Mak 2003; Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Ho and Wong 2001; Hossain, Tan and Adams 
1994; Ibrahim, Haron and Ariffin 2000). 
3.6 Prior Research on Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Corporate governance disclosure has been identified as one of the 
fundamental elements contributing to overall effective performance by firms (Cheng, 
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 Jiang and T 2010; Hossain and Khan. 2006; Hossain, Salat and Al-Amin. 2005; 
Karim 1996). Gul and Leung (2004) contend that disclosure is a key requirement for 
the effective operation of equity markets and Mitton (2002) indicates that superior 
share price is associated with firms that have higher level of corporate governance 
disclosure. Researchers have investigated relationships between corporate 
characteristics and disclosures in annual reports by firms since the 1960s. Seminal 
work on this subject was conducted by Cerf (1961) and subsequently many studies 
examined the quality of disclosures in various contexts. Examples of such studies 
include; Owusu-Ansah (1998); Ho and Wong (2001), Joshi and Ramadhan (2002); 
Chau and Gray (2002); Naser et al. (2002); Naser and Nuseibeh (2003); Akhtaruddin 
(2005) and Ofoegbu and Okoye (2006); Barako (2007); Iatridis (2008); Aktaruddin et 
al (2009); Islam et al (2010); Jianfei et al (2011); Aboagye et al (2012); Omar 
(2013); Idaad et al (2014). Each of these studies is different in terms of research 
setting, explanatory variables, and construction of disclosure indices and differences 
in the type and depth of statistical analysis. 
Research has expanded from examining developed to developing countries 
also. Studies in developed countries include: United States; (Buzby 1975; Singhvi 
and Desai 1971; Street and Gray 2001); New Zealand (McNally, Eng and Hasseldin 
1982); Sweden (Cooke 1989); Canada (Bujaki and McConomy 2002); Spain 
(Wallace, Kamal and Araceli 1994); France (Depoers 2000); Japan (Cooke 1992); 
Germany (Glaum and Street 2003); New Zealand (Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh 2005); 
United Kingdom (Camfferman and Cooke 2002; Iatridis 2008) and Bahrain (Omar 
2013). On the other hand, studies in developing countries include India (Ahmed 
2005; Singhvi 1968), Mexico (Chow and Wong-Boren 1987), Nigeria (Ofoegbu and 
Okoye 2006; Wallace 1988); Zimbabwe (Owusu-Ansah 1998); Jordan (Naser, Al-
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 Khatib and Karbhari 2002); Saudi Arabia (Naser and Nuseibeh 2003); Kenya 
(Barako 2007); Malaysia (Akhtaruddin et al. 2009); Bangladesh (Anup and Shahnag 
2013); China (Jianfei and Yiran 2011); and Ghana (Aboagye et al. 2012). 
The prior literature has identified several factors as important predictors in 
the level of disclosures that listed firms made (Benjamin and Stanga 1977; Cooke 
1982; Inchausti 1997; Lang and Lundholm 1993; Meek, Roberts and Gray 1995; 
Singhvi and Desai 1971; Wallace, Naser and Mora 1994).The most important 
characteristics include firm size, firm profitability, size of the board, firm leverage, 
audit size, listing status, type of industry, firm age, and board independence. The 
quality of disclosure in corporate annual reports and accounts has also been 
represented in the literature by several different constructs: sufficiency (Buzby 1975; 
Owusu-Ansah 1998), depth (Wallace and Naser 1995; Barrett 1975), in 
formativeness (Alford et al. 1993), and suitability (Courtis 1976). Each construct 
suggests that the quality of disclosure can be measured in creating an index to 
represent the dependent variable. 
The remainder of this section provides an overview of the empirical literature 
on corporate governance disclosure and the various proxies used to investigate the 
association between corporate governance and the level of disclosure. 
3.6.1 Board Size  
A bigger board of directors is expected to decrease information asymmetry 
among insiders and outsiders and positively influence the level of disclosure within 
firms (Akhtaruddin et al. 2009). This is achieved by reducing the information 
asymmetry that is inherent in agency relationships that exist within firms between 
managers and owners (Chen and Jaggi 2000). Therefore, a greater level of 
information disclosure by firms is expected with a larger board (Zahra, Neubaum and 
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 Huse 2000). Other studies find that a larger board is likely to increase consensus and 
reduce the unavailability of information (Birnbaum 1984). As a result of the 
subsequent faster information processing that occurs (via a larger board), board size 
is expected to influence the levels of disclosure by firms (Zahra, Neubaum and Huse 
2000). Furthermore, with a greater number of board directors, there is increased 
collective expertise and experience which results in the exchange of ideas and 
information that consequently results in greater levels of disclosure (Chen and Jaggi 
2000; Zahra, Neubaum and Huse 2000). However, Jensen (1993) argues that board 
of directors become less important in terms of the level of disclosure since as board 
size grows, the control over management decreases.  
3.6.2 Board Independence 
The main purpose of having independent directors on the board is to increase 
the level of monitoring and controlling authority over management (Agrawal and 
Knoeber 1996; Goodstein, Guatam and Boeker 1994; Klein 1998; Kosnik 1990). 
Given that such directors are independent of management, they are more objective in 
dealing with management and providing necessary information to outsiders such as 
key stakeholders. As such, the success in reducing the information asymmetry gap 
among insider and outsider is strongly depending on the number of independent 
directors on the board (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996; Goodstein, Guatam and Boeker 
1994; Klein 1998; Kosnik 1990). In fact, the independence of board members often 
results in firms making additional voluntary disclosures at the behest of the 
independent directors (Anup and Shahnag 2013). Prior literature has shown that 
firms with dominating independent directors on the boards disclose more information 
(Fama and Jensen 1983; Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman 1981). 
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 Early research has shown a positive association between board performance 
and the number of outside directors on the board as these independent directors are 
expected to increase shareholders capital. Similarly, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) 
found a negative association among outside non-executive directors and firm 
performance. However, Klein (1998) argues that inside directors have better 
experience and skill and as a consequence, they are able to contribute further 
compared to outside directors. However, this argument ignores the information 
asymmetry issue which relates to the release of financial information to outsiders. 
Generally prior literature indicates that the release of information, including 
disclosures, is positively related to the number of independent directors on the board 
(Akhtaruddin et al. 2009; Goodstein, Guatam and Boeker 1994) 
3.6.3 Audit Quality 
Becker et al (1998) suggest that financial information is more reliable when 
audited by ‘big four’ auditing firms compared to non-big four auditors. As such, the 
level of disclosure may be different from one company to another company 
depending on whether the auditor belongs to the big four (Aboagye et al. 2012). Big 
auditing firms provide better quality auditing since they have a better reputation 
resulting from better expertise and access to more resources (Anup and Shahnag 
2013). In this respect, Beatty and Zajac (1994) believed that big four auditors 
convince their clients to disclose more information than the minimum. These big four 
auditors may do so to maintain their reputations as high-quality auditors or to 
minimize litigations concerns. This is supported by Ahmed and Nichols (1994) who 
observed that bigger auditing firms would encourage increased disclosure as 
violations could damage the big four auditor’s reputation. In short, audit quality is 
expected to increase the quality of financial and non-financial information that firms 
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 disclose (Ali, Ahmed and Henry 2004; Barako 2007; Camfferman and Cooke 2002; 
Chau and Gray 2002; Depoers 2000; Glaum and Street 2003; Haniffa and Cooke 
2002; Inchausti 1997; Malone, Fries and Jones 1993; McNally, Eng and Hasseldin 
1982; Naser, Al-Khatib and Karbhari 2002; Owusu-Ansah 1998; Raffournier 1995; 
Singhvi and Desai 1971; Wallace, Kamal and Araceli 1994; Wallace and Naser 
1995). Prior literature specifically links the greater skill, expertise and experience of 
the large big four auditing firms in influencing firms to disclosure a greater amount 
of (additional) information (Wallace, Naser and Mora 1994; De Angelo 1981; Chow 
1982; Ahmed and Nicholls 1994).  
3.6.4 CEO Duality 
The need to separate the position between the CEO and board chairman has 
been scrutinized in past studies with a view that such a combined role decreases 
transparency in accounting and quality of financial reporting (Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney 1995).  
CEO duality has been found to be negatively related with corporate 
governance disclosure since combining the two roles reduces the quality of 
monitoring (Forker 1992). One reason for this is that once the CEO is also the chair 
of the board, board’s efficiencies in performing its tasks is affected as CEO will have 
the power to run board meetings, alter agenda matters and choose board members all 
of which can potentially reduce the effectiveness of boards (Iaad et al. 2014). A 
number of past studies have found a negative association between CEO duality and 
disclosure (Argenti 1976; Blackburn 1994; Donaldson and Davis 1991; Forker 1992; 
Rechner and Dalton 1991; Shamser and Annuar 1993; Stiles and Taylor 1993).  
On the other hand, other studies suggest that CEO duality actually improve 
monitoring quality by boards. Such studies suggest that CEO and board chair roles 
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 are combined, there is a higher possibility in achieving company objectives as 
managers take a greater interest in the firm and shareholders increasing overall board 
effectiveness (Dahya, Lonie and Power 1996; Donaldson and Davis 1991; Eisenhardt 
1989; Rechner and Dalton 1991). 
3.6.5 Firm Size 
Previous studies find a positive association between firm size and the level of 
disclosure in both developed and developing countries (Adrem 1999; Cerf 1961; 
Cooke 1992; Craig and Diga 1998; Kahl and Belkaoui 1981; Raffournier 1995). 
Small firms have difficulties in bearing the cost of producing both financial and non-
financial information compared to larger firms who have access to greater funding 
and resources (Owusu-Ansah 1998). Furthermore, larger firms have greater 
incentives to provide additional information in annual reports to reassure a range of 
consumer groups compared to smaller firms (Ali and Merve 2012). Specifically, 
larger firms also disclose more information due to the higher number of work 
processes and volume of transactions generated within such large firms thus 
necessitating greater levels of disclosure (Ahmed and Courtis 1999; Alsaeed 2006; 
Buzby 1975; Chow and Wong-Boren 1987; Cooke 1982; Depoers 2000).  
Firth (1979) suggests that another possible reason for disclosing more 
information for larger firms is that larger firms already gather more information for 
corporate report and for their internal controls. Watts and Zimmerma (1990) argue 
that bigger firms are more likely to increase disclosure levels because these 
companies want to make sure that investors are confident about their investments and 
also wish to reduce political costs. As such, large firms disclose more information 
than the smaller ones (Meek, Roberts and Gray 1995). Another reason why larger 
firms disclose more is that they are concerned about their visibility, reputations and 
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 the need to maximize profits compared to smaller firms that possibly to disclose less 
information for reasons relating to competitive advantages (Akhtaruddin 2005; Ali, 
Ahmed and Henry 2004; Barako 2007; Camfferman and Cooke 2002; Eng and Mak 
2003; Ferguson, Lam and Lee 2002; Glaum and Street 2003). 
3.6.6 Firm Leverage 
Other studies sought to determine the association, if any, between leverage 
and firm disclosure levels. It was believed that highly leveraged firms, incurring 
greater observing costs, would look to decrease such costs by greater compliance 
with disclosure levels (Chow and Wong-Boren 1987; Malone, Fries and Jones 1993; 
Wallace and Naser 1994). As a consequence, firms disclose further information for 
the benefit of creditors regularly (Bujaki and McConomy 2002; Camfferman and 
Cooke 2002; Depoers 2000; Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Inchausti 1997; Meek, Roberts 
and Gray 1995; Raffournier 1995; Tower, Hancock and Taplin 1999). Essentially, 
past literature suggests that highly gearing firms reveal additional information to 
appease shareholders who may have concerns about the viability of their investment 
in the firm (Taylor et al. 2011). Similarly, Robbins and Austin (1986) discovered an 
affirmative association between leverage and municipal disclosure. On the whole, 
leverage is an important variable in disclosure studies as highly leveraged firms 
disclose additional information to assure shareholders, creditors and other key 
stakeholders (Ali, Ahmed and Henry 2004; Bujaki and McConomy 2002; 
Camfferman and Cooke 2002; Depoers 2000; Ferguson, Lam and Lee 2002; Haniffa 
and Cooke 2002; Inchausti 1997; Prencipe 2004; Raffournier 1995).  
3.6.7 Firm Profitability 
Past studies have viewed firm profitability as an explanatory variable in 
disclosure studies (Akhtaruddin 2005; Ali, Ahmed and Henry 2004; Camfferman and 
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 Cooke 2002; Glaum and Street 2003; Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Naser, Alkatib and 
Karbhari 2002; Tower, Hancock and Taplin 1999). Specifically, since managers 
pursue self-interested objectives and wish to maintain their prospects within firms 
including remuneration levels, greater levels of profits are rapidly communicated to 
the market. Such profits also allow for greater disclosures as resources from profits 
are available to promote such disclosures (Ahmed and Courtis 1999; Firth 1979; 
Singhvi and Desai 1971). As such, prior studies reveal a significant association 
among profitability and information disclosure (Inchausti 1997; Malone, Fries and 
Jones 1993; McNally, Eng and Hasseldin 1982; Meek, Roberts and Gray 1995; 
Owusu-Ansah 1998; Raffournier 1995; Singhvi 1968; Singhvi and Desai 1971; 
Wallace, Kamal and Araceli 1994; Wallace and Naser 1995). 
3.6.8 Firm Age 
Firm age is also believed to an important variable in determining the extent of 
information disclosure (Akhtaruddin 2005; Glaum and Street 2003; Haniffa and 
Cooke 2002; Owusu-Ansah 1998; Prencipe 2004). Researchers such as Choi (1973) 
and Spero (1979) suggest that recently listed firms release additional information in 
order to further increase the possibility of obtaining capital at the lowest price and 
increase confidence among different stakeholder groups, including prospective 
investors. For different reasons, older firms may also choose to disclose additional 
information to the market due to reputational and political concerns (Kabir 2014; 
Madhani 2014). Although it is also possible that older firms may chose due disclose 
less due to their entrenched existence, new firms almost always have no choice but to 
disclose more given their relatively new existence. 
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 3.6.9 Industry Type 
The type of industry in which the firm is operating is an important variable in 
terms of disclosure levels since disclosure levels differ between industries 
(Akhtaruddin 2005; Barako 2006; Camfferman and Cooke 2002; Chau and Gray 
2002; Cooke 1982; Cooke 1989; Ferguson, Lam and Lee 2002; Glaum and Street 
2003; Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Inchausti 1997; McNally, Eng and Hasseldin 1982; 
Meek, Roberts and Gray 1995; Naser, Alkatib and Karbhari 2002; Owusu-Ansah 
1998; Raffournier 1995; Tower, Hancock and Taplin 1999). For example, Whittred 
and Zimmer (1990) argued that firms that are operating in a politically visible 
environment such as oil and gas and manufacturing (Cooke 1992) disclose additional 
information (Ng and Koh 1994) to manage any negative societal views or concerns. 
3.7 Studies in Bangladesh 
Several factors are associated with the extent of corporate governance 
disclosure in Bangladesh. Akhtaruddin (2005) examined corporate governance and 
mandatory disclosure practices in Bangladesh by selecting 94 listed companies for 
the period of 1999. A corporate governance disclosure index was prepared and non-
parametric and parametric tests used to test hypotheses. It was found that company 
disclosures averaged 44%. Firm age was not associated with disclosures but industry 
and profitability were significant predictors of higher disclosures. Hossain and Khan 
(2006) analysed the annual reports of 100 companies listed on DSE in 2004 to assess 
the impact of leverage, profitability, firm size, qualification of accounting officer, 
banking companies, big four auditor, multinational company and concentrated 
ownership on a disclosure index. Their results indicate that large firms with 
multinational affiliations, employing big four auditors, concentrated ownership and 
banks were all positively associated with higher levels of disclosure. 
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 Bhuiyan and Biswas (2007) use data from 155 public listed companies and 
determined that firms in the financial sector and size were associated with greater 
disclosures but not older firms and bigger boards. Rouf and Harun (2011) conducted 
a study examining the link between governance characteristics, corporate 
characteristics and the level of disclosure on sample of 120 listed non-financial 
companies the DSE in 2007. A disclosure index was developed utilizing 68 
disclosure items. Several variables were used in the study to test the association 
between the extent of disclosure and ownership structure consisting of proportion of 
equity in possession by insiders, proportion of equity held by institutional 
shareholders, total assets, total sales and profitability of a firm. Results indicate that 
the level of information disclosure is positively associated with higher institutional 
ownership composition but negatively associated with higher management 
ownership. There was also a positive relation between disclosure and board size, 
board leadership structure and audit committee existence but a negative relation with 
the percentage of independent non-executive directors.  
Anup and Shahnag (2013) studied the association between voluntary 
disclosure and several attributes of corporate governance using data from the annual 
reports of companies listed on the DSE in 2011. The results obtained show 
statistically significant differences in levels of voluntary disclosure among listed 
companies in Bangladesh and show that companies in the financial sector disclose 
more voluntary information than nonfinancial companies. Findings from this analysis 
indicate a negative association between voluntary disclosure and percentage of 
equity owned by insiders. By contrast, firm size and profitability show significant 
positive relationship with voluntary disclosure. However, this study also shows that 
voluntary disclosure has no significant relationship with the percentage of equity 
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 held by institutions, board size, board audit committee and percentage of independent 
directors on the board of directors. Finally, Karim, Islam, and Chowdhury (1998) 
investigated the extent of voluntary disclosure for 146 companies. Using an 
unweighted index, they find that companies disclose an average of only 26 percent of 
the 91 voluntary information items suggesting that firm characteristics such as size, 
audit complexity, return on equity and audit fees are not significantly associated with 
disclosures.  
3.8 Studies in Malaysia 
A number of Malaysian studies in the 1990s examined the effect of corporate 
governance variables on a disclosure index that included strategic, financial and non-
strategic information (Hossain, Tan and Adams 1994; Soh 1996). Their results 
indicate a positive relationship between independent directors, their race and the 
extent of disclosures made by the listed companies. Haniffa and Cooke (2002), using 
1995 annual reports, observed that Malaysian corporate governance disclosure in 
influenced by cultural factors and the effectiveness of corporate governance 
mechanisms. These include proportion of non-executive directors on the board, 
family members on the board, CEO duality and multiple-directorships. Subsequently, 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006) sought to determine whether there was an impact of the 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance on the level of disclosure among 
Malaysian publicly listed companies. Their results indicated a significant association 
between independent non-executive directors, an independent chairman as well as 
the presence of family members on the board and the extent of disclosure. However, 
they did not find proprietary costs as significant predictors. 
However, past studies also provide contrary evidence. Nazli, Ghazali and 
Weetman (2006) examined structural institutional factors associated with the degree 
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 of disclosures. Using a sample of 2001 listed company annual reports, their results 
indicated that extent of government ownership; new governance initiatives and 
industry competitiveness were not important predictors of disclosure. Wan Izyani 
Adilah and Zunaidah (2010) more recently examined the relationship between family 
ownership and extent of disclosure for listed companies in Malaysia and their 
evidence support the claim that when a higher number of family members sit on the 
board the level of disclosure in firms’ annual reports reduces significantly. 
Ho (2008) also investigated the impact of corporate governance structures on 
disclosure by specifically examining five key information categories. In terms of 
sampling, there were 100 firms over three different socio-economic periods: 1996, 
2001 and 2006. Ho (2008) found that the strength of a firm's corporate governance 
structure influenced disclosure with significant increases in all the key information 
categories the most pronounced between 1996 and 2001 with a noticeably lower 
level of communication growth between 2001 and 2006. Aktaruddin et al (2009) 
examined whether board size, percentage of independent non-executive directors, on 
board, external share ownership, family power and proportion of independent audit 
committee members were associated with the degree of corporate disclosure among 
listed firms in Malaysia. Results suggested a positive association between board size 
and percentage of independent non-executive directors with disclosure and a 
negative relationship between family control and independent audit committee 
members with disclosure. 
3.9 Studies in Australia 
Clarkson, Bueren, and Walker (2006) provided positive results on the 
association between internal governance quality and CEO compensation disclosures. 
They analysed the correlation between the extent of, and changes in disclosure 
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 involving chief executive officer remuneration in the annual reports under the 
Company Law Review Act 1998 (CLRA98) and AASB1046 using a sample of 124 
Australian firms for the period 1998 to 2004. Their results indicated that firm size, 
board, audit committee and remuneration committee independence, quality of the 
auditor, cross-listing status and public scrutiny were positively related to higher 
levels of disclosure. Furthermore, Beekes and Brown (2006) examined the 
association between the disclosure of price-sensitive information under the ASX 
continuous disclosure requirements and corporate governance based on governance 
quality ratings published in the Horwath 2002 Corporate Governance Report (Psaros 
and Seamer 2002). The overall results of their study provided strong support for the 
link between better governance and more informative disclosure. Specifically, 
Beekes and Brown (2006), utilizing a sample of 250 Australian firms, found 
evidence that better governed firms make more price-sensitive disclosure, have a 
larger analyst following, less biased analyst consensus forecasts, and have a faster 
speed of price disclosure.  
O’Sullivan, Percy and Stewart (O’Sullivan, Percy and Stewart 2006) 
examined the association between a composite governance score and the disclosure 
of prospective information in Australian annual reports for the period 2000 and 2002. 
They found that, in 2000, audit quality variables such as audit committee existence, 
independence, meeting frequency, auditor quality and independence were all 
positively associated with the choice to disclose forward-looking information in 
annual reports. In addition, they also find that governance quality variables such as 
the independence of compensation committee members and the formation of a 
nomination committee also positively associated to forward-looking information 
disclosures. 
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 However, other studies suggest no association between firm or governance 
quality and disclosures. Using a sample comprising 161 Australian firms and a total 
of 198 firm-year observations, researchers (Coulton, James and Taylor 2003) 
investigated the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on the extent of CEO 
compensation disclosures following a change in reporting provision in Australia. 
They show no evidence of a relationship between an index of governance attributes 
and CEO compensation disclosures. James and Cotter (2007), using a sample of 38 
companies in 2003, investigated the correlation between the quality of corporate 
governance disclosure and assessed default risk. A corporate governance disclosure 
index was developed based on annual report disclosure items to rate each company’s 
corporate governance disclosure quality. Their results revealed that disclosures of 
corporate governance information in the annual reports are not useful for the 
assessment of default risk. In a similar vein, Chan and Wickramasinghe (2006) 
investigated the voluntary disclosure of governance and financial information on the 
company websites of 40 of Australia’s largest companies by market capitalization. 
Using data from 2000, they find no association between internal governance quality 
and the level of financial information disclosed on the websites. 
In summary, disclosures by firms and their association with firm and 
governance characteristics has been the subject of extensive academic investigation. 
Although there are significant predictors of disclosures identified by the prior 
literature, findings are also mixed with other researchers finding conflicting results 
thus suggesting that the identification of determinants of disclosures remain an open 
empirical question. Table 3.1 below presents a review of the past literature on 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure in countries other than those examined in the 
study.
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Table 3.1: Summary of literature conducted in the past on mandatory and voluntary corporate governance disclosure 
Number Author(s) and 
Year 
Article Title Country of Study Theory Independent 
variables/Dependent 
Variables 
Significant 
Variables 
Data Analysis 
1 Singhvi (1968) Corporate 
Disclosure Through 
Annual Reports in 
The United States 
Of America And 
India 
United States and 
India 
Agency theory Dependent Variable 
Disclosure index 
Independent 
Variables 
Company size,  
profitability, number 
of shareholders, type 
of management 
Company size 
(+ve),  
profitability 
(+ve), number of 
shareholders(+ve) 
Univariate  
2 Singhvi and Desai 
(1971) 
An Empirical 
Analysis of the 
Quality of 
Corporate Financial 
Disclosure 
United States Not specified Dependent Variable 
Disclosure index 
Independent 
Variables 
Company size, listing 
status, profitability, 
audit firm, number of 
shareholders 
Company size 
(+ve),  
Listing status 
(+ve), number of 
stakeholders 
(+ve) 
Univariate and 
Linear Regression 
3 Buzby (1975) Company Size, 
Listed Versus 
Unlisted Stocks, 
and the Extent of 
United States Agency theory Dependent Variable 
Disclosure index. 
Independent 
Company size 
(+ve) 
Univariate and 
Matched-pair 
Ranked Correlation 
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 Financial 
Disclosure 
Variables 
Company size, listing 
status 
4 Firth (1979) The Impact of Size, 
Stock Market 
Listing, and 
Auditors on 
Voluntary 
Disclosure in 
Corporate Annual 
Reports 
United Kingdom Agency theory Dependent Variable 
Disclosure index. 
Independent 
Variables 
Company size, listing 
status, audit firm 
Company size 
(+ve), listing 
status (+ve) 
Univariate 
5 McNally et al 
(1982) 
Corporate Financial 
Reporting in New 
Zealand: An 
Analysis of User 
Preferences, 
Corporate 
Characteristics and 
Disclosure 
Practices for 
Discretionary 
Information 
New Zealand Agency theory Dependent Variable 
Disclosure index. 
Independent 
Variables 
Company size, rate of 
return, growth, audit 
firm, industry 
 
Company size 
(+ve), rate of 
return (+ve), 
industry (-ve) 
 
Univariate, 
Kruskal-Wallis, 
Rank order 
Correlation 
6 Chow and Wong-
Boren (1987) 
Voluntary Financial 
Disclosures by 
Mexican 
Corporations 
Mexico Institutional theory Dependent Variable 
Disclosure index. 
Independent 
Variables 
Company size, 
financial leverage, 
assets in place. 
Company size 
(+ve) 
Univariate, 
Bivariate 
Correlation and 
Multiple 
Regression 
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 7 Wallace (1988) Corporate Financial 
Reporting in 
Nigeria  
 
Nigeria Not specified Dependent Variable 
Disclosure index. 
Independent 
Variables 
Various user groups 
The entire 
contents of the 
corporate annual 
report and its 
different parts are 
found be 
significant 
Descriptive 
8 Cooke (1989) Disclosure in the 
Corporate Annual 
Reports of Swedish 
Companies 
Sweden Agency theory Dependent Variable 
Disclosure index 
Independent 
Variables 
Company size, listing 
status, industry and 
parent company 
relationship. 
Company size 
(+ve), listing 
status (+ve) 
Univariate, Linear 
Regression 
Stepwise 
9 Cooke (1992) An Assessment of 
Voluntary 
Disclosure in the 
Annual Reports of 
Japanese 
Corporations 
Japan Institutional theory Dependent Variable 
Disclosure index 
Independent 
Variables 
Company size, listing 
status, industry. 
Company size 
(+ve) 
Univariate, Linear 
Regression 
Stepwise and Factor 
analysis for size 
variables. 
10 Cooke (1993) Disclosure in 
Japanese Corporate 
Annual Reports 
Japan Agency theory Dependent Variable 
Disclosure index 
Independent 
Variables 
Listing status 
Listing status 
(+ve) 
Univariate 
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 11 Malone et al (1993) Empirical 
Investigation of the 
Extent of Corporate 
Financial 
Disclosure in the 
Oil and Gas 
Industry 
United States Agency theory Dependent Variable 
Disclosure index 
Independent 
Variables 
Company size, listing 
status, profitability, 
leverage, audit firm, 
number of 
shareholders 
listing status 
(+ve), 
profitability 
(+ve), number of 
shareholders 
(+ve) 
Stepwise 
Regression model 
12 Wallace et al 
(1994) 
The Relationship 
between 
Comprehensiveness 
of Corporate 
Annual Reports and 
Firm 
Characteristics in 
Spain. 
Spain Not specified Dependent Variable 
Disclosure index 
Independent 
Variables 
Company size, 
profitability, listing 
status, industry, 
liquidity, audit firm, 
gearing. 
Company size 
(+ve), listing 
status (+ve) 
Multivariate Rank 
OLS Regression 
13 Meek et al (1995) Factors Influencing 
Voluntary Annual 
Report Disclosures 
by US, UK and 
Continental 
European 
Multinational 
Corporations 
UK, US, France, 
Germany, 
Netherlands 
Agency theory Dependent Variable 
Disclosure index 
Independent 
Variables 
Company size, 
profitability, country 
origin, listing status, 
industry, leverage, 
industry. 
Company size 
(+ve), listing 
status (+ve), 
industry (+ve) 
Linear Regression  
models 
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 14 Raffournier (1995) The Determinants 
of Voluntary 
Financial 
Disclosure by 
Swiss Listed 
Companies 
Switzerland Not specified Dependent Variable 
Disclosure index 
Independent 
Variables 
Company size, 
profitability, 
ownership structure, 
internationality, 
industry, leverage, 
auditor type 
 
Company size 
(+ve), 
internationality 
(+ve) 
Univariate and 
Multiple Linear 
Regression 
(stepwise) 
15 Wallace and Naser 
(1995) 
Firm-Specific 
Determinants of the 
Comprehensiveness 
of Mandatory 
Disclosures in the 
Corporate Annual 
Reports of Firms 
Listed on the Stock 
Exchange of Hong 
Kong 
Hong Kong Not specified Dependent Variable 
Disclosure index 
Independent 
Variables 
Company size, 
profitability, scope of 
business, audit firm, 
market capitalization, 
sales, liquidity, 
earnings return, 
outside ownership, 
foreign registered 
office, gearing 
 
Company size 
(+ve), scope of 
business (+ve), 
profitability (-ve) 
OLS and Rank OLS 
Regression 
16 Inchausti (1997) The Influence of 
Company 
Characteristics and 
Accounting 
Spain Positive accounting 
theory 
Dependent Variable 
Disclosure index 
Independent 
Company size 
(+ve), auditing 
(+ve), stock 
exchange (+ve) 
Correlation and 
Stepwise 
Regression 
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 Regulation on 
Information 
Disclosed by 
Spanish Firms. 
Variables 
Company size, Stock 
exchange, industry, 
profitability, leverage, 
auditing, dividends 
17 Owusu-Ansah 
(1998) 
The Impact of 
Corporate 
Attributes on the 
Extent of 
Mandatory 
Disclosure and 
Reporting by Listed 
Companies in 
Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe Institutional theory Dependent Variable 
disclosure index 
Independent 
Variables 
Company size, audit 
quality, ownership 
structure, industry 
type, company age, 
MNC affiliation, 
profitability, liquidity 
company size 
(+ve), ownership 
structure (+ve), 
company age 
(+ve), 
multinational 
corporation 
affiliation (+ve), 
profitability (+ve) 
OLS Regression 
18 Entwistle (1999) Exploring the R&D 
Disclosure 
Environment. 
Canada Not specified Dependent Variable 
Number of sentences 
Independent 
Variables 
R & D expense 
proportion, 
capitalization of R & 
D, Cross listing 
status, Size, Industry, 
Capital structure 
Cross listing 
(+ve), size (+ve),  
Industry (+ve) 
Multiple Linear 
Regression 
19 Tower et al (1999) A Regional Study 
of Listed 
Companies' 
Compliance with 
Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, 
Philippines, 
Singapore and 
Agency theory Dependent Variable 
Disclosure ratio 
Independent 
Country (+ve), 
days (+ve) 
Univariate and 
General Linear 
Model 
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 International 
Accounting 
Standards. 
Thailand Variables 
Country, Size, 
Leverage, Profit, 
Industry, Days 
20 Depoers (2000) A Cost-Benefit 
Study of Voluntary 
Disclosure: Some 
Empirical Evidence 
from French Listed 
Companies. 
France Agency theory Dependent Variable 
Disclosure index 
Independent 
Variables 
Company size, 
barriers to entry, 
labour pressure, 
leverage, ownership 
structure, foreign 
activity, audit firm. 
Company size 
(+ve), foreign 
activity (+ve) 
Multiple Linear 
Regression, 
Stepwise OLS 
21 Street and Gray 
(2001) 
Observance of 
International 
Accounting 
Standards: Factors 
Explaining Non-
Compliance 
China, France, 
Germany, 
Switzerland, Other 
Western Europe, 
Africa, Middle 
East, Former Soviet 
block 
Not specified Dependent Variable 
Disclosure Index 
Independent 
Variables 
Listing status, 
company size, 
profitability, industry, 
type of auditor, type 
of accounting 
standard used, type of 
auditing standard 
used, country of 
domicile, size of 
home stock market.  
Listing status 
(+ve), company 
size (+ve), 
auditing standard 
(+ve) 
Multiple 
Regression, 
Correlation, 
ANOVA, and 
Univariate 
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 22 Bujaki and 
McConomy (2002) 
Corporate 
Governance: 
Factors Influencing 
Voluntary 
Disclosure by 
Publicly Traded 
Canadian Firms. 
Canada Not specified Dependent Variable 
Disclosure score 
Independent 
Variables 
Financial condition, 
Share issue, unrelated 
director, regulated 
industry, medium and 
size. 
Company size 
(+ve), Industry 
(+ve) 
Linear Regression 
23 Chau and Gray 
(2002) 
Ownership 
Structure and 
Corporate 
Voluntary 
Disclosure in Hong 
Kong and 
Singapore 
Hong Kong and 
Singapore 
Agency theory Dependent Variable 
Disclosure Index 
Independent 
Variables 
Ownership structure, 
size, leverage, audit 
firm, multinational, 
industry and 
profitability. 
 
Ownership 
structure (+ve), 
size (+ve) 
Linear Regression 
24 Naser et al (2002) Empirical Evidence 
on the Depth of 
Corporate 
Information 
Disclosure in 
Developing 
Countries: The 
Case of Jordan. 
Jordan Agency theory Dependent Variable 
Disclosure Index 
Independent 
Variables 
Company size, 
Liquidity, Market 
Capitalization, 
Gearing, Sales, 
Profitability, Number 
Company size 
(+ve), audit firm 
status (+ve), 
liquidity (+ve), 
gearing (+ve), 
profitability (-ve) 
Multiple Linear 
Regression, 
Correlation and 
Univariate 
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 of shareholders, % of 
Government 
ownership, % of 
individual ownership, 
% of Foreign 
ownership, % of Arab 
ownership, Size of 
Auditors, Type of 
Industry, Profit 
Margin, Number of 
employees. 
25 Camfferman and 
Cooke (2002) 
An Analysis of 
Disclosure in the 
Annual Reports of 
U.K. And Dutch 
Companies 
United Kingdom 
and Netherlands 
Agency theory Dependent Variable 
Disclosure Index 
Independent 
Variables 
Industry type, 
size, net income 
margin, debt ratio, 
liquidity ratio, return 
on equity, and audit 
firm 
 
Company size 
(+ve), industry 
type (+ve) 
Mann-Whitney 
nonparametric 
statistic and 
Regression analysis 
26 Ferguson, Lam and 
Lee (2002) 
Voluntary 
Disclosure by State-
Owned Enterprises 
Listed on the Stock 
Exchange of Hong 
Kong 
Hong Kong Not specified Dependent Variable 
Disclosure Index 
Independent 
Variables 
Firm type (Local, H-
Share, Red chip), 
Industry type, firm 
Firm type (+ve), 
multiple listing 
(+ve) 
Univariate and 
Linear OLS 
Regression 
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 size, leverage, 
multiple listing. 
27 Eng and Mak 
(2003) 
Corporate 
Governance and 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Singapore Agency theory Dependent Variable 
Disclosure Index 
Independent 
Variables 
Managerial 
ownership, 
government 
ownership, proportion 
of outside directors, 
sixe, leverage, 
growth, industry, 
audit firm, analyst, 
profitability. 
Ownership 
structure (+ve), 
board 
composition 
(+ve) 
OLS Regression 
28 Glaum and Street 
(2003) 
Compliance With 
The Disclosure 
Requirement of 
German’s new 
market: IAS Versus 
US GAAP 
 
Germany Agency theory Dependent Variable 
Disclosure Index 
Independent 
Variables 
Company size, 
Industry type, 
profitability, 
multinational, 
Company size 
(+ve), 
profitability 
(+ve), ownership 
structure (+ve) 
Univariate and 
Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) 
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 domicile, maturity, 
growth, growth 
options, choice, 
ownership structure, 
country, listing. 
29 Ali et al (2004) Disclosure 
Compliance with 
National 
Accounting 
Standards by Listed 
Companies in 
South Asia 
India and Pakistan Not specified Dependent Variable 
Disclosure Index 
Independent 
Variables 
Size, financial 
leverage, 
multinational 
company status, size 
of external auditor 
and profitability. 
Size (+ve), 
profitability 
(+ve), 
multinational 
company status 
(+ve) 
Univariate, 
Ordinary Least 
Square, 
(OLS),Correlation 
and Factor analysis 
30 Prencipe (2004) Proprietary Costs 
and Determinants 
of Voluntary 
Segment 
Disclosure: 
Evidence from 
Italian Listed 
Companies 
Italy Proprietary costs 
theory 
Dependent Variable 
Disclosure index. 
Independent 
Variables 
Correspondence 
between segments, 
growth rate, listing 
status, age, ownership 
dilution, profitability, 
size, leverage. 
Correspondence 
between 
segments (+ve), 
listing status 
(+ve), age (+ve), 
ownership 
dilution (+ve), 
profitability 
(+ve), size (+ve), 
leverage (+ve) . 
OLS regression 
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 31 Rosario Babio 
Arcay and 
Vazquez. (2005) 
Corporate 
Characteristics, 
Governance Rules 
and the Extent of 
Voluntary 
Disclosure in Spain 
Spain Not specified Dependent Variable 
Disclosure Index 
Independent 
Variables 
Firm size, proportion 
of independent 
directors, existence of 
audit committee, 
ownership 
concentration, 
investor protection, 
stock option plan. 
Firm size (+ve), 
proportion of 
independent 
directors (+ve), 
audit committee 
(+ve), stock 
option plan (+ve), 
investor 
protection (+ve)  
Univariate and 
Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) 
32 Daske and 
Gebhardt (2006) 
International 
Financial Reporting 
Standards and 
experts’ perceptions 
of disclosure 
quality 
Germany, 
Switzerland and 
Austria 
Not specified Log of market 
capitalization, log of 
assets, average 
number of analysts, 
total debt to market 
capitalization, PPE to 
total assets and return 
on assets. 
log of assets 
(+ve), average 
number of 
analysts (+ve), 
total debt to 
market 
capitalization 
(+ve) 
Multiple Linear 
Regression, 
Correlation and 
Univariate 
33 Barako (2007) Determinants of 
Voluntary 
Disclosures in 
Kenyan Companies 
Annual Reports 
Kenya Agency theory Dependent Variable 
Disclosure index 
Independent 
Variables 
Board composition, 
leadership structure, 
board size, audit 
committee, 
shareholder 
Firm size (+ve), 
audit committee 
(+ve), board 
composition (-
ve), profitability 
(-ve), leverage 
(+ve), liquidity 
(+ve) 
Univariate, 
Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) with 
Panel-Corrected 
Standard Errors 
(PCSEs). 
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 concentration, foreign 
ownership, 
institutional 
ownership, firm size, 
external auditor firm, 
leverage, profitability, 
liquidity and industry 
type. 
34 Iatridis (2008) Accounting 
Disclosure and 
Firms' Financial 
Attributes: 
Evidence from the 
UK Stock Market 
United Kingdom Agency theory Dependent Variable 
Binary 
Independent Not 
specified Variables 
Size, growth, 
profitability, liquidity, 
leverage, taxation, 
management 
 
Size, (+ve), 
growth (+ve), 
leverage (+ve). 
Binary Logistic 
Regression and 
Kruskal-Wallis test. 
35 Mohammad and 
Helmi (2009) 
Voluntary 
Disclosure in the 
Annual Reports of 
an Emerging 
Country: The Case 
of Qatar 
Qatar Agency theory Dependent Variable 
Disclosure Index 
Independent 
Variables 
Firm age, firm size, 
profitability, 
complexity, assets in 
place  
Firm age (+ve), 
size (+ve), assets 
in place (-Ve) 
OLS Regression 
Analysis 
36 Kim, Lee and 
Taeyong (2010) 
Corporate 
Transparency and 
Firm Performance: 
Evidence from 
Korea Not specified Dependent Variable 
Disclosure index 
Independent 
firm profitability 
(+ve), firm value 
(-ve) 
multivariate 
regression methods 
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 Korean Ventures Variables 
firm value, firm 
profitability and firm 
sustainability  
37 Jianfei et al (2011) Internal Control 
Disclosure and 
Corporate 
Governance: 
Empirical Research 
from Chinese 
Listed Companies 
China Not specified Dependent Variable 
Disclosure Index 
Independent 
Variables 
The degree of 
ownership 
concentration, the 
proportion of state 
ownership, board 
size, the total number 
of board directors, 
directors’ 
remuneration, 
directors’ education 
level, the proportion 
of independent 
directors ,the number 
of independent 
directors/the total 
number of di- rectors, 
two part-time posts of 
chairman and general 
man-ager; 
Supervisors’ 
education level. 
Directors 
remuneration 
(+ve), proportion 
of state 
ownership (-ve),  
Descriptive 
statistics, 
correlation analysis, 
Linear regression 
analysis. 
  
93 
 
 38 Aboagye et al 
(2012) 
Corporate 
Governance and 
Disclosure 
Practices of 
Ghanaian Listed 
Companies 
Ghana Agency theory Dependent Variable 
Disclosure Index 
Independent 
Variables 
Board composition, 
audit committee 
composition, audit 
committee 
competence, market 
capitalization 
ownership structure, 
firm size, leverage. 
Board 
composition 
(+ve), audit 
committee 
composition 
(+ve) 
Regression 
analysis, descriptive 
statistics,  
 Ali et al (2012) Value Relevance of 
Voluntary 
Disclosure: 
Evidence from 
Turkish Firms 
Turkey Not specified Dependent Variable 
Market capitalization. 
Independent 
Variables 
Voluntary disclosure 
score. 
Voluntary 
disclosure score 
(+ve) 
Descriptive 
statistics, univariate 
analysis, 
multivariate 
analysis. 
39 Omar (2013) Ownership 
Structure and 
Corporate 
Voluntary 
Disclosure: 
Evidence from 
Bahrain 
Bahrain Agency theory Dependent Variable 
Disclosure Index 
Independent 
Variables 
Firm size, firm 
leverage, ownership 
structure, blockholder 
ownership, 
managerial 
ownership, 
Firm size (+ve), 
Firm leverage (-
ve), blockholder 
ownership (-ve), 
Descriptive 
statistics, univariate 
analysis, 
multivariate 
analysis 
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 government 
ownership. 
41 Khiari (2013) Corporate 
Governance and 
Disclosure Quality: 
Taxonomy of 
Tunisian Listed 
Firms Using the 
Decision Tree 
Method Based 
Approach 
Tunisia Not specified Dependent Variable 
Disclosure Index 
Independent 
Variables 
Board of directors, 
ownership structure, 
board audit 
committee. 
Board of 
directors (+ve), 
ownership 
structure (+ve) 
Content analysis 
42 Idaad et al (2014) Board 
Composition, Firm 
Characteristics, and 
Voluntary 
Disclosure: The 
Case of Jordanian 
Firms Listed on the 
Amman Stock 
Exchange 
Jordan Agency theory Dependent Variable 
Disclosure Index 
Independent 
Variables 
Board size, 
proportion of non-
executive directors, 
CEO duality, board 
ownership 
concentration, 
institutional 
ownership, foreign 
ownership, director 
age, director gender.  
Foreign 
ownership (+ve), 
director age 
(+ve), ownership 
concentration (-
ve) 
Multiple regression 
analysis. 
43 Kabir (2014) Firm 
Characteristics and 
Voluntary 
Segments: 
Nigeria Agency theory Dependent Variable 
Disclosure Index 
Independent 
Variables 
firm size (+ve), 
industry type 
(+ve, firm listing 
status (-ve), 
Descriptive 
analysis, 
Pearson 
correlations and 
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 Disclosure among 
the Largest Firms in 
Nigeria 
Firm size, industry 
type, Listing status 
age, growth, return on 
investment, 
ownership diffusion, 
voluntary segments 
disclosure. 
growth (-ve), 
return on 
investment (-ve), 
ownership 
diffusion(-ve), 
voluntary 
segments 
disclosure (-ve). 
Multivariate 
regression 
44 Madhani (2014) 
 
Corporate 
Governance and 
Disclosure 
Practices in India: 
Domestic Firms 
Versus Cross-
Listed Firms 
India Not specified Dependent Variable 
Disclosure Index 
Independent 
Variables 
Listing status age, 
return on investment, 
ownership diffusion.  
Listing status 
(+ve),  
Descriptive 
analysis, 
Pearson 
correlations and 
Multivariate 
regression 
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 3.10 Developments in International Corporate Governance  
Corporate governance practices vary widely across countries and firms. A 
great deal of effort has been expended on improving corporate governance quality 
following the corporate scandals of Enron and WorldCom in the US, HIH and 
OneTel in Australia and Parlamat in Italy. Such global collapses have confirmed that 
corporate governance issues are not merely a dilemma for emerging markets 
financial system but also for developed economies and has become an international 
concern (Rhoads 2004). As such, there is a need for an international response and a 
number of countries and corporate governance reformists have sought to formulate 
and introduce guiding principles that other countries can adapt to their institutional 
circumstances. As a result of these efforts by organizations such as the Organization 
of Economic Co-operation and development (OECD), other countries have 
implemented new rules and stock exchange listing requirements in order to 
strengthen the quality of their corporate governance processes. Such examples 
include the New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, ASX, LSE, DSE and BMB who 
have improved their listing regulations to introduce stronger and more effective 
governance structures for companies. 
By way of background to the work done by the OECD in corporate 
governance, in 1999, the OECD introduced and designed a set of principles of 
corporate governance for firms to adhere to (OECD 2004) with international 
applicability (Dallas and Bradley 2002). Since then, the OECD principles of 
corporate governance have been recognized as an international benchmark for 
investors, policy makers, stakeholders, and companies including the International 
monetary fund, the World Bank, the United Nations and the G7 leaders at the 
Cologne summit in June 1999. 
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 3.11 Summary of the Chapter 
Chapter Three outlines the literature review relating to corporate governance 
disclosure with definitions of corporate governance and mandatory and voluntary 
corporate governance disclosures initially provided. A detailed literature review on 
the determinants of corporate governance disclosures is consequently undertaken 
with prior disclosure studies in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia identified. A 
brief discussion on the developments in international corporate governance is then 
provided. Chapter Four will discuss the theoretical framework for corporate 
disclosure and develop the hypotheses of this thesis. 
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 CHAPTER FOUR 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 Overview of the Chapter 
 This chapter has two main objectives, namely to discuss the theoretical 
underpinnings to the study of corporate governance disclosure and to present the key 
literature relating to the hypotheses examined in the study. This chapter is organized 
as follows: Section 4.2 describes the two theoretical perspectives to the study with 
Section 4.3 developing all the testable hypotheses. A conceptual schema illustrating 
the key relationships is also provided in Section 4.4 and a summary of the chapter 
concludes Section 4.5. 
4.2 Theoretical Perspective – Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Corporate governance has been examined in a number of theoretical contexts 
such as agency theory, institutional theory, legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory and 
resource dependency theory (Psaros 2009). The two theories most relevant to the 
current study are agency theory and institutional theory given the relevance of 
agency theory to the insider/outsider dichotomy prevalent in most corporate 
structures and institutional theory to the functioning of capital markets and society as 
a whole. In line with agency theory, companies prepare and release information to 
user groups such as shareholders, creditors, financial analysts and the principal 
objective of information disclosure by firms is to mitigate conflicts among 
shareholders and managers and therefore minimise agency costs (Lobo and Zhou 
2001). At the same time, the study seeks to investigate the determinants of corporate 
governance disclosure from three different institutional settings, i.e., emerging, 
developing and developed settings. Institutional theory maintains that firms are not 
only be influenced by informal pressures to disclose information, but also face 
formal, coercive pressures to conform to societal standards (Scott 2001; Greening 
99 
 
 and Gray 1994; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The following subsections discuss both 
agency and institutional theories and also provide a link between them and corporate 
governance disclosure. 
4.2.1 Agency Theory 
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) explain the division of ownership and control 
as an agency relationship based upon conflicts of interests between a range of 
contracting parties, namely, shareholders, corporate managers and debt holders. 
Specifically, both Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest 
that an agency relationship occurs when the principal delivers decision-making 
authority to an agent to perform some service on the behalf of the principal. 
Shareholders (and debt holders) act as principals in seeking to obtain maximum 
utility from the actions of management (who serve as the agents). However, both 
parties in the relationship are utility maximizers and it is reasonable to believe that 
the managers will not always act in the best interests of the shareholders but will 
pursue self-interest creating the agency problem. As a result of having conflicting 
aspirations, both shareholders and managers incur monitoring and bonding costs 
respectively, known as agency costs. 
Corporate governance structures in firms are viewed as an important 
mechanism to overcome the agency problem and reduce agency costs (Pratt and 
Zeckhauser 1991; Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Stano 1976; 
Fama 1980). Strong corporate governance mechanisms often align the interests of 
owners and managers (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Stano 1976). In an agency theory framework, information disclosure promoted 
by corporate governance structures in firms is, in fact, considered as essential to 
overcome agency problem. For example, Burton (2000) argues that agency costs are 
100 
 
 best controlled by limiting management discretion through the establishment of 
structures to monitor and control management behaviour. Such structures include 
independent board of directors, an independent chairperson and independent board 
sub-committee such as the audit committee (Ellstrand et al. 1999). Such structures 
would serve to moderate management’s self-serving behaviour and improve the 
quality of information generated by management, including financial and non-
financial disclosures. 
4.2.2  Institutional Theory 
 Since Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) seminal work developing institutional theory, a 
vast body of research has subsequently used institutional theory. Institutional theory 
suggests that organizational structures play a vital role as symbolic displays of 
conformity and social accountability (Kalbers and Fogarty. 1998). Institutional 
theory scrutinizes the function of societal forces in determining appropriate firm 
behaviour (Ingram and Simons 1995; Oliver 1997). Firms obey the rule and 
regulations expected from society to improve their legitimacy (DiMaggio and 
Powell. 1983). Given therefore such expectations from society, firms may choose to 
disclose information to key stakeholders such as shareholders, creditors, and 
financial analysts etc. to enhance their legitimacy, right to use resources and ensure 
their continued existence.  
 For the purposes of the study, institutional theory offers a basis to explain 
how external pressures affect organizational behaviour and consequently affect their 
disclosures. The rationale for information disclosure by firms is to provide 
information to firms’ key stakeholders such as customers, investors, employees, and 
other interest groups. Such information disclosure policies are premised on the 
notion that making organizations disclose information can reduce stakeholder 
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 pressure (Weil et al. 2006). Prior literature has shown such stakeholder pressure to 
vary according to the nature of information disclosed, geographic locations and 
industry (McConnell and Schwab 1990; Sine and Lee 2009). Using institutional 
theory as a theoretical framework, a number of other studies find that external 
institutional pressures force firms to disclose corporate governance information 
(Dacin 2002; DiMaggio and Powell. 1983; Meyer and Rowan. 1977; O'connell 2006; 
Oliver 1991; Scott 1987). 
 It is important for firms to implement the new structures as a response to 
rules, accreditation demands and public opinion. O’Connell (2006), argues that a 
developed corporate governance mechanism such as audit committee or board of 
directors can help the firm to respond appropriately to such expectations. O’Connell 
(2006) also believes that firms that do not conform no longer have legitimacy of 
functions. As a result such firms are at risk to claims that they are slipshod, 
unreasonable, or superfluous and risk forfeiting stakeholder support (O'Connell 
2006). 
4.2.3 Adoption of Theories 
 The prior discussions indicate that both theories have a role in the level of 
corporate governance disclosure by firms even though both theories have different 
individual objectives. The main benefit of corporate governance disclosure is to 
provide additional assurance to different stakeholder groups on the integrity and 
fairness of presented financial information. Agency theory is adopted in the current 
study since agency theory provides the most relevant theoretical framework for 
investigating the relationship between corporate governance, firm and country 
characteristics disclosure. The reason corporations need to disclose information can 
best be explained within an agency theory context.  
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  For example, Pincus et al. (1989) found a significant relationship between 
agency costs (proxied by firm leverage, size and ownership structure) and the 
formation of an audit committee. In this respect, corporate governance disclosure 
practices is considered to work as a fundamental mechanism to reduce information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders of corporation. Scholars strongly argue 
that corporate governance disclosure is a pivotal governance mechanism in 
mitigating conflicts between contractual parties (Carcello and Neal 2000; Van Der 
Zahn and Tower 2004; Beasley 1996). To decrease the information gap therefore, a 
variety of contractual mechanisms, including corporate boards and audit committees 
are considered necessary to balance the interests of the management with the needs 
of outsiders (Klein 1998; Shleifer and Vishny 1997 ). For this reason, from an 
agency theory perspective, monitoring the actions and decisions of management is 
the primary focus of the board. Fama (1980), for example, finds that the composition 
of board structures is an effective monitoring mechanism in assuring the quality of 
reporting and corporate accountability. This view is also supported by other 
researchers (Dalton et al. 1998; Dulewicz and Herbert 2004; Peng 2004; Weisbach 
and Hermalin 2003). Given therefore the close association of corporate governance 
and firm characteristics with information disclosure and contractual arrangements 
arising from agency conflicts, agency theory provides the study’s underlying 
theoretical perspective. 
On the other hand, institutional theory is also relevant for the study as this 
theory suggests that firms, in efforts to conform to societal expectations, prepare and 
release disclosure items not all of which is mandatory. A number of studies 
determined that institutional factors, for example, shareholder protection laws and 
judicial efficiency have an affirmative role on corporate governance disclosure 
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 (Klapper and Love 2002; La porta, Lopez-de-silanes and Shleifer 1999; La porta et 
al. 2000). As such, corporate governance disclosure can best be applied in an 
institutional theory context since institutional factors are strongly linked to corporate 
governance disclosure. Researchers have concluded that institutional factors can 
have a significant impact on the level of disclosure since developed laws, legal 
regimes and regulations have all been found to be positively associated with 
institutional theory (La porta et al. 2000).  
Institutional theory is also relevant to the study given its focus to examine the 
extent of corporate governance disclosure within three different institutional settings 
(i.e., Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Australia). Therefore, in the context of the study, 
institutional theoretical arguments suggest that organizations may engage in 
complying with guidelines on expectations such as disclosure levels as these are seen 
as obvious or proper, as opposed to being calculative and self-interested (Oliver 
1991). Scott (1987) documents that outside pressures and expectations relate to not 
only former corporate governance guidelines, but also public opinion regarding good 
corporate governance practices. In other words, applying corporate governance 
guidelines may be driven not only by process of self-interest, as explained by 
DiMaggio (1983), but also by an acceptance of these institutionalized guidelines. 
Covaleski and Dirsmith (1988) go on to argue that an organization’s survival 
requires it to conform to social norms of acceptable behaviour. DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983), Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Zucker (1987) all suggest that the self-serving 
advantages of compliance with institutional norms result in a variety of rewards for 
organizations such as increased sales, higher levels of legitimacy, high-quality 
employees etc.  
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 Using institutional theory as a theoretical framework, a number of studies 
find that external institutional pressures force firms to adopt corporate governance 
guidelines (Dacin 2002; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977; 
O'Connell 2006; Oliver 1991; Scott 1987). In addition, in a strong institutional 
setting, firms will be able to disclose more information for different groups of 
consumers in order to increase their legitimacy and mitigate social pressures. As a 
result, institutional factors have an influence in the area of corporate governance and 
the level of disclosure.  
4.3 Development of Hypotheses 
 The study investigates whether corporate governance characteristics, firm 
characteristics and country characteristics are key predictor variables affecting the 
levels of both mandatory and voluntary disclosures for Bangladeshi, Malaysian and 
Australian listed firms. The following sub-sections present the development of 
hypotheses that will be tested using empirical analyses, including the rationale for the 
expected relationships and identify the proxies utilized to measure each of the 
variables. 
4.3.1  Corporate Governance Characteristics and Disclosure 
 If a firm has stronger corporate governance (i.e., strong board characteristics 
and audit quality) mechanisms in place, these structures should ensure that the firm 
discloses required and often, additional information in their annual report to mitigate 
external pressure from society and reduce agency costs. For the purposes of the 
study, the corporate governance characteristics examined are board independence, 
board size, CEO duality, and audit quality.  
4.3.1.1 Board Independence 
Corporate governance advocates, regulators and scholars frequently argue 
that a board with independent directors is more likely to be effective in discharging 
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 its responsibilities. This is due to the fact that independent directors, having no role 
in the executive or day-to-day running of the firm, are much more concerned about 
their reputational capital and more likely to required firms to comply with all rules 
and regulations, including those relating disclosures. In fact, the independence of 
board members often results in firms also making additional voluntary disclosures at 
the behest of these independent directors. Prior literature has shown that firms whose 
boards are dominated by independent directors are expected to disclose more 
information (Fama and Jensen 1983; Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman 1981). 
Similarly, other research has determined that firm-level disclosure is associated with 
the higher percentage of independent directors on the board (Chen and Jaggi 2000; 
Forker 1992). 
Moreover, in a corporate environment, there is a possibility to reduce 
information asymmetry by appointing independent directors on behalf of the external 
owners (Healy and Palepu 2001). In this way, agency theory suggests that board 
effectiveness can be increased through the work of such non-executive directors 
(Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Mangel and Singh 1993). 
Another study suggests that non-executive directors are the real monitors of a firm as 
they have the experience, expertise and better linkages with the outside environment 
(Tricker 1984). 
4.3.1.2 Board Size  
Board size may also influence the level of disclosure made by firms. A larger 
number of directors on the board play a more substantial role in reducing the 
information asymmetry that is inherent in agency relationships existing within firms 
(Chen and Jaggi 2000). Therefore, a greater level of information disclosures by firms 
is expected with more directors are on boards (Zahra, Neubaum and Huse 2000).  A 
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 board of directors is the highest level of controlling body within a firm and they are 
also responsible for making policies and procedures which managers are expected to 
adhere to. Chen and Jaggi suggest (2000) that there is a positive linkage between the 
level of disclosure and the amount of directors on the board. 
Brinbaun (1984) also suggests that a greater number of board members are 
likely to result in increases in the level of information disclosure. The size of the 
board is believed to impact the level of disclosure as larger boards are expected to 
observe management more closely as smaller boards tend to result in slower 
information processing (Zahra, Neubaum and Huse 2000). As such, the efforts and 
capabilities of a larger board of directors increases the value of the firm which results 
in an improved level of disclosure.  
4.3.1.3 CEO Duality 
CEO duality can be described as a role duality in which the CEO (or the 
equivalent top manager) of the firm is also the Chairperson of the board of directors. 
Past researchers such as Donaldson and Davis (1991), Forker (1992), Rechner and 
Dalton (1991), Shamser and Annuar (1993), Stiles and Taylor (1993), and Blackburn 
(1994) all call for the separation of these two roles as evidence suggests that CEO 
duality reduces internal governance quality with the CEO being able to regulate 
board meetings, prepare the agenda and select board members leading to lower 
disclosures. Other researchers believe that CEO duality actually increases internal 
governance quality given that the CEO, who is involved in the day-to-day operations 
of the firm, is better able to inform the board and also help in effective monitoring 
(Dahya, Lonie and Power 1996; Dhaliwal 1980; Eisenhardt 1989; Rechner and 
Dalton 1991). 
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 However, given that the majority of the prior literature indicates that CEO 
duality reduces governance quality and in turn disclosures, the study assumes that 
CEO duality is detrimental to the levels of disclosures by firms. 
4.3.1.4 Big 4 Auditor 
Audit quality is posited to increase the quality of financial information 
reported by firms given that, as a result of a higher quality auditor, a greater amount 
and quality of financial and non-financial information is provided by firms. Prior 
literature specifically links the skill, expertise and experience of the large big four 
auditing firms in inducing firms to engage in greater levels of disclosure (Wallace, 
Naser and Mora 1994; De Angelo 1981; Chow 1982; Ahmed and Nicholls 1994). It 
is therefore likely that the appointment of a big four auditor will result in increased 
levels of both mandatory and voluntary disclosures by firms, although there may be a 
lagged effect before firms actually start disclosing more. 
4.3.1.5 Audit Committee 
The existence of an audit committee is also important to improve the level of 
transparency and disclosure within firms. Forker (1992) suggested the presence of an 
audit committee is an important component in terms of reduce information gap 
between insiders and outsiders. Researchers and regulators suggest that an audit 
committee, particularly one that consists of non-executive or independent directors, 
will be more successful in persuading management to increase levels of disclosure 
given that audit committees are specifically charged with the responsibility of 
providing oversight of the firm’s financial reporting process (Abbott, Parker and 
Peters 2004; Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 2007; Blue Ribbon Committee 
1999; Carcello and Neal 2000; Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 1995; McMullen and 
Raghunandan 1996; Menon and Williams 1994). 
108 
 
 The above discussions relate to the corporate governance characteristics 
examined in the study. In line with the above arguments, the following hypotheses 
are proposed with regards to the relation between corporate governance 
characteristics and levels of disclosures by firms in the three countries examined: 
H1a: Corporate governance characteristics of firms influence the extent of 
mandatory disclosure by publicly listed firms in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. 
H1b: Corporate governance characteristics of firms influence the extent of voluntary 
disclosure by publicly listed firms in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. 
In summary, given that the five measures above have been found in the past 
literature to influence firm level disclosures, the study will also develop proxies for 
these measures when determining the extent to which that they influence the level of 
both mandatory and voluntary disclosure in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia.  
4.3.2 Firm Characteristics and Disclosure 
 If a firm has certain characteristics, it is believed that these features can 
influence the extent of disclosures by the firm. For the purposes of the study, the firm 
characteristics examined are ownership concentration, return on asset, firm size, firm 
leverage and firm age. 
4.3.2.1 Ownership Concentration 
The impact of ownership concentration on firm disclosure has received 
considerable attention over the last three decades (Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Morck, 
shleifer and Vishny 1988). Increased levels of concentrated ownership can lead to 
greater levels corporate governance disclosure (McConnell and Servaes 1990). 
Specifically, recent studies on East Asian markets found that concentrated ownership 
within firms can reduce agency conflicts between inside owners and outside 
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 investors thereby resulting in greater levels of disclosure (Claessens, Djankov and 
Lang 2000; Claessens et al. 2002; La porta, Lopez-de-silanes and Shleifer 1999). 
Specifically, contemporary research work on East Asian markets establish that 
concentrated ownership volumes contained through organizations can moderate 
agency engagements among privileged owners and external stakeholders, in so 
doing, bring about in superior stages of disclosure (Claessens, Djankov and Lang 
2000; Claessens et al. 2002; La porta, Lopez-de-silanes and Shleifer 1999).  
Researchers believed that high levels of concentrated ownership can improve 
monitoring quality resulting in a better level of information disclosure (McConnell 
and Servaes 1990). Other empirical studies also show that ownership concentration 
can reduce the information gap between inside owners and outside investors 
potentially resulting in better disclosures (Claessens et al. 2002; Claessens, Djankov 
and Lang 2000; La porta, Lopez-de-silanes and Shleifer 1999).  
4.3.2.2 Firm Return on Assets  
Return on assets is also an indicator of firm’s profitability but, unlike return 
on equity, it is calculated using the firm’s total assets as the benchmark. A profitable 
firm may wish to disclose more information as this will enhance investors’ 
confidence and ultimately, the compensation of the management. According to Ng 
and Koh (1994), profitable firms wish to disclose more information as this will 
generate a better reputation and help the firm either avoid or minimize their exposure 
to external regulations. Additionally, some of the disclosures may relate to the firm 
introducing self-regulation mechanisms to evade external scrutiny (Watson, Shrives 
and Marston 2002).  
Furthermore, profitable companies are prepared to reveal higher levels of 
disclosures as this has been found to increase stakeholder support for their continued 
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 profitable position (Inchausti 1997). Other prior research has also revealed a positive 
relation between a firm’s return on asset and the release of information (Wallace, 
Naser and Mora 1994; Lundholm and Lang 1993; Singhvi and Desai 1971). 
4.3.2.3 Firm Size 
Prior studies have identified firm size is an important variable in information 
disclosure. This is because bigger companies may release additional information due 
to reputational concerns and the ability to allocate additional resources to disclosing 
(Ahmed and Courtis 1999; Alsaeed 2006; Buzby 1975; Chow and Wong-Boren 
1987; Cooke 1982; Depoers 2000). Other researchers also found that the size of the 
firm is clearly connected with the stage of development by firms (Barako, Hancock 
and Izan 2006) and that larger firms disclose more information than smaller firms 
(Brammer and Pavelin 2006). 
Researchers have noted several reasons for larger firms to disclose more 
information than smaller firms. Managers of larger firms are expected to release 
additional material since they are very concerned about their reputation and the 
future profits of the firm whereas smaller firms are more likely to think that complete 
release of information possibly will negatively affect their economic situation (Ho 
and Wong 2001; Wallace, Kamal and Araceli 1994; Watson, Shrives and Marston 
2002). 
4.3.2.4 Firm Leverage  
Prior research has determined that there is a positive association between 
leverage and disclosure given that a more leveraged firm has to provide greater levels 
of disclosure to satisfy the needs of creditors and (increasingly) vigilant stakeholders 
(Ahmed and Courtis 1999; Alsaeed 2006; Fama and Miller 1972; Malone, Fries and 
Jones 1993; Naser, Alkatib and Karbhari 2002). Moreover, if firms do consequently 
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 demonstrate higher levels of disclosure in efforts to satisfy creditors, the firm’s costs 
of raising funding can fall (Khanna, Palepu and Srinivasan 2004). Past studies have 
shown mixed result on the relationship between firm leverage and with the level of 
disclosure among US and UK firms suggesting that institutional features can affect 
the relationship between leverage and disclosure by firms (Meek, Roberts and Gray 
1995).  
4.3.2.5 Firm Age 
Firm age is thought to influence the disclosure of information. A recently 
listed company may need to reveal further information to reduce the uncertainty from 
investors and to encourage these investors and other key stakeholders such as 
creditors to not only invest or lend funds to the firm but also on favourable terms 
(Choi 1973; Spero 1979). Owusu-Ansah (1998) believe that there are two main 
reasons why information disclosure is affected by firm age: (1) a newly listed firm 
may experience competition in the corporate environment; and (2) difficulties in 
getting the required information because of expenditure and effort. In addition, newly 
listed firms may suffer from lack of capital, not have a well-established brand name 
and/or corporate reputation compared to older firms (Kakani, Saha and Reddy 2001).  
The above discussions relate to the firm characteristics examined in the study. 
In line with the above arguments, the following hypotheses are proposed with 
regards to the relation between firm characteristics and levels of disclosures by firms 
in the three countries examined: 
H2a: Firm characteristics influence the extent of mandatory disclosure by publicly 
listed firms in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. 
H2b: Firm characteristics influence the extent of voluntary disclosure by publicly 
listed firms in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. 
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 In summary, given that the six measures above have been found in the past 
literature to influence firm level disclosures, the study will also develop proxies for 
these measures when determining the extent to which that they influence the level of 
both mandatory and voluntary disclosure in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia.  
4.3.3 Country Characteristics and Disclosure 
If a firm has stronger country characteristics in place, these structures may 
ensure that the firm discloses required and additional information in their annual 
report to secure investments. Institutional theory also suggests that countries 
response to international pressure in order to gain legitimacy and consequently 
investments and enhance their chances of prosperity (Elsbach 1994; Suchman 1995; 
Zucker 1987). For the purposes of the study, the corporate governance characteristics 
examined are gross domestic product, equity markets, adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards, corruption, investor protection and the Gini 
coefficient. 
4.3.3.1 Gross Domestic Product 
Gross domestic product (GDP) represents the value of all goods and services 
produced in a country and prior literature often utilizes GDP per capita as an 
indicator of a country’s economy and the individual’s standard of living (Easterlin 
and Laura 2007). A high GDP level suggests improved production of goods and 
services and refers to the wellbeing of the individual with higher average incomes. 
Such incomes generally results in increased consumption levels that perpetuate the 
increase in a country’s economy (Stevenson and Justin 2008). For the purposes of the 
study, it is posited that the greater the GDP per capita of a country, the greater the 
likelihood of educated investors and the stronger the regulatory framework in the 
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 country. These factors consequently result in company’s responding to increased 
demands from stakeholders and regulatory agencies by disclosing more. 
4.3.3.2 Equity Market  
Equity markets are an indicator of market growth within a country. Equity 
market development is an important determinant of corporate financing choices and 
long-run economic growth (Demirguc and Levine 1996). Strong equity markets 
demonstrate economic growth and liquidity that leads to capital build-up which, in 
turn, is connected to economic growth within a country (Demirguc and Levine 
1996). Equity markets provide capital and allocate this capital into useful 
investments by utilizing domestic savings, improving information, formulating 
monitoring mechanisms of good corporate governance practices, and facilitating 
exchange of financial instruments that correspond to the ownership of capital (Levine 
2005). Equity markets consequently lead to long-term growth and for the purposes of 
the study, it is posited that the greater the market growth and hence trading of a 
country, the greater the likelihood of firm’s disclosures in that country as the 
securities traded increases transactional activity resulting in greater regulatory 
protection. 
4.3.3.3 International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
The main objective of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is to 
provide a general global language for business so that company accounts are 
understandable and comparable across international boundaries. IFRS resulted from 
the development of international shareholdings and businesses and is particularly 
important for companies that have dealings in several countries. The implementation 
of IFRS results in an increase in comparable financial information which 
consequently decreases the information asymmetry between firm insiders and 
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 outsiders (Ashbaugh 2001; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000). As a result, additional 
comparable and (often) international financial information about a firm is available 
to outside investors and managers are therefore unable to obscure their 
expropriations from companies (Ball 2006). Given that IFRS adoption increases the 
provision of comparable financial information internationally by increasing the 
understand ability and comparability of financial reports, IFRS adoption in a country 
is expected to also result in increased levels of disclosures. 
4.3.3.4 Corruption  
Corruption is an important factor influencing firm level disclosures. Empirical 
research on corruption is rare given the methodological issues involved in measuring 
this construct and obtaining the required data (Treisman 2000). Corruption is 
expected to have a negative consequence on economic growth and social welfare as 
corrupt practices reduce the effective and efficient operations of capital markets as 
both individuals and companies may fear to participate. Of the limited prior studies 
investigating corruption, results indicate that corrupt practices lower economic 
growth and this decreases the incentives for investment and capital trading (Bradhan 
1997; Huntington 1968; Leff 1964). Other adverse consequences of corruption 
within a country include slower economic growth resulting from reduced foreign 
direct investments and increased income inequality (Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson 
2002; Mauro 1995; Mo 2001; Wei 2000) 
.  For the purposes of the study, it is posited that the lower the corruption rate 
of a country, the greater the likelihood of firm’s disclosures in that country given that 
regulatory enforcement is likely effective in promoting legitimate and non-corrupt 
transactions. 
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 4.3.3.5 Investor Protection  
Investor protection mechanisms within a country impact the release of 
information for that country (Hope 2003; Jaggi and Low 2000; Bushman, Piotroski 
and Smith 2004). Researchers have indicated that the level of legal protection for 
investors is positively related with disclosures by firms (La porta et al. 2000). 
Investors act on disclosures if a country has strong legal protection for those 
investors whereas weak legal protection regimes lead investors believing that 
disclosures are held back resulting in ineffective disclosures and higher levels of 
uncertainly which discourage investment decisions. Morck, Yeung and Yo (2006) 
suggest that if a country’s legal systems are not strong enough, the level of 
information disclosure become ineffective. For the purposes of the study, it is posited 
that greater levels of investor protection promotes increased transactional activity 
and this, in turn, encourages disclosures by firms. 
4.3.3.6 Gini Coefficient 
The Gini coefficient also known as the Gini index or Gini ratio is a measure 
of statistical dispersion intended to represent the income distribution of a nation's 
residents (Gini 1936). The Gini coefficient therefore measures the inequality among 
values of levels of income (Ali and Gesami. 2002) with a Gini coefficient of zero 
expresses perfect equality where all values are the same and everyone has the same 
income. A Gini coefficient of one (or 100%), on the other hand, expresses maximum 
inequality among income values (for example, where only one person has all the 
income) (Blomquist 1981). The Gini coefficient is therefore an index of income 
inequality to measure national income inequality (Firebaugh 1999). Income 
inequality and distribution can influence the levels of corporate governance 
disclosure exhibited by firms given that high levels of income inequality reduces the 
number of individuals and investors that have the money to participate in the capital 
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 marketplace. For the purposes of the study, it is posited that the lower the Gini 
coefficient of a country (i.e., when income inequality is low and money is available 
to a greater number of individuals), the greater the likelihood of firm disclosures in 
that country. 
The above discussions relate to the country characteristics examined in the 
study. In line with the above arguments, the following hypotheses are proposed with 
regards to the relation between country characteristics and levels of disclosures by 
firms in the three countries examined: 
H3a: Country characteristics influence the extent of mandatory disclosure by 
publicly listed firms in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. 
H3b: Country characteristics influence the extent of voluntary disclosure by publicly 
listed firms in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. 
In summary, given that the six measures above have been found in the past 
literature to influence firm level disclosures, the study will also develop proxies for 
these measures when determining the extent to which that they influence the level of 
both mandatory and voluntary disclosure in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia.  
4.4 Conceptual Schema 
Figure 4.1 shows the conceptual schema of the variables examined in this 
thesis: 
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 Figure 4.1: Conceptual Schema 
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4.5  Summary of the Chapter 
 This chapter presented the two theories applicable to the study and a 
detailed discussion of how both theories underpin the research questions. Past 
literature is discussed when developing the testable hypotheses. Finally, a conceptual 
schema is also provided illustrating the major relationships between the three groups 
of independent variables and the level of disclosures exhibited by firms. 
 Chapter Five will provide details of research method including the sample 
selection process, sources of data, time period selection and the measurement criteria 
for all the variables used in the study. Additionally, the statistical models used for 
multivariate analysis will also be specified. 
  
Independent Variables 
 
 
 
Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Board independence, Board size, Audit quality, 
CEO duality 
Firm Characteristics 
Ownership concentration, ROA, Firm size, 
Leverage, Firm age 
Country Characteristics 
GDP per capita, Equity market, IFRS adoption, 
Corruption, Investor protection, Gini coefficient 
Dependent Variables 
Mandatory disclosure 
Index 
Voluntary disclosure 
Index 
Control Variables 
Industry, Year 
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 CHAPTER FIVE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Overview of the Chapter 
The theoretical perspective to the study is provided in Chapter Four with the 
development of hypotheses. Theories related to corporate governance disclosure 
were also discussed and a conceptual schema provided.  
Chapter Five presents’ the key features of the research techniques to be 
applied to the analysis. This chapter is organized follows: Section 5.2 outlines the 
procedure of sample selection and source documentation. Subsequently a detailed 
description of the dependent, independent and control variables along with the 
measurement technique are in Section 5.2.1 to 5.2.3. Section 5.6 specifies the 
statistical models for the data analysed. Section 5.7 stipulates additional analysis and 
Section 5.8 concludes the chapter. 
5.2 Sample, Documentation and Time Period 
This section outlines the methodology applied in sample selection and the 
source documentation. The following sub-sections provide a justification of the 
sample firms selected, source documentation chosen and time period analysed. 
5.2.1 Sample  
The preliminary sample encompasses all publicly listed firms that are 
continuously listed on the DSE, BSMB and ASX for the period of 2006-2010. The 
study also excludes IPO firms, foreign firms and unit trusts as their financial 
statement are not prepared in accordance with the standard disclosure requirements 
compared to other listed firms. 
5.2.2 Source Documentation  
Data for the study are obtained from archival data in the form of listed firm 
annual reports. Listed firms are selected in view of the fact that listed entities provide 
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 readily accessible information in an appropriate usable form. Consistent  with former 
empirical research, financial institutions, banks and stock brokerages are excluded 
since that firms are regulated by specific regulatory boards and data presentation 
differs from other companies (Gul and Leung. 2004). 
A number of sources are used to obtain data for the study. Data for the 
dependent, independent and control variables are collected from publicly available 
financial information, specifically annual reports which were obtained from the 
Annual Reports Collection (Connect 4 Pty Ltd). The study considers annual reports 
as a major source of documentation consistent with Lang and Lundholm (1993) who 
discovered a significant positive association among annual report disclosure and 
other forms of disclosure. Mandatory and voluntary information is generally 
provided through annual report which could be business or non-financial information 
and either qualitative or quantitative in nature. 
Annual reports for Bangladesh and Malaysia are downloaded from their 
respective stock exchanges’ web-sites. Failing this, the required annual reports are 
accessed via each firm’s individual web-site. Data for Australian firms are collected 
from annual reports located either within DatAnalysis (an Aspect Huntley Database) 
or the Annual Reports Collection (Connect 4 Pty Ltd) or ORBIS. 
5.2.3 Time Period and Sample Selection 
The time period selected for examination comprises all firms registered on 
the DSE, BSMB and ASX continuously across the observation window of 2006 to 
2010 calendar years (a five-year time-frame). This period is selected as it transcends 
a key period in the global financial accounting and corporate governance landscape 
specifically the Global Financial Crisis. By applying a random selection process, 40 
companies are initially selected for 2006. Data for these 40 companies are also 
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 selected for the remaining time period resulting in a total sample of 200 firm-year 
observations per country over the five year period resulting in a final usable sample 
of 600 firm-year observations. Tables 5.1 to 5.3 summarize the detailed sample 
selection process for Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. 
Table 5.1: Sample selection and industry breakdown (Bangladesh) 
Panel A: Sample Selection  
Number of firms listed on the DSE as at 2006-2010 522 
Exclusions:   
 Financial institutions (22)  
 Insurance (46)  
 Bank (30)  
 Corporate Bond (3)  
 Debenture (8)  
 Mutual Funds (41)  
 Treasury Bond (221)  
 Firms that are not continuously listed (41)  
Sample pool for random selection - 2006  110 
 Number randomly selected - 2006 40  
 Firm-years from 2006 to 2010 200 (40*5)  
Final usable sample  200 
Panel B: Sample firm break down by industry 
DSE Industry No. of Firms % of Sample 
 Cement 3 7.5% 
 Engineering 10 25.00% 
 Food & Allied 4 10.00% 
 Fuel & Power  5 12.5% 
 Jute 1 2.5% 
 IT Sector 1 2.5% 
 Textile 5 12.5% 
 Miscellaneous 4 10.00% 
 Tannery Industry 1 2.5% 
 Pharmaceuticals & Chemicals 6 15.00% 
Total 40 100 
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 Table 5.2: Sample selection and industry breakdown (Malaysia) 
Panel A: Sample Selection  
Number of firms listed on the BSMB as at 2006-2010 958 
Exclusions:   
 Financial institutions (69)  
 Insurance (9)  
 IPO firms (396)  
 Bank (33)  
 Investment Services (19)  
 Foreign incorporated firms (27)  
 Firms that are not continuously listed (26)  
Sample pool for random selection - 2006  379 
 Number randomly selected - 2006 40  
 Firm-years from 2006 to 2010 200 (40*5)  
Final usable sample  200 
Panel B: Sample firm break down by industry 
Bursa Malaysia Industry No. of Firms % of Sample 
 Communication 6 15.00% 
 Consumer Discretionary 7 17.5% 
 Industrial 5 12.5% 
 Materials 3 7.5% 
 Consumer Staples 15 37.5% 
 Utilities 1 2.5% 
 Energy 2 5.00% 
 Healthcare 1 2.5% 
Total 40 100 
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 Table 5.3: Sample selection and industry breakdown (Australia) 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
Number of firms listed on the ASX as at 2006-2010 2,128 
Exclusions:   
 Financial institutions (133)  
 Insurance (10)  
 IPO firms (106)  
 Trust (92)  
 Foreign incorporated firms (64)  
 Firms that are not continuously listed (222)  
Sample pool for random selection - 2006  1,501 
 Number randomly selected - 2006 40  
 Firm-years from 2006 to 2010 200 (40*5)  
Final usable sample  200 
Panel B: Sample firm break down by industry 
ASX Industry No. of Firms % of Sample 
 Materials 10 25.00% 
 Energy 3 7.5% 
 Information Technology 1 2.5% 
 Industrial 8 20.00% 
 Consumer Staples 3 7.5% 
 Consumer Discretionary 8 20.00% 
 Health Care 4 10.00% 
 Utilities 3 7.5% 
Total 40 100 
In the next sections, proxy measures for the dependent, independent and 
control variables are identified. 
5.3 Measurement of Dependent Variables  
One key objective of this research is to discover the governance information 
content disclosed in firms’ annual reports. In this respect, past researchers have used 
a variety of disclosure checklists (Chau and Gray 2002; Meek, Roberts and Gray 
1995). Some have utilized voluntary disclosure checklists (Barako 2007; Ferguson, 
Lam and Lee 2002; Haniffa and Cooke 2002), while other studies have utilized 
mandatory disclosure checklists (Akhtaruddin 2005; Owusu-Ansah 1998; Street and 
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 Gray 2001; Al-Shammari 2008). Researchers have also combined both mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure checklists (Cooke 1992; Cooke 1993; Inchausti 1997). The 
items included in preparation of a disclosure checklist can also vary (Wallace, Kamal 
and Araceli 1994).This study developed a disclosure checklist drawing on prior 
studies and separated mandatory and voluntary disclosure items in line with the 
existing disclosure requirements in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia.  
The dependent variable in the study is the corporate governance disclosure 
index (CGD) as described in Table 5.4. The extent of CGD is measured using a 
mandatory (MDIit) and voluntary disclosure (VDIit) index. The total disclosure index 
comprising 53 disclosure items relate to corporate governance disclosures. However, 
the mandatory items differ between countries depending upon individual stock 
exchange listing rules, regulations, codes of practice, accounting standards and 
company acts. 
The disclosure checklist (at Table 5.4) is categorized into 13 major 
categories: general corporate information, corporate strategic information, director’s 
information, ownership and shareholder, governance structure and policies, audit 
committee, remuneration committee, nomination committee, recognize and manage 
risk, members of the board and key executives, annual general meeting, timing and 
means of disclosure and best practices for compliance with required regulations. 
These 13 key categories have been established by previous studies showing that they 
are relevant to corporate governance disclosure (Eng and Mak 2003; Hossain, Tan 
and Adams 1994; Soh 1996). 
Table 5.4 outlines the approach adopted in preparing both the mandatory and 
voluntary disclosures checklists for Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. Initially, all 
mandatory disclosure items for each country were identified with the note below 
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 Table 5.4 indicating the mandatory disclosure items for each country. Naturally, 
given the different institutional frameworks in each of the three countries examined, 
some disclosure requirements were mandatory in a particular country but not in 
another country. In total, there were 13 categories of disclosures with the actual 
number of disclosures items reaching a total of 53. After considering mandatory 
items in the disclosure index, the remaining items were regarded as potential 
voluntary disclosure items. For each item in the mandatory disclosure checklist, a 
firm within a country is given a score of ‘1’ if it is disclosed that information item 
and ‘0’ if the item is not disclosed. Similarly for voluntary disclosure items, a firm is 
given a score of ‘1’ if it disclosed that item voluntarily and ‘0’ if the item is not 
disclosed. Each firm then received a percentage measure of their compliance with the 
respective disclosure checklist within their country for each year. 
Table 5.4: Corporate Governance Disclosure Index 
 Item 
1. General Corporate Information 
1. Company’s mission statementA 
2. Brief history of the companyA 
3. Corporate structure/ chartA 
4. The annual statement contain a statement addressing corporate governanceA 
5. Stock exchanges on which shares are heldA 
2. Corporate strategic Information 
6. Statement of corporate strategy and objectives -generalA 
7. Statement of corporate strategy and objectives-financialA 
8. Statement of corporate strategy and objectives-marketingA 
9. Statement of corporate strategy and objectives-socialA 
10. Impact of strategy on current performanceA 
3. Corporate Governance/Directors Information 
11. Name of principal shareholdersB 
12. List of DirectorsB 
13. Board’s policy for nomination and appointment of directorsB 
14. Procedure for the selection and appointment of new directors and the re-election of 
incumbent directorsB 
15. Shares held by directors of the companyB 
16. Meeting held and attendanceH 
17. Educational qualifications of the directorsA 
18. Experience of the directorsG 
19. Position or office held by executive directorsA 
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20. Other directorship held by executive directorsG 
21. Remuneration of the directorsB 
4. Ownership and Shareholder  
22.  Statement of shareholder rightsD 
23. Description of communication process with shareholdersI 
5. Governance Structure and Policies 
24. Size of boardH 
25. Composition of boardE 
26. Division between chairman and CEOH 
27. Chairman statementB 
28. Information about Independent directorG 
29. Role and functions of the boardE 
30. Compliance with stock exchange legal rulesG 
31. Code of conduct or a summaryD 
32. Trading policy or a summaryD 
6. Audit committee 
33. Audit committee charterI 
34. ‘Big Four’ auditG 
35. Independence of auditorsD 
36. Auditor feesH 
37. Information on procedures for the selection and appointment of the external auditorF 
38. Committee sizeG 
39. Number of meeting during yearG 
7. Remuneration committee 
40. Charter of the remuneration committee/ summary of the role, rights, responsibilities and 
membership requirementsF 
41. Number of meeting during yearG 
42. Number of meeting during yearI 
8. Nomination committee 
43. Charter of the nomination committee/summary of the role, rights, responsibilities and 
membershipF 
44. Size of the committeeG 
45. Number of meeting during yearI 
9. Recognize and manage risk 
46. Summary of the company’s policies on risk oversightF 
47. Summary of the company’s policy on prohibiting entering into transactions in associated 
products which limit the economic risk under any equity-based remuneration schemeF 
48. Management of material business riskF 
10. Members of the Board and Key executives 
49. Biography of the board membersC 
11. Annual General Meeting 
50. Notice of the AGME 
12. Timing and means of disclosure 
51. Separate section for corporate governanceC 
13. Best practices for compliance with required corporate governance regulations 
52. Compliance with required regulationH  
53. Policies or a summary of those policies designed to guide compliance with listing rule 
disclosure requirementF 
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 Note: 
Mandatory and Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosure Items in Bangladesh, Malaysia, 
and Australia. 
1. In Bangladesh, items no, 2, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 21, 28, 39, 41, 50, are mandatory and rest of the 
items are voluntary. 
2. In Malaysia, items no, 13, 16, 24, 25, 27, 33, 41, 47, 48, 52, 53, are mandatory and rest of the items 
are voluntary.  
3. In Australia, items no, 13, 14, 37, 38, 39, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49, 52, are mandatory and rest of the items 
are voluntary.15 
Sources of disclosure checklist: 
A= (Adapted from Voluntary Disclosure Checklist, Gray, Meek, and Roberts 1995) 
B= (Adapted from Corporate Mandatory Disclosure Practices in Bangladesh, M. Akhtaruddin 2005) 
C= (Adapted from Islam, Hossienie and Baki: Corporate Governance and Voluntary Information 
Disclosure: A Study of Listed Financial Companies in Bangladesh 2010) 
D= (Adapted from OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 1999)  
E= (Adapted from Guidance on Good Practices in Corporate Governance Disclosure-United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development 2006) 
F= (Adapted from Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations, ASX Corporate 
Governance Council 2007, 2nd Edition) 
G= (Adapted from Companies Annual Reports Listed on the DSE, BSMB, and ASX 2006-2010) 
H= (Adapted from Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements 2010) 
I= (Adapted from Corporate Governance Listing Requirements of the New York Stock Exchange 
2002) 
5.4 Measurement of Independent Variables 
The study examines corporate governance characteristics, firm characteristics 
and country characteristics as being possible key predictor (independent) variables 
affecting the level of both mandatory and voluntary disclosures within Bangladeshi 
Malaysian and Australian listed firms. The independent variables are consequently 
classified into three groups: corporate governance characteristics, firm 
characteristics, and country characteristics. Measurement proxies for the independent 
variables are detailed in the sections 5.4.1 to 5.4.3.  
5.4.1 Measurement of Corporate Governance Characteristics 
The study has identified four dominant corporate governance proxies 
(measures) found to play a role in the level of disclosures by listed firms. The study 
measured corporate governance characteristics using board independence, board size, 
15    The results reported are expressed as a percentage to indicate the proportion of firms (in each of the three countries) that 
either complied with mandatory or voluntary disclosures and this approach is consistent with prior studies. However, one 
shortcoming of this approach is that the mean does not equate to the number of disclosures as the former is a percentage 
while the latter is simply a raw number.  
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 CEO duality, and audit quality. The following sub-sections specify the measurement 
technique for each of these proxies. 
5.4.1.1 Measurement of Board Independence 
Corporate governance advocates, regulators and scholars frequently argue 
that a board with independent directors is more likely to be effective in discharging 
responsibilities. This is due directly to the fact that independent directors, having no 
role in the executive or day-to-day running of the firm, are much more concerned 
about their reputational capital and are therefore more likely to require firms to 
comply with all rules and regulations, including those relating mandatory 
disclosures. In fact, the independence of board members often results in firms also 
making additional voluntary disclosures at the behest of these independent directors. 
Prior literature has measured board independence, considering the proportion of 
independent directors on the board (Fama and Jensen 1983; Leftwich, Watts and 
Zimmerman 1981). For the purpose of the study, each company’s board 
independence is measured as the percentage of independent directors on the board to 
the total number of directors on the board of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0.  
5.4.1.2 Measurement of Board Size 
Board size may also influence the level of disclosure made by firms. A larger number 
of directors on the board play a more substantial role in reducing the information 
asymmetry that is inherent in agency relationships that exist within firms (Chen and 
Jaggi 2000). Therefore, a greater level of information disclosures by firms is 
expected with more directors on boards (Zahra, Neubaum and Huse 2000). 
Board size is measured based on the total number of directors on the board. 
Past literature suggests that a greater level of information disclosure is expected with 
more directors on boards (Zahra, Neubaum and Huse 2000). 
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 5.4.1.3 Measurement of CEO Duality 
CEO duality has been found to be associated with corporate governance 
disclosure (Forker 1992). When the CEO is also the chair of the board, the board’s 
effectiveness in performing its governing function may affected as CEO will be able 
to influence board meetings, select agenda items, as well as board members. In the 
study for the purpose of measuring CEO duality, a firm will take the value 1 if the 
CEO is also the chairman of the board of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0. 
5.4.1.4 Measurement of Audit Quality 
 The quality of audit refers to the appointment of a ‘Big Four Auditor’ and the 
existence of an audit committee. Audit quality is posited to increase the quality of 
financial information that firms produce as a greater degree of quality scrutiny has 
been applied to the financial statements. Prior literature specifically links the greater 
skill, expertise and experience of the large Big Four auditing firms in influencing 
firms to disclosure a greater amount of (additional) information (Wallace, Naser and 
Mora 1994; De Angelo 1981; Chow 1982; Ahmed and Nicholls 1994). The study 
measures audit quality as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is 
audited by a big four auditor of firm i for the time period t, otherwise 0. Audit 
committee existence is measured as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
firm has an audit committee of firms i for time period t, otherwise 0. Given that audit 
committees are charged with oversight over the financial reporting function, the 
existence of an audit committee should increase the quality of financial reporting. 
5.4.2 Measurement of Firm Characteristic 
Prior literature has identified six firm related proxies (measures) found to 
play a dominant role in the level of governance disclosures. For this study, firm 
characteristics are measured by firm ownership concentration, return on asset, size, 
129 
 
 leverage and age. The following sub-sections specify measurement technique of 
these proxies. 
5.4.2.1 Measurement of Ownership Concentration 
The impact of ownership concentration on firm disclosure has received 
considerable attention over the last three decades (Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Morck, 
shleifer and Vishny 1988). Increased levels of concentrated ownership can lead to 
greater levels corporate governance disclosure (McConnell and Servaes 1990). 
Specifically, recent studies on East Asian markets found that concentrated ownership 
can reduce agency conflicts between inside owners and outside investors thereby 
resulting in greater levels of disclosure (Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000; 
Claessens et al. 2002; La porta, Lopez-de-silanes and Shleifer 1999). On the other 
hand, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that in a widely held ownership environment, 
the likelihood of conflicts of interest among manager and shareholders are higher 
compared to closely held companies. As a consequence, the probability of 
information disclosure is expected to be higher in the case of widely held companies 
as managers seek to appease shareholders. 
Past literature has examined ownership concentration as an important 
determinant of information disclosure. For example, some studies found a negative 
relationship among concentred ownership and disclosure (Haniffa and Cooke 2002; 
Huafang and Jianguo 2007; Tsamenyi, Enninful-Adu and Onumah 2007). On the 
other hand, other empirical results indicate no such association (Baek, Johnson and 
Kim 2009; Depoers 2000; Ghazali and Weetman 2006; Holm and Scholer 2010; 
Makhija and Patton 2004; Parsa, Kouhy and Tzovas 2007). Ownership concentration 
is measured by the proportion of ordinary share held by top five shareholders to total 
number of shares issued of firm i for time period t. 
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 5.4.2.2 Measurement of Firm Return on Assets 
Prior studies found a positive association between firm’s return on asset and 
the level of information disclosure (Wallace, Naser and Mora 1994; Lundholm and 
Lang 1993; Singhvi and Desai 1971). Researchers find that higher levels of return on 
assets suggest to outsiders a company with higher investment potential which, in 
turn, increases the level of disclosure in corporate annual report (Hossain 2000; 
Inchausti 1997; Karim 1996; Owusu-Ansah 1998; Wallace, Kamal and Araceli 
1994). This study measures a firm’s return on asset by calculating the firm’s net 
profit after tax divided by total assets of firm i for time period t. 
5.4.2.3 Measurement of Firm Size 
Prior studies examined firm size as an important disclosure-related variable 
(Buzby 1975; Cerf 1961; Courtis 1976; Singhvi 1968; Soh 1996). Several studies 
found that pressure from shareholders, closer monitoring by regulatory bodies and 
the requirement to raise the capital lead larger firms to disclose a greater level of 
information (Choi 1973; Firth 1979; Schipper 2007). Furthermore, previous studies 
also found a positive association among firm size to the level of disclosure in both 
developed and developing countries (Cerf 1961; Cooke 1992; Craig and Diga 1998; 
Kahl and Belkaoui 1981; Raffournier 1995).  
Larger firms disclose more information due to the higher number of work 
processes and volume of transactions generated within such large firms thus 
necessitating greater levels of disclosure (Ahmed and Courtis 1999; Alsaeed 2006; 
Buzby 1975; Chow and Wong-Boren 1987; Cooke 1982; Depoers 2000). To measure 
firm size, this study used natural log of total asset of firm i for time period t. 
5.4.2.4 Measurement of Firm Leverage 
Earlier research has found that there is a positive association between 
leverage and disclosure given that a more leveraged firm has to adopt greater levels 
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 of disclosure to satisfy the needs of creditors and increasingly vigilant stakeholders 
(Ahmed and Courtis 1999; Alsaeed 2006; Fama and Miller 1972; Malone, Fries and 
Jones 1993; Naser, Alkatib and Karbhari 2002). Highly geared firms are expected to 
disclose further information for the benefit of creditors and to also reassure 
shareholders (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Schipper 1981; Taylor et al. 2011). The study 
measured leverage as total debt divided by total assets of firm i for time period t. 
5.4.2.5 Measurement of Firm Age 
Firm age is also believed to be an important variable in determining the 
extent of information disclosure. Researchers such as, Choi (1973) and Spero (1979) 
suggested that recently listed firms release additional information in order to further 
raise capital at the lowest price and increase confidence among different stakeholder 
groups. The study measured firm’s age calculating number of years in operation as a 
listed firm of firm i for time period t. 
5.4.3 Measurement of Country Characteristics 
For the study, country characteristics are measured by culture, GDP per 
capita, equity market, IFRS adoption, corruption, investor protection and Gini 
coefficient. The following sub-sections specify measurement technique of these 
proxies. 
5.4.3.1 Measurement of Gross Domestic Product 
Gross domestic product (GDP) refers to the price of a country’s goods and 
services produced. Prior literature often utilizes GDP per capita as an indicator of a 
country’s standard of living. For the purposes of the study, it is posited that the 
greater the GDP per capita of a country, the greater the likelihood of firm’s 
disclosures in that country as the education of investors and other stakeholder grows 
and the countries regulatory framework improves requiring greater information 
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 exchange. The study measure gross domestic product as real Gross Domestic Product 
divided by total population. 
5.4.3.2 Measurement of Equity Market 
Equity market is also a sign of market growth, as sizes of market boost the 
disclosure necessities as well as the extent of information revealed by market 
contributors (Adhikari and Tondkar 1992; Jaggi and Low 2000). In terms of 
measurement, the variable equity market is captured by the stock market 
capitalisation ratio divided by Gross Domestic Product. 
5.4.3.3 Measurement of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
Many countries around the world have adopted international financial 
reporting standards to improve the quality of financial reporting (example include 
Bangladesh, Malaysia, USA, UK, Singapore in 2009; Thailand, Philippines in 2005; 
New Zealand in 2007; Hong Kong in 2005; China in 2007; Canada and Australia in 
2005).16 Implementation of IFRS can aid to reduce information asymmetry between 
a firm and its stakeholders including creditors, suppliers, employees, financial 
analysts, stockbrokers, management and government agencies. The implementation 
of IFRS can lead to increased disclosures and a decrease in information irregularity 
among firm insiders and outsiders (Ashbaugh 2001; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000). The 
study considered this proxy as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm 
adopts IFRS between the periods of 2006-2010 of firms i for the time period t, 
otherwise 0.  
5.4.3.4 Measurement of Corruption 
Corruption is considered as an important factor influencing firm level disclosures. 
However, empirical research on corruption is rare given the methodological issues 
17     More than 100 countries have introduced IFRS since 2005 including countries from the European Union. 
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 involved in measuring this construct (Treisman 2000). The study measure corruption 
as considering corruption perception index score ranging from ‘0’ to ‘10’, where 0 
point out a high level of alleged corruption and 10 point to entirely clean country 
(Transparency International 2005). 
5.4.3.5 Measurement of Investor Protection 
The type of investor protection largely depends on a country’s legal system, 
standard of accounting policies and stock exchange regulations. Earlier research 
shows that there appears to be a difference among civil law countries compared to 
common law countries regarding the protection of investors. In this respect, 
researchers (La porta, Lopez-de-silanes and Shleifer 1999) in a cross country study, 
argue that common law countries are found to have greater investor protection than 
countries of civil law countries. Their research also found that the establishment of 
investor protection in countries impacts on accounting policy choice which is, in 
turn, associated with the extent of firm disclosure. To measure this variable, the 
shareholder rights index is used (La porta 1998) ranging from ‘0’ to ‘6’, where 0 
indicates the weakest and 6 the strongest shareholder rights of firm i for time period 
t. 
5.4.3.6 Measurement of Gini Coefficient 
The Gini coefficient is an indicator of national income inequality. Although 
not previously studied, it is believed that income inequality can influence the levels 
of corporate governance disclosure exhibited by firms. Based on the Gini index of 
income inequality, this proxy is measured as a percentage from 0 to 100; where 0 
indicates perfect equality and 100 indicate perfect inequality (Uni-Wider World 
Income Inequality 2008). 
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 5.5 Measurement of Control Variables 
Two additional control variables are incorporated into the statistical analysis 
to examine the hypotheses. The control variables that are used to test the hypotheses 
of this research are industry and year which are explained in the following sub-
sections. 
5.5.1 Measurement of Industry 
The type of industry in which the firm is operating may be an important 
variable in terms of disclosure since levels of disclosure differ as per industry type. 
Whittred and Zimmer (1990) argued that firms those are operating in a politically 
responsive environment such as oil and gas are estimated to disclose additional  
information (Ng and Koh 1994). On the other hand, Inchausti (1997) believed that 
there is no connection among the type of industry and the stage of disclosure. The 
study used industry as a control variable. The study consider industry as a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the firm operate in a specific industry sector of firm i 
for time period t, otherwise 0. 
5.5.2 Measurement of Year 
The study will use year as a dummy variable as a series indicator variable 
controlling time temporal differences of reporting periods for the firm-year 
observations with firm i scored 1 if financial data correspond to year t, 0 otherwise. 
The measurement techniques for the independents and control variables are 
summarized in Table 5.5. 
  
135 
 
 Table 5.5: Measurement techniques of variables 
Dependent Variables Measurement Source 
Corporate governance 
mandatory disclosure 
Measured by mandatory disclosure index for 
each country 
Listed company’s annual 
report 
Corporate governance 
voluntary disclosure 
Measured by voluntary disclosure index for 
each country 
Listed company’s annual 
report 
Independent variables 
Corporate Governance Characteristics  
Board Independence Percentage of independent directors on the 
board 
Listed company annual 
report 
Board size Number of directors on the board Listed company annual 
report 
Big4 Auditor Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
firm is audited by a big four auditor, 
otherwise 0. 
(Kusumawati 2006) 
Audit Committee Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
firm has an audit committee, otherwise 0 
Listed company annual 
report 
CEO duality Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
CEO is also the chairman of the board, 
otherwise 0 
Listed company annual 
report 
Firm Characteristics   
Ownership concentration Proportion of ordinary shares held by top 
five shareholders to total number of shares 
issued 
(Ho 2008) 
ROA Net profit after tax divided by total assets of 
firm 
(Singhvi and Desai 1971) 
Firm size Natural log of total asset (Camfferman and Cooke 
2002) 
Leverage Total debt divided by  total assets of firm (Lesmana 2006) 
Firm age Number of years in operation as a listed firm Listed company annual 
report 
Country Characteristics   
GDP per capita Real Gross Domestic Product Cap divided by 
total population 
(The Organisation of 
Economic Co-Operation 
and Development 1999) 
Equity market Stock market capitalization ratio divided by 
Gross Domestic Product 
International financial 
statistics, (World Bank 
2000)World Bank 
Statistical Yearbook 
IFRS adoption Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
firm adopt IFRS between the period of 2006-
2010, otherwise 0 
Listed company annual 
reports  
Corruption perception index Corruption perception index score ranging 
from ‘0’ to ‘10’, where 0 point out a high 
level of alleged corruption and 10 point to 
entirely clean country 
(TransparencyInternational 
2005) 
Investor protection Anti-directors rights indicator, which is 
formed by adding 1 when: (1) the country 
allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote; 
(2) shareholders are not required to deposit 
(La porta 1998)  
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 5.6 Statistical Tests and Multiple Regression Models 
 Regression analysis is the key statistical method used to answer the study’s 
hypotheses. Multiple regression is the most appropriate method for this research 
since the major aim is to identify the influential factors on the extent of corporate 
disclosure controlling for the collinearity among these variables. This study develops 
two main regression models: one for assessing the hypothesized relationship between 
mandatory levels of corporate governance disclosure and a number of predictor 
variables and second; assessing the hypothesized relationship between voluntary 
levels of corporate governance disclosure and the same predictor variables.  
 The main focus of the study is to examine whether corporate governance 
characteristics, firm characteristics and country characteristics influence the level of 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. The 
regression model testing the hypothesized relationship between mandatory levels of 
their shares prior to the general shareholders’ 
meeting; (3) cumulative voting or 
proportional representations of minorities on 
the board of directors is allowed; (4) an 
oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; 
(5) shareholders have the pre-emptive rights 
that can only be waived by a shareholders 
meeting; and (6) the minimum percentage 
share capital that entitles a shareholder to call 
for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is 
less than or equal to 10%. This index is 
varying from ‘0’ to ‘6’, where 0 indicates the 
weakest and 6 the strongest shareholder 
rights 
Gini Coefficient Gini index of income inequality ranging from 
‘0’ to ‘1’, where 0 indicates perfect equality 
and 1 indicate perfect inequality 
(Uni-Wider World Income 
Inequality 2008) 
Control Variables   
Industry Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
firm operate in the specific industry sector, 
otherwise 0 
(Deumes and Knechel 
2008) 
Year  Series indicator variables controlling time 
temporal differences of reporting periods for 
firm-year observations scored 1 if financial 
data correspond to year, 0 otherwise 
Listed company annual 
report 
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 corporate governance disclosure and a number of predictor variables is specified in 
equation 1 below: 
MDIit=βο+β1BoD_Indit+β2BoD_Sizeit+β3Big4Auditit+β4Audit_Committeeit+β5Ce
o_Dualityit+β6Top_5_ShareHit+β7ROAit+β8LN_TAit+β9Leverageit+β10F_Ageit+β1
1GDP_Capit+β12Equity_Mktit+β13IFRS_Adoptit+β14Corruptionit+β15Investor_Prot
ectionit+β16Gini_coefficientit+β17Industry_Dummyit+β18Year_Dummyit+εit  
 [1]  
Where: 
MDIit =Measured by mandatory disclosure index for each country of firm i for time 
period t. 
BoD_Indit =Percentage of independent directors on the board of firm i for time period t. 
BoD_Sizeit =Number of directors on the board of firm i for time period t. 
Big4 Auditit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is audited by a big four 
auditor of firm i for the time period t, otherwise 0. 
Audit_Committeeit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has an audit committee of 
firm i for time period t, otherwise 0. 
Ceo_ Dualityit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0.  
Top_5_ShareHit =Proportion of ordinary shares held by top five shareholders to total number 
of shares issued of firm i for time period t. 
ROAit =Net profit after tax divided by total assets of firm i for time period t 
LN_TAit =Natural log of total asset of firm i for time period t. 
Leverageit =Total debt divided by total assets of firm i for time period t. 
F_Ageit =Number of years in operation as a listed firm of firm i for time period t. 
GDP_Capit =Real Gross Domestic Product Cap divided by total population. 
Equity_Mktit =Stock market capitalisation ratio divided by Gross Domestic Product. 
Corruptionit =Corruption perception index score ranging from ‘0’ to ‘10’, where 0 point 
out a high level of alleged corruption and 10 point to entirely clean country.  
IFRS_Adoptit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm adopt IFRS between the 
period of 2006-2010 of firm i for the time period t, otherwise 0. 
Investor_Protectionit =Shareholder rights index, ranging from ‘0’ to ‘6’, where 0 indicates the 
weakest and 6 the strongest shareholder rights of firm i for time period t. 
Gini_Coefficientit =Gini index of income inequality ranging from ‘0’ to ‘1’, where 0 indicates 
perfect equality and 1 indicate perfect inequality. 
Industry_Dummyit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm operate in the specific 
industry sector of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0. 
Year_Dummyit =Series indicator variables controlling time temporal differences of reporting 
periods for firm-year observations with firm i scored 1 if financial data 
correspond to year t, 0 otherwise. 
ε it =Error term. 
Equation 1 will be run three times (one for each country) to examine the 
association between the corporate governance characteristics, firm characteristics and 
country characteristics attributes along with all control variables.  The regression 
model testing the hypothesized relationship between voluntary levels of corporate 
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 governance disclosure and a number of predictor variables, is specified in equation 2 
below: 
VDIit=βο+β1BoD_Indit+β2BoD_Sizeit+β3Big4Auditit+β4Audit_Committeeit+β5Ceo
_Dualityit+β6Top_5_ShareHit+β7ROAit+β8LN_TAit+β9Leverageit+β10F_Ageit+β11
GDP_Capit+β12Equity_Mktit+β13IFRS_Adoptit+β14Corruptinit+β15Investor_Protect
ionit+β16Gini_coefficientit+β17Industry_Dummyit+β18Year_Dummyit+εit  
 [2] 
Where: 
VDIit =Measured by voluntary disclosure index for each country of firm i for time 
period t. 
BoD_Indit =Percentage of independent directors on the board of firm i for time period t. 
BoD_Sizeit =Number of directors on the board of firm i for time period t. 
Big4 Auditit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is audited by a big four 
auditor of firm i for the time period t, otherwise 0. 
Audit_Committeeit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has an audit committee of 
firm i for time period t, otherwise 0. 
Ceo_ Dualityit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0.  
Top_5_ShareHit =Proportion of ordinary shares held by top five shareholders to total number 
of shares issued of firm i for time period t. 
ROAit =Net profit after tax divided by total assets of firm i for time period t 
LN_TAit =Natural log of total asset of firm i for time period t. 
Leverageit =Total debt divided by total assets of firm i for time period t. 
F_Ageit =Number of years in operation as a listed firm of firm i for time period t. 
GDP_Capit =Real Gross Domestic Product Cap divided by total population. 
Equity_Mktit =Stock market capitalisation ratio divided by Gross Domestic Product. 
Corruptionit =Corruption perception index score ranging from ‘0’ to ‘10’, where 0 point 
out a high level of alleged corruption and 10 point to entirely clean country.  
IFRS_Adoptit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm adopt IFRS between the 
periods of 2006-2010 of firm i for the time period t, otherwise 0. 
Investor_Protectionit =Shareholder rights index, ranging from ‘0’ to ‘6’, where 0 indicates the 
weakest and 6 the strongest shareholder rights of firm i for time period t. 
Gini_Coefficientit =Gini index of income inequality ranging from ‘0’ to ‘1’, where 0 indicates 
perfect equality and 1 indicate perfect inequality. 
Industry_Dummyit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm operate in the specific 
industry sector of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0. 
Year_Dummyit =Series indicator variables controlling time temporal differences of reporting 
periods for firm-year observations with firm i scored 1 if financial data 
correspond to year t, 0 otherwise. 
ε it =Error term. 
Equation 2 will similarly be run three times (one for each country) to examine 
the association between the corporate governance characteristics, firm characteristics 
and country characteristics attributes along with all control variables. 
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 5.7 Summary of the Chapter  
The research method adopted for the purpose of answering hypotheses is 
discussed in this chapter. Specifically this chapter commenced with the selection of 
sample and source of documentation. It also included a detailed description of the 
measurement of the dependent, independent, and control variables and concluded 
with specifying the regression models for testing the hypotheses. Chapter Six will 
analyse, report and discuss the descriptive statistics of the sample 
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 CHAPTER SIX 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
6.1 Overview of the Chapter 
The past five chapters detailed the research questions of the study, 
development of institutional background, discussed the literature, developed 
hypotheses and provided the research methodology used to test the hypotheses of the 
study. A justification of the sample selected was provided, source documentation 
identified and time period discussed. Subsequently, measures for the dependent and 
independent variables used in the study were outlined and regression models 
specified. 
Chapter Six reports the descriptive statistics from the pool of 600 firm-year 
observations adopted for the study. This chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 
presents the descriptive statistics for the sampled firms from Bangladesh, Malaysia 
and Australia; Section, 6.3 outlines the correlations among the variables for each of 
the three countries. Finally a summary is provided at the end of the chapter. 
6.2 Sample Descriptive Statistics - Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia 
This section presents an initial analysis of descriptive statistics for 
Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia for the period of 2006-2010 covering a sample 
of 200 firm-years each. The reporting of the descriptive statistics in this chapter is 
organized within tables; in this respect three tables are created for each country 
covering a total of 50 listed firms and 200 observations for each country for the 
period of 2006-2010. 
6.2.1 Descriptive Statistics - Bangladesh 
Table 6.1 shows the descriptive statistics for all of the variables used for 
analysis for Bangladesh. For the purposes of the study, the dependent variables (i.e., 
corporate governance disclosure indices) are examined using two primary indices: a 
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 corporate governance mandatory disclosure index and a corporate governance 
voluntary disclosure index. Table 6.1 reports that mandatory information disclosure 
(MDIit) by listed firms has a mean (median) of 54% (55%) and a standard deviation 
of 7% with minimum and maximum levels of 45% and 64% respectively. Table 6.1 
also reports that voluntary information disclosure (VDIit) by listed firms have a mean 
(median) of 63% (62%) and a standard deviation of 5% with a minimum 55% and a 
maximum of 74% respectively. Results show that no company within the final usable 
sample in Bangladesh fully complies with either mandatory or voluntary disclosure 
requirements and surprisingly the mean for MDIit is considerably lower than the 
mean for VDIit, with a low dispersion (standard deviation of 7% compared to 5%). 
This suggests that in spite of reforms, regulation and competition in the corporate 
sector in Bangladesh, listed firms maintain lower standards of information disclosure 
relative to Australia and Malaysia.  
Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics-Bangladesh (n = 200) 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
MDIit 0.54 0.55 0.07 0.45 0.64 
VDIit 0.63 0.62 0.05 0.55 0.74 
BoD_Indit 17.49 16.67 5.79 8.33 36.36 
B_Sizeit 7.31 7.00 2.08 5.00 13.00 
Audit_Committeit 0.88 1.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Ceo_Dualityit 0.85 1.00 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Top_5_ShareHit 0.38 0.39 0.05 0.23 0.48 
ROAit 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.24 
LN_TAit 22.59 22.03 2.53 16.65 28.11 
Leverageit 0.73 0.76 0.22 0.11 1.39 
F_Ageit 16.82 18.00 8.52 1.00 34.00 
GDP_Capit 1696.50 1600.00 314.22 1400.00 2300.00 
Equity_Mktit 9.52 8.40 3.32 5.80 15.60 
IFRS_Adoptsit 0.60 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Corruptionit 2.18 2.10 0.18 2.00 2.40 
Investor_Protectionit 3.02 3.00 0.33 2.00 4.00 
Gini_coefficientit 33.07 33.20 0.47 32.12 33.40 
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 MDIit= Measured by mandatory disclosure index for each country of firm i for time period t; VDIit= 
Measured by voluntary disclosure index for each country of firm i for time period t; BoD_Indit= 
Percentage of independent directors on the board of firm i for time period t; BoD_Sizeit= Number of 
directors on the board of firm i for time period t; Audit_Committeeit= Dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if the firm has an audit committee of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0; Ceo_ Dualityit = 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board of firm i for time 
period t, otherwise 0; Top_5_ShareHit= Proportion of ordinary shares held by top five shareholders to 
total number of shares issued of firm i for time period t; ROAit= Net profit after tax divided by total assets 
of firm i for time period t; LN_TAit= Natural log of total asset of firm i for time period t; Leverageit=Total 
debt divided by total assets of firm i for time period t; F_Ageit= Number of years in operation as a listed 
firm of firm i for time period t; GDP_Capit= Real Gross Domestic Product Cap divided by total 
population; Equity_Mktit= Stock market capitalisation ratio divided by Gross Domestic Product; 
Corruptionit= Corruption perception index score ranging from ‘0’ to ‘10’, where 0 point out a high level 
of alleged corruption and 10 point to entirely clean country; IFRS_Adoptit= Dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 if the firm adopt IFRS between the period of 2006-2010 of firm i for the time period t, 
otherwise 0; Investor_Protectionit= Shareholder rights index, ranging from ‘0’ to ‘6’, where 0 indicates 
the weakest and 6 the strongest shareholder rights of firm i for time period t; Gini_Coefficientit= Gini 
index of income inequality expressed as a percentage where 0 indicates perfect equality and 100 indicates 
perfect inequality. 
In terms of corporate governance descriptive statistics, Table 6.1 reports that, 
on average, only 17.49% of the board’s members in Bangladesh (BoD_Indit) were 
independent directors with a standard deviation of 5.79% and minimum and 
maximum levels of 8.33% and 36.36%. Board size of firms in Bangladesh (B_Sizeit) 
ranged from boards with only five members to boards comprising 13 members with 
an average of just over seven members. In terms of audit committee existence 
(Audit_Committeeit), 88% of firms formed audit committees indicating a very high 
level of audit committee existence in the sampled companies in Bangladesh. In terms 
of role duality (Ceo_Dualityit), a very high 85% of firms had CEOs that occupied 
both CEO and Board Chairperson roles. Not tabulated in Table 6.1 is the fact that 
none of the firms employed a Big 4 auditor (Big 4 Auditit). Although the big 4 
auditors do operate in Bangladesh, they do so only with affiliations with local firms. 
Such affiliated arrangements are not consistent with prior literature and may not 
represent an appropriate proxy for audit quality and are therefore excluded from our 
analysis. 
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 In terms of firm characteristics, Table 6.1 reveals that on average, 38% of 
firms shareholding were controlled by the five shareholders suggesting that among 
the largest Bangladeshi firms, concentrated share ownership is prevalent. This 
provides greater incentives of the company's owners to monitor and control 
managerial actions.  Table 6.1 also shows the descriptive statistics for the 
profitability metric in the study; return on assets (ROAit). Descriptive statistics for 
ROAit has a mean of 5% indicating that return on assets for Bangladesh firms trails 
return on equity. One possible reason for this may be that some industries are asset 
intensive i.e. they need more expensive and high-value plant and equipment to 
generate income compared to others and as such, this reduces the return on assets. In 
terms of the natural log of total assets for the Bangladeshi firms in the sample, 
LN_TAit has a mean (median) of 22.59 (22.03) with minimum and maximum values 
ranging from 16.65 to 28.11. In terms of leverage, it is noted that Leverageit ranges 
between 11% and 139%. The sample companies in Bangladesh record a relatively 
high level of borrowings with a mean of 73%. Company Age (F_Ageit), as measured 
by the listing age of the listed companies, ranges from one year to 34 years with a 
most firms having an average period of existence of almost 17 years. In terms of 
country characteristics descriptive statistics, Table 6.1 reports that the GDP rate 
(GDP_Capit) in Bangladesh ranges from $1400 to $2300 for the entire observation 
window. The values increase steadily from 2006-2010 confirming the recognition 
that Bangladesh is an emerging economy. Table 6.1 also shows that 60% of firms in 
the sample companies adopted IFRS. The study also used the Gini-coefficient of 
inequality to measure of income inequality (Gini-coefficientit). Table 6.1 documents 
that the coefficient ranges from 32.12% to 33.40% indicating income inequality in 
Bangladesh.  
144 
 
 6.2.2 Descriptive Statistics - Malaysia 
Table 6.2 shows the descriptive statistics for all of the variables used for 
analysis for Malaysia. Table 6.2 reports that mandatory information disclosure 
(MDIit) by listed firms has a mean (median) of 83% (82%) and a standard deviation 
of 9% with minimum and maximum levels of 64% and 100% respectively. Table 6.2 
also reports that voluntary information disclosure (VDIit) by listed firms have a mean 
(median) of 89% (90%) and a standard deviation of 5% with a minimum 81% and a 
maximum of 98% respectively. Results show that companies within the final usable 
sample in Malaysia largely comply with mandatory disclosure requirements however 
the mean for MDIit is lower than the mean for VDIit with a low dispersion (standard 
deviation of 9% compared to 5%). As such, results suggest that, although Malaysian 
firms in the sample maintain higher standards of information and corporate 
governance disclosure, compliance with voluntary disclosure is greater.  
Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics-Malaysia (n = 200) 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
MDIit 0.83 0.82 0.09 0.64 1.00 
VDIit 0.89 0.90 0.05 0.81 0.98 
BoD_Indit 62.90 45.75 8.86 24.20 100.00 
B_Sizeit 9.00 9.00 1.86 5.00 14.00 
Big4Auditit 0.68 1.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Audit_Committeit 1.00  0.00 100 1.00 
Ceo_Dualityit 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Top_5_ShareHit 0.62 0.64 0.16 0.12 0.92 
ROAit 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.27 
LN_TAit 22.35 22.02 2.29 18.02 29.10 
Leverageit 0.61 0.60 0.31 0.01 1.88 
F_Ageit 28.30 28.00 14.22 1.00 60.00 
GDP_Capit 14220.00 14500.00 800.50 12900.00 15200.00 
Equity_Mktit 137.38 144.70 32.15 81.00 168.30 
IFRS_Adoptsit 0.80 1.00 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Corruptionit 4.82 5.00 0.31 4.40 5.10 
Investor_Protectionit 3.87 4.00 0.34 3.00 4.00 
Gini_coefficientit 46.08 46.05 0.08 46.00 46.21 
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 MDIit= Measured by mandatory disclosure index for each country of firm i for time period t; VDIit= 
Measured by voluntary disclosure index for each country of firm i for time period t; BoD_Indit= 
Percentage of independent directors on the board of firm i for time period t; BoD_Sizeit= Number of 
directors on the board of firm i for time period t; Big4Auditit= Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
the firm is audited by a big four auditor of firm i for the time period t, otherwise 0; Audit_Committeeit= 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has an audit committee of firm i for time period t, 
otherwise 0; Ceo_ Dualityit = Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of 
the board of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0; Top_5_ShareHit= Proportion of ordinary shares held by 
top five shareholders to total number of shares issued of firm i for time period t; ROAit= Net profit after 
tax divided by total assets of firm i for time period t; LN_TAit= Natural log of total asset of firm i for time 
period t; Leverageit=Total debt divided by total assets of firm i for time period t; F_Ageit= Number of 
years in operation as a listed firm of firm i for time period t; GDP_Capit= Real Gross Domestic Product 
Cap divided by total population; Equity_Mktit= Stock market capitalization ratio divided by Gross 
Domestic Product; Corruptionit= Corruption perception index score ranging from ‘0’ to ‘10’, where 0 
point out a high level of alleged corruption and 10 point to entirely clean country; IFRS_Adoptit= Dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the firm adopt IFRS between the period of 2006-2010 of firm i for the 
time period t, otherwise 0; Investor_Protectionit= Shareholder rights index, ranging from ‘0’ to ‘6’, where 
0 indicates the weakest and 6 the strongest shareholder rights of firm i for time period t; 
Gini_Coefficientit= Gini index of income inequality expressed as a percentage where 0 indicates perfect 
equality and 100 indicates perfect inequality. 
In terms of corporate governance descriptive statistics, Table 6.2 reports that, 
on average, 62.9% of boards in Malaysia (BoD_Indit) were comprised of more 
independent directors than non-independent directors with a standard deviation of 
8.86% and minimum and maximum levels of 24.20% and 100% suggesting the 
likelihood of effective oversight by board members. The board size of firms in 
Malaysia (B_Sizeit) ranged from 5 members to boards comprising 14 members with 
an average of 9 members. In terms of audit committee existence 
(Audit_Committeeit), 100% of Malaysian firms formed audit committees. In terms of 
role duality (Ceo_Dualityit), 20% of firms had CEOs that occupied both CEO and 
Board Chairperson roles. Table 6.1 also reports that 68% of the firms employed a 
Big 4 auditor (Big 4 Auditit). 
In terms of firm characteristics, Table 6.2 suggests that 92% of one firm’s shares 
were owned by five shareholders (Top_5_ShareHit). However, on average, the top 
five shareholders held 62% with a standard deviation of 16% suggesting that, among 
the largest Malaysian firms, concentrated share ownership is prevalent and greater 
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 than the other countries. Table 6.2 reveals that the maximum return on equity a 
company earned is 88% with a mean of 12% suggesting a high level of return on 
equity in the sample companies from Malaysia. Descriptive statistics for ROAit is 
somewhat more subdued with a mean of 5% and a maximum of 27% indicating that 
return on assets for Malaysia firms trails return on equity. In terms of the natural log 
of total assets for the Malaysian firms in the sample, LN_TAit has a mean (median) of 
22.35 (22.02) with minimum and maximum values ranging from 18.02 to 29.10.  In 
terms of leverage, it is noted that Leverageit ranges between 1% and 188%. The 
sample companies in Malaysia record a relatively high level of borrowings with a 
mean of 61%. Company Age (F_Ageit), as measured by the listing age of the listed 
companies, ranges from one year to 60 years with a most firms having an average 
period of existence of just over 28 years. From Table 6.1, it is noted that one firm 
had been in operation for 60 years. 
In terms of country characteristics descriptive statistics, Table 6.2 reports that 
the GDP rate (GDP_Capit) in Malaysia ranges from $12,900 to $15,200 for the 
entire observation window. This indicates the values increase steadily from 2006-
2010 and the values are consistent with the recognition that Malaysia is an 
establishing economy. Table 6.2 also shows that 80% of firms in the sample 
companies adopted IFRS. The study also used the Gini-coefficient of inequality to 
measure of income inequality (Gini-coefficientit). Table 6.2 documents that the 
coefficient ranges from 46.00% to 46.21% indicating relatively high income 
inequality in Malaysia. 
6.2.3 Descriptive Statistics - Australia 
Table 6.3 shows the descriptive statistics for all of the variables used for 
analysis for Australia. Table 6.3 reports that mandatory information disclosure 
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 (MDIit) by listed firms has a mean (median) of 97.73% (100%) and a standard 
deviation of 4.89% with minimum and maximum levels of 81.82% and 100% 
respectively. Table 6.3 also reports that voluntary information disclosure (VDIit) by 
listed firms have a mean (median) of 88% (88%) and a standard deviation of 4% with 
a minimum 81% (81%) and a maximum of 98% (98%) respectively. Results show 
that companies within Australia predominantly comply with both mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure requirements however the mean for MDIit is considerably 
higher than the mean for VDIit suggesting that as expected, mandatory disclosure is 
higher. This suggests that as a result of reforms, regulation and competition in the 
corporate sector in Australia, listed firms maintain very high standards of 
information disclosure.  
Table 6.3: Sample Descriptive Statistics - Australia (n = 200) 
 
MDIit= Measured by mandatory disclosure index for each country of firm i for time period t; VDIit= 
Measured by voluntary disclosure index for each country of firm i for time period t; BoD_Indit= 
Percentage of independent directors on the board of firm i for time period t; BoD_Sizeit= Number of 
directors on the board of firm i for time period t; Big4Auditit= Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
MDIit 97.73 100.00 4.89 81.82 100.00 
VDIit 88.00 88.00 4.00 81.00 98.00 
BoD_Indit 67.63 64.29 15.19 25.00 100.00 
B_Sizeit 8.63 10.00 2.21 5.00 16.00 
Big4Auditit 1.00  0.00 1.00 1.00 
Audit_Committeit 1.00  0.00 100 1.00 
Ceo_Dualityit 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Top_5_ShareHit 0.49 0.57 0.15 0.04 0.93 
ROAit 0.21 0.09 0.52 -0.12 3.99 
LN_TAit 21.73 22.47 1.37 18.44 25.59 
Leverageit 0.44 0.38 0.25 0.03 1.15 
F_Ageit 24.28 25.00 22.95 1.00 125 
GDP_Capit  37920.00 38100.00 2658.75 33300.00 41000.00 
Equity_Mktit 125.64 136.50 31.99 64.20 152.70 
IFRS_Adoptsit 1.00  0.00 1.00 1.00 
Corruptionit 8.68 8.70 0.04 8.60 8.70 
Investor_Protectionit 4.03 4.00 0.40 3.00 5.00 
Gini_coefficientit 32.38 30.50 2.31 30.50 35.20 
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 the firm is audited by a big four auditor of firm i for the time period t, otherwise 0; Audit_Committeeit= 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has an audit committee of firm i for time period t, 
otherwise 0; Ceo_ Dualityit = Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of 
the board of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0; Top_5_ShareHit= Proportion of ordinary shares held by 
top five shareholders to total number of shares issued of firm i for time period t; ROAit= Net profit after 
tax divided by total assets of firm i for time period t; LN_TAit= Natural log of total asset of firm i for time 
period t; Leverageit=Total debt divided by total assets of firm i for time period t; F_Ageit= Number of 
years in operation as a listed firm of firm i for time period t; GDP_Cap it= Real Gross Domestic Product 
Cap divided by total population; Equity_Mktit= Stock market capitalization ratio divided by Gross 
Domestic Product; Corruptionit= Corruption perception index score ranging from ‘0’ to ‘10’, where 0 
point out a high level of alleged corruption and 10 point to entirely clean country; IFRS_Adoptit= Dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the firm adopt IFRS between the period of 2006-2010 of firm i for the 
time period t, otherwise 0; Investor_Protectionit= Shareholder rights index, ranging from ‘0’ to ‘6’, where 
0 indicates the weakest and 6 the strongest shareholder rights of firm i for time period t; 
Gini_Coefficientit= Gini index of income inequality expressed as a percentage where 0 indicates perfect 
equality and 100 indicates perfect inequality. 
In terms of corporate governance descriptive statistics, Table 6.3 reports that, 
on average, 67.63% of boards in Australia (BoD_Indit) were comprised of more 
independent directors than non-independent directors with a standard deviation of 
15.19% and minimum and maximum levels of 25.00% and 100.00% suggesting the 
likelihood of effective oversight by board members. Board size of firms in Australia 
(B_Sizeit) ranged from boards with only 5 members to boards comprising 16 
members with an average of almost 9 members. In terms of audit committee 
existence (Audit Committeeit), 100% of firms formed audit committees indicating a 
very high level of audit committee existence in the sampled companies in Australia. 
In terms of role duality (Ceo_Dualityit) none of firms had CEOs that occupied both 
CEO and board chairperson roles. Table 6.3 also reports that all of the firms 
employed a Big 4 auditor (Big4Auditit). 
On average, five shareholders controlled 49% of the firm’s shareholding 
suggesting that, even among the largest Australian firms, concentrated share 
ownership is prevalent. This provides greater incentives of the company's owners to 
monitor and control managerial actions. Table 6.3 also shows the descriptive 
statistics for the profitability metric in the study; return on assets (ROAit). 
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 Descriptive statistics in Table 6.3 for ROAit have a mean of 21%. In terms of the 
natural log of total assets for the Australian firms in the sample, LN_TAit has a mean 
(median) of 21.73 (22.47) with minimum and maximum values ranging from 18.44 
to 25.59. The sample companies in Australian record a relatively low level of 
borrowings with a mean of 0.44%. Company Age (F_Ageit), as measured by the 
listing age of the listed companies, ranges from one year to 125 years with a most 
firms having an average period of existence of just over 24 years. In terms of country 
characteristics, Table 6.3 suggests that the GDP growth rate in Australia increase 
from $33,300 to $41,000 over the time period. Table 6.3 also shows that 100% of 
firms in the sample companies adopted IFRS. The study also used the Gini-
coefficient of inequality to measure of income inequality (Gini-coefficientit). Table 
6.3 documents that the coefficient ranges from 30.50% to 35.20% indicating less 
income inequality in Australia relative to Malaysia. 
6.2.4 Descriptive Statistics – Comparisons between Bangladesh, Malaysia and 
Australia 
Comparisons between the descriptive statistics for Bangladesh, Malaysia an 
Australia in Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 highlight a number of interesting observations. In 
terms of both mandatory and voluntary corporate governance a disclosure, 
Bangladesh has the lowest levels of disclosures (54% for MDIit and 63% for VDIit) 
followed by Malaysia (83% for MDIit and 89% for VDIit) with Australia having the 
highest levels of corporate governance disclosures in the study (97% for MDIit and 
88% for VDIit). 
Differences in the descriptive statistics for the corporate governance 
mechanisms between the three countries are also notable. In relation to board 
independence (BoD_Indit), Bangladeshi firms only had 17.49% of firms with a 
majority of independent directors with Malaysia having the most at 92.80% and 
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 Australian having 67.63%. In terms of average board members (BoD_Sizeit), 
Bangladesh firms have an average of 7 members with both Malaysia and Australia 
having larger boards averaging 9 members. In a similar vein, 88% of firms in 
Bangladesh firms have an audit committee (Audit_Committeeit) whilst all Malaysian 
and Australian firms in the sample has an audit committee. Finally, in terms of CEO 
duality, 85% of firms in Bangladesh have a CEO who is also the board chairperson 
(CEO_Dualityit) with Malaysia having 20% and Australia having no CEOs who are 
also the board chairperson.  
In terms of firm characteristics and country characteristics, other significant 
differences are also evident between Bangladeshi, Malaysian and Australian firms. 
Australian firms are the most heavily leveraged followed by Bangladeshi firms and 
Malaysian firms suggesting that the strength of an economy is only one of the factors 
determining the borrowing capacity of firms in a country. The average age of firms 
in the sample is highest in Malaysia (28 years) followed by Australia (24 years) and 
Bangladesh (17 years). Finally, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP_Capit) for each 
person in Bangladesh ranges from $1,400.00 to $2,300.00 with Malaysia ranging 
from $12,900.00 to $15,200.00 and Australia with the highest GDP per person of 
between $33,300.00 to $41,000.00. 
6.3 Pearson Correlation Analysis 
Tables 6.4 to 6.6 present a correlation matrix reporting Pearson listwise 
correlation coefficient for both the continuous and dichotomous variables used in the 
study for the year 2006-2010 for Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia.  
6.3.1 Pearson Correlation Coefficients - Bangladesh 
Table 6.4 present a correlation matrix Pearson listwise correlation 
coefficients for both the continuous and dichotomous variables used in the study for 
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 Bangladesh. A review of the correlation coefficients in table 6.4 highlights a number 
of observations. First, in no instances are both dependent variables, i.e., MDIit and 
VDIit significantly correlated with one another, suggesting that both MDIit and VDIit 
are separate constructs of corporate governance disclosures. In terms of individual 
correlations, mandatory disclosures are positively associated with the existence of an 
audit committee (Audit Committeeit) and firm leverage (Leverageit) but negatively 
associated with CEO duality (CEO_Dualityit), shareholder concentration 
(Top_5_ShareHit) and the length of time that the firm has been in existence 
(F_Ageit). On the other hand, voluntary disclosures are positively associated with 
board size (B_Sizeit), and IFRS adoption by firms (IFRS_Adoptit) but negatively 
associated with the existence of an audit committee (Audit Committeeit) and firm 
leverage (Leverageit).  
152 
 
 Table: 6.4 Pearson Correlation Coefficients-Bangladesh (n= 200) 
VariablesϮ [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] 
MDIit [1] 1                 
VDIit [2] -0.13 1                
BOD_Indit [3] -0.01 -0.17* 1               
B_Sizeit [4] 0.06 0.35** -0.32** 1              
Audit_committe it [5] 0.17* -0.35** 0.30** -0.18** 1             
CEO_dualityit [6] -0.14* -0.16 -0.02 -0.23** -0.16* 1            
Top_5_ShareHit [7] -0.17* 0.05 -0.10 0.14 -0.05 -0.09 1           
ROAit [8] -0.11 0.25 -0.16* 0.00 -0.27** 0.16* 0.01 1          
LN_TAit [9] -0.06 0.10 -0.12 0.21** 0.12 -0.14 0.07 -0.11 1         
Leverageit [10] 0.16* -0.29** -0.05 -0.17* 0.10 0.37** 0.03 0.02 -0.01 1        
F_Ageit [11] -0.18* -0.04 0.13 0.05 0.34** -0.06 -0.18* -0.09 -0.11 -0.13 1       
GDP_Capit [12] 0.00 -0.11 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 1      
Equity_Mktit [13] 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.12 -0.30** 1     
IFRS_Adoptit [14] -0.08 0.54** -0.27** 0.45** -0.31** -0.20** 0.06 0.05 0.08 -0.17* -0.18** 0.01 0.00 1    
Corruptionit [15] 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.15* -0.15* 0.55** 0.00 1   
Investor_Protectionit [16] 0.03 -0.27 -0.05 -0.06 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.10 0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.02 -0.10 1  
Gini_Coeffecientit  [17] 0.01 -0.41 -0.02 -0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.07 0.00 -0.05 0.01 -0.09 -0.17* -0.82** -0.02 -0.64** 0.06 1 
 
**, * = Significant 1%, and 5% (two-tailed) respectively; Ϯ = Numbers in the top row of the table correspond in sequential order with the variables listed in the left column of the table (i.e., [1] – MDIit etc.); MDIit= 
Measured by mandatory disclosure index for each country of firm i for time period t; VDIit= Measured by voluntary disclosure index for each country of firm i for time period t; BoD_Indit= Percentage of independent 
directors on the board of firm i for time period t; B_Sizeit= Number of directors on the board of firm i for time period t; Audit_Committeeit= Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has an audit committee of 
firm i for time period t, otherwise 0; Ceo_ Dualityit = Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0; Top_5_ShareHit= Proportion of ordinary 
shares held by top five shareholders to total number of shares issued of firm i for time period t; ROAit= Net profit after tax divided by total assets of firm i for time period t; LN_TAit= Natural log of total asset of firm i 
for time period t; Leverageit=Total debt divided by total assets of firm i for time period t; F_Ageit= Number of years in operation as a listed firm of firm i for time period t; GDP_Capit= Real Gross Domestic Product 
Cap divided by total population; Equity_Mktit= Stock market capitalization ratio divided by Gross Domestic Product; Corruptionit= Corruption perception index score ranging from ‘0’ to ‘10’, where 0 point out a high 
level of alleged corruption and 10 point to entirely clean country; IFRS_Adoptit= Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm adopt IFRS between the period of 2006-2010 of firm i for the time period t, otherwise 
0; Investor_Protectionit= Shareholder rights index, ranging from ‘0’ to ‘6’, where 0 indicates the weakest and 6 the strongest shareholder rights of firm i for time period t; Gini_Coefficientit= Gini index of income 
inequality expressed as a percentage where 0 indicates perfect equality and 100 indicates perfect inequality. 
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 In relation to other variables, Table 6.4 indicates that firms that adopt IFRS 
are significantly associated with corporate governance characteristics (i.e., 
BoD_Indit, B_Sizeit, Audit Committeeit and CEO_Dualityit) and, to a lesser extent, 
firm features (Leverageit and F_Ageit). Additionally, firms will borrowings 
(Leverageit) significantly associated with B_Sizeit and CEO_Dualityit. A review of 
Table 6.4 also suggests that none of the correlations among the variables are above 
the critical multicollinearity limit of 0.8 (Hair et al. 1995). As such, at this stage 
therefore, based on Table 6.4 correlations, multivariate analysis can be undertaken. 
6.3.2 Pearson Correlation Coefficients - Malaysia 
Table 6.5 present a correlation matrix Pearson listwise correlation 
coefficients for both the continuous and dichotomous variables used in the study for 
Malaysia. A review of the correlation coefficients in table 6.5 highlights a number of 
observations. First, in no instances are both dependent variables, i.e., MDIit and VDIit 
significantly correlated with one another, suggesting that both MDIit and VDIit are 
separate constructs of corporate governance disclosures. In terms of individual 
correlations, mandatory disclosures are positively associated with board 
independence (BoD_Indit) but negatively associated with board size (B_Sizeit) and 
IFRS adoption by firms (IFRS_Adopit). On the other hand, voluntary disclosures are 
positively associated with a Big 4 auditor (Big4Auditit), shareholder concentration 
(Top_5_ShareHit), return on assets (ROAit) and log of total assets (LN_TAit). 
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 Table: 6.5 Pearson Correlation Coefficients-Malaysia (n= 200) 
VariablesϮ [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] 
MDIit [1] 1                 
VDIit [2] -0.05 1                
BOD_Indit [3] 0.37** -0.32** 1               
B_Sizeit  [4] -0.31** -0.26** -0.17* 1              
Big4it [5] -0.04 0.20** -0.11 0.21** 1             
CEO_dualityit [6] 0.07 0.12 0.06 -0.03 -0.32** 1            
Top_5_ShareHit [7] -0.03 0.31** -0.15* -0.21** 0.10 -0.12 1           
ROAit [8] -0.07 0.38** -0.17* -0.23** 0.06 0.17* 0.26** 1          
LN_TAit [9] -0.11 0.15* -0.16* 0.06 0.33** -0.24** 0.15* -0.03 1         
Leverageit [10] -0.00 0.29 -0.03 0.09 -0.10 0.25** 0.05 -0.01 0.03 1        
F_ageit [11] 0.05 -0.12 0.11 0.20** -0.11 -0.07 0.09 -0.27** -0.17* -0.08 1       
GDP_Capit [12] 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.05 1      
Equity_Mktit [13] 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.10 0.00 -0.30** 1     
IFRS_Adoptit [14] -0.26** 0.05 -0.24** 0.01 0.32** -0.06 0.12 0.19** -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.00 1    
Corruptionit [15] 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03 -0.08 0.04 -0.30** 0.00 1   
Investor_Protectionit [16] 0.04 -0.05 0.06 0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.06 0.04 0.08 0.10 -0.01 0.10 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 1  
Gini_Coeffecientit [17] 0.04 -0.15 0.91** -0.31** -0.04 0.07 -0.03 -0.07 -0.11 -0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.26** 0.00 0.04 1 
 
**, * = Significant 1%, and 5% (two-tailed) respectively; Ϯ = Numbers in the top row of the table correspond in sequential order with the variables listed in the left column of the 
table (i.e., [1] – MDIit etc.); MDIit= Measured by mandatory disclosure index for each country of firm i for time period t; VDIit= Measured by voluntary disclosure index for each 
country of firm i for time period t;  BoD_Indit= Percentage of independent directors on the board of firm i for time period t; B_Sizeit= Number of directors on the board of firm i 
for time period t; Audit_Committeeit= Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has an audit committee of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0; Ceo_ Dualityit = Dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0; Top_5_ShareHit= Proportion of ordinary shares held by top 
five shareholders to total number of shares issued of firm i for time period t; ROAit= Net profit after tax divided by total assets of firm i for time period t; LN_TAit= Natural log of 
total asset of firm i for time period t; Leverageit=Total debt divided by total assets of firm i for time period t; F_Ageit= Number of years in operation as a listed firm of firm i for 
time period t GDP_Cap it= Real Gross Domestic Product Cap divided by total population; Equity_Mktit= Stock market capitalization ratio divided by Gross Domestic Product; 
Corruptionit= Corruption perception index score ranging from ‘0’ to ‘10’, where 0 point out a high level of alleged corruption and 10 point to entirely clean country; 
IFRS_Adoptit= Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm adopt IFRS between the period of 2006-2010 of firm i for the time period t, otherwise 0; Investor_Protectionit= 
Shareholder rights index, ranging from ‘0’ to ‘6’, where 0 indicates the weakest and 6 the strongest shareholder rights of firm i for time period t; Gini_Coefficientit= Gini index of 
income inequality expressed as a percentage where 0 indicates perfect equality and 100 indicates perfect inequality.
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 In relation to other variables, Table 6.5 indicates that return on assets (ROAit) 
are positively associated with voluntary corporate governance disclosures (VDIit), 
CEO duality (CEO_Dualityit) and shareholder concentration (Top_5_ShareHit) but 
negatively associated with board independence (BoD_Indit) and board size 
(B_Sizeit). A review of Table 6.5 also suggests that none of the correlations among 
the variables are above the critical multicollinearity limit of 0.8 (Hair et al. 1995). As 
such, at this stage therefore, based on Table 6.4 correlations, multivariate analysis 
can be undertaken. 
6.3.3 Pearson Correlation Coefficients - Australia 
Table 6.6 present a correlation matrix Pearson listwise correlation 
coefficients for both the continuous and dichotomous variables used in the study for 
Australia. A review of the correlation coefficients in table 6.6 highlights a number of 
observations.17 First, in no instances are both dependent variables, i.e., MDIit and 
VDIit significantly correlated with one another, suggesting that both MDIit and VDIit 
are separate constructs of corporate governance disclosures. In terms of individual 
correlations, mandatory disclosures are positively associated with leverage 
(Leverageit). On the other hand, voluntary disclosures are positively associated with 
leverage (Leverageit). 
 
17 Given that all Australian firms in the sample employed a Big 4 auditor, established an audit committee and did not have a 
CEO who was also the Chairperson of the board, the values for these three variables (i.e., Big4it, Audit_Committeeit and 
Ceo_Dualityit) are constant and therefore excluded from analysis. 
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 Table: 6.6 Pearson Correlation Coefficients-Australia (n= 200) 
VariablesϮ [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] 
MDIit [1] 1              
VDIit [2] 0.06 1             
BOD_Indit [3] 0.03 0.10 1            
B_Sizeit [4] -0.03 -0.10 -0.16* 1           
Top_5_ShareHit [5] 0.04 0.25 -0.26** 0.28** 1          
ROAit [6] 0.11 -0.13 -0.09 0.50** 0.11 1         
LN_TAit [7] 0.13 0.11 0.05 0.62** 0.30** 0.50** 1        
Leverageit [8] 0.18* 0.28** 0.14* -0.15* -0.11 0.05 0.05 1       
F_Ageit [9] 0.11 -0.05 0.02 0.41** 0.06 0.50** 0.44** -0.09 1      
GDP_Capit [10] 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.16* -0.01 0.08 -0.04 0.06 1     
Equity_Mktit [11] 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.01 -0.23** 1    
Corruptionit [12] 0.00 0.10 -0.04 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.11 0.02 0.12 -0.42** 1   
Investor_Protectionit [13] 0.08 0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.14 0.06 -0.03 0.09 -0.04 0.03 0.10 1  
Gini_Coeffecient it [14] 0.00 0.20 0.01 0.00 -0.08 0.06 0.01 0.07 -0.01 -0.04 -0.45** -0.54** -0.09 1 
 
**, * = Significant 1%, and 5% (two-tailed) respectively; Ϯ = Numbers in the top row of the table correspond in sequential order with the variables listed in the left column of the 
table (i.e., [1] – MDIit etc.); MDIit= Measured by mandatory disclosure index for each country of firm i for time period t; VDIit= Measured by voluntary disclosure index for each 
country of firm i for time period t;  BoD_Indit= Percentage of independent directors on the board of firm i for time period t; BoD_Sizeit= Number of directors on the board of firm 
i for time period t; Audit_Committeeit= Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has an audit committee of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0; Top_5_ShareHit= 
Proportion of ordinary shares held by top five shareholders to total number of shares issued of firm i for time period t; ROAit= Net profit after tax divided by total assets of firm i 
for time period t; LN_TAit= Natural log of total asset of firm i for time period t; Leverageit=Total debt divided by total assets of firm i for time period t; F_Ageit= Number of 
years in operation as a listed firm of firm i for time period t; GDP_Cap it= Real Gross Domestic Product Cap divided by total population; Equity_Mktit= Stock market 
capitalization ratio divided by Gross Domestic Product; Corruptionit= Corruption perception index score ranging from ‘0’ to ‘10’, where 0 point out a high level of alleged 
corruption and 10 point to entirely clean country; IFRS_Adoptit= Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm adopt IFRS between the period of 2006-2010 of firm i for the 
time period t, otherwise 0; Investor_Protectionit= Shareholder rights index, ranging from ‘0’ to ‘6’, where 0 indicates the weakest and 6 the strongest shareholder rights of firm i 
for time period t; Gini_Coefficientit=  Gini index of income inequality expressed as a percentage where 0 indicates perfect equality and 100 indicates perfect inequality. 
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 In relation to other variables, Table 6.6 indicates that log of total assets 
(LN_TAit) is positively associated with board size (B_Sizeit), shareholder 
concentration (Top_5_ShareHit) and return on assets (ROAit). Firm age (F_Ageit) is 
positively associated with board size (B_Sizeit), return on assets (ROAit) and log of 
total assets (LN_TAit). A review of Table 6.7 also suggests that none of the 
correlations among the variables are above the critical multicollinearity limit of 0.8 
(Hair et al. 1995). As such, at this stage therefore, based on Table 6.6 correlations, 
multivariate analysis can be undertaken. 
6.3.4 Correlations – Comparisons between Bangladesh, Malaysia and 
Australia 
Comparisons between the correlations for Bangladesh, Malaysia an Australia 
in Tables 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 highlight a number of observations. In all correlation 
matrices in Tables 6.4 to 6.6, both mandatory and voluntary corporate governance 
disclosures (i.e., MDIit and VDIit) are not significantly correlated to one another 
suggesting that a separate examination of these two constructs is justified. 
Additionally, MDIit is positively associated for both Bangladeshi and Australian 
firms with the extent of borrowings by firms (Leverageit). 
6.4  Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter provided the disaggregated descriptive statistics for each 
country. Consequently, a comparison is provided between the descriptive statistics 
for Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. Subsequently, correlation coefficients are 
also reported upon for each of the three countries before a comparison is made 
between countries.  
Chapter Seven will provide the results of the regressions run to determine the 
main predictors of both mandatory and voluntary corporate governance disclosures 
in the three countries. Additionally, the results of a One-Way ANOVA test are also 
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 provided to determine if there are significant differences in the independent variables 
between Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. 
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 CHAPTER SEVEN 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS – MULTIPLE REGRESSIONS 
7.1 Overview of the Chapter 
Chapter Six reported the descriptive statistics for the data examined in the 
study. Pearson correlation analysis along within comparisons between the three 
countries in the sample was also provided. 
This chapter reports and discusses the main empirical results of the study. 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 7.2 presents details of the regression 
models utilized followed by Sections 7.3 and 7.4 which report the regression results 
of both mandatory and voluntary corporate governance disclosure in terms of the 
regression models utilized. Section 7.5 reports the results from the one-way ANOVA 
tests followed by Section 7.6 which summarizes the supporting/non-supporting of the 
study’s hypotheses. Finally, a summary is provided at Section 7.7. 
7.2 Model Specification 
The study uses Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) statistical regression models 
for the purpose of examining the association between levels of mandatory and 
voluntary corporate governance disclosures and corporate governance, firm and 
country characteristics of Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australian firms. The overall 
regression models are specified into two equations (resulting in a total of six 
regression results reported) which are used to analyse the testable hypotheses.  
7.3 Multiple Regression Analysis 
This section will discuss the multivariate results arising from examining the 
association between corporate governance mandatory disclosure and the corporate 
governance, firm and country characteristics related variables for listed firms in 
Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. Results of multivariate analysis and the 
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 association between dependent, independent and voluntary disclosure are presented 
and discussed in the subsequent subsection. 
7.3.1 Mandatory Corporate Governance Disclosure  
Table 7.1 presents the results of multiple regressions using corporate 
governance, firm and country characteristics and all remaining control variables as 
predictors in analysing the variation of mandatory corporate governance disclosure 
(MDIit). 
Table 7.1: Ordinary Least Squares regression of Governance, Firm and Country 
Characteristics on Mandatory Corporate Governance Disclosure. 
 Bangladesh Malaysia Australia 
Variables Beta P-value Beta P-value Beta P-value 
Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Intercept 0.70 0.49 9.31 0.28 64.87 0.67 
BoD_Indit 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.00*** 0.03 0.46 
BoD_Sizeit 0.00 0.31 -0.02 0.00*** -0.10 0.61 
Big4Auditit   0.03 0.00***   
Audit_Committeit 0.03 0.03**     
Ceo Dualityit -0.01 0.11 0.03 0.05**   
Firm Characteristics 
Top_5_ShareHit -0.35 0.00*** 0.03 0.02** -11.52 0.00*** 
ROAit -0.14 0.09* -0.03 0.67 1.48 0.06* 
LN_TAit 0.00 0.02** 0.00 0.33 0.96 0.03** 
Leverageit 0.06 0.00*** 0.00 0.83 1.67 0.04** 
F_Ageit 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.85 0.03 0.06* 
Country Characteristics 
GDP_Capit 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.23 
Equity_Mktit 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.49 0.02 0.72 
IFRS_Adoptit -0.02 0.55 -0.02 0.47   
Corruptionit 0.02 0.82 -0.04 0.26 0.77 0.84 
Investor_Protectionit 0.02 0.02** 0.00 0.73 0.15 0.48 
Gini_coefficientit 0.00 0.96 -0.21 0.31 -0.21 0.32 
Industry 
Cement -0.02 0.53     
Engineering 0.00 0.06*     
Food & Allied 0.05 0.51     
Fuel & Power 0.07 0.28     
Jute 0.05 0.09*     
Textile 0.02 0.84     
Miscellaneous 0.08 0.08*     
Tannery Industry 0.04 0.64     
Pharmaceutical & 
Chemical 0.03 0.74 
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 IT Sector 0.08 0.00***   5.96 0.05** 
Communication   0.02 0.04**   
Consumer 
Discretionary 
  0.04 0.00*** 7.47 0.00*** 
Industrial   -0.02 0.48 4.18 0.17 
Materials   0.03 0.44 -2.84 0.30 
Consumer Staples   0.03 0.08 0.83 0.78 
Utilities   0.04 0.03 5.64 0.07* 
Energy   0.02 0.56 7.78 0.00*** 
Health Care   -0.04 0.03** 7.68 0.00*** 
Year Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.42 0.58 
F statistic (sig.) 5.53 6.25 6.93 
Observations 200 200 200 
 
***, **, *,  = 1%, 5% and 10% significance with one-tailed significance level where direction of 
sign on coefficient predicted, otherwise two-tailed. 
Where: 
MDIit =Measured by mandatory disclosure index for each country of firm i for time 
period t. 
BoD_Indit =Percentage of independent directors on the board of firm i for time period t. 
BoD_Sizeit =Number of directors on the board of firm i for time period t. 
Big4 Auditit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is audited by a big four 
auditor of firm i for the time period t, otherwise 0. 
Audit_Committeeit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has an audit committee of 
firm i for time period t, otherwise 0. 
Ceo_ Dualityit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0.  
Top_5_ShareHit =Proportion of ordinary shares held by top five shareholders to total number 
of shares issued of firm i for time period t. 
ROAit =Net profit after tax divided by total assets of firm i for time period t 
LN_TAit =Natural log of total asset of firm i for time period t. 
Leverageit =Total debt divided by total assets of firm i for time period t. 
F_Ageit =Number of years in operation as a listed firm of firm i for time period t. 
GDP_Capit =Real Gross Domestic Product Cap divided by total population. 
Equity_Mktit =Stock market capitalisation ratio divided by Gross Domestic Product. 
Corruptionit =Corruption perception index score ranging from ‘0’ to ‘10’, where 0 point 
out a high level of alleged corruption and 10 point to entirely clean country.  
IFRS_Adoptit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm adopt IFRS between the 
period of 2006-2010 of firm i for the time period t, otherwise 0. 
Investor_Protectionit =Shareholder rights index, ranging from ‘0’ to ‘6’, where 0 indicates the 
weakest and 6 the strongest shareholder rights of firm i for time period t. 
Gini_Coefficientit =Gini index of income inequality ranging from ‘0’ to ‘1’, where 0 indicates 
perfect equality and 1 indicate perfect inequality. 
Industry_Dummyit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm operate in the specific 
industry sector of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0. 
Year_Dummyit =Series indicator variables controlling time temporal differences of reporting 
periods for firm-year observations with firm i scored 1 if financial data 
correspond to year t, 0 otherwise. 
ε it =Error term. 
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 The result of the regression analysis is reported in Table 7.1. The regression 
results are grouped into Columns 1 to 3 reporting results for Bangladesh in Column 
1, Malaysia in Column 2 and Australia in Column 3. For each country, the regression 
model is run in which all corporate governance characteristics, firm characteristics 
and country characteristics along with remaining industry and year variables. 
A review of Table 7.1 Column 1 suggests that on average, in terms of 
corporate governance characteristics, Bangladeshi firms with higher levels of 
mandatory corporate governance disclosure (MDIit) are likely to have an audit 
committee (Audit_Commiteeit) in place. They are also, in terms of firm 
characteristics, likely to be larger (LN_TAit), with higher borrowings (Leverageit) 
and have been in operations longer (F_Age). However, these same firms also had less 
concentrated shareholdings (Top_5_ShareHit) and lower return on assets (ROAit). In 
relation to country characteristics, these firms also tended to have high levels of 
shareholder rights (Investor_Protectionit). Finally, Bangladeshi firms with higher 
mandatory corporate governance disclosure scores (MDIit) were most prevalent in 
the engineering, shoes (Jute) and information technology industries. A review of 
Table 7.1 Column 1 shows that the model specified has an adjusted R2 of 38% 
suggesting that the variables in the model account for up to 38% of the variation in 
mandatory levels of corporate governance disclosure. 
A review of Table 7.1 Column 2 suggests that on average, in terms of 
corporate governance characteristics, Malaysian firms with mandatory corporate 
governance disclosure (MDIit) employed a Big 4 auditor (Big4Auditit) and had 
independent boards (BoD_Indit) but increased CEO duality (Ceo Dualityit) although 
these boards tended to be small (BoD_Sizeit).18 On the other hand, in terms of firm 
18 Since all the firms in Malaysia formed audit committee and the Audit_Committee variable is therefore constant, there is no 
result for the variable. 
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 characteristics, Malaysian firms with MDIit had broader shareholdings 
(Top_5_ShareHit). In relation to country characteristics, none of the variables were 
significantly associated with Malaysian firms with mandatory corporate governance 
disclosure (MDIit). Finally, Malaysian firms with higher mandatory corporate 
governance disclosure scores (MDIit) were in the communication and consumer 
discretionary industries although less in the health care industry. A review of Table 
7.1 Column 2 shows that the model specified has an adjusted R2 of 42% suggesting 
that the variables in the model account for up to 42% of the variation in mandatory 
levels of corporate governance disclosure. 
A review of Table 7.1 Column 3 suggests that on average, in terms of corporate 
governance characteristics, none of the variables used in the model were significant 
predictors.19 On the other hand, in terms of firm characteristics, Australian firms with 
MDIit have higher return on assets (ROAit), are generally large (LN_TAit), with high 
borrowings (Leverageit) and have been in operations longer (F_Ageit). However, 
these same firms also had narrow shareholdings (Top_5_ShareHit). In relation to 
country characteristics, none of the variables were significantly associated with 
Australian firms with mandatory corporate governance disclosure (MDIit). Finally, 
Australian firms with higher mandatory corporate governance disclosure scores 
(MDIit) were in the information technology, consumer discretionary, utilities, energy 
and health care industries. A review of Table 7.1 Column 3 shows that the model 
specified has an adjusted R2 of 58% suggesting that the variables in the model 
account for up to 58% of the variation in mandatory levels of corporate governance 
disclosure.20 
19 Given that all firms in Australia employed a Big 4 auditor (Big_4), formed audit committees (Audit_Committee) and had no 
instances of a CEO being also the chairperson of the board (CEO_Duality), the values for all these variables is constant and 
there is no result for these variables. 
20    As a result of the multivariate analysis undertaken in Table 7.1, we also sought to determine whether our model suffered 
from any multicollinearity concerns. In this respect, we generated Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) from the regression 
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 In terms of comparing the results between Bangladesh, Malaysia and 
Australia, Table 7.1 Columns 1 to 3 shows that high levels of mandatory corporate 
governance disclosures by firms in Bangladesh and Australia were primarily 
associated with firm characteristics such as shareholder concentration, return on 
assets, large firms, high borrowings and firm age. Alternatively, Malaysian firms 
disclosures, were significantly associated with corporate governance characteristics 
such as board independence, size and Big 4 auditors. 
7.4 Multiple Regression Analysis 
This section will discuss the multivariate results arising from examining the 
association between corporate governance voluntary disclosure and all the corporate 
governance, firm and country characteristics related variables (i.e., all the variables) 
for listed firms in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. Results of multivariate 
analysis and the association between dependent, independent and predictor variables 
are presented and discussed in the subsequent subsection. 
7.4.1 Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosure  
Table 7.2 presents the results of multiple regressions using corporate 
governance, firm and country characteristics and all remaining control variables as 
predictors in analysing the variation of voluntary corporate governance disclosure 
(VDIit). 
  
results undertaken for each country and reviewed them for any relationships that exceeded 0.8 (Hair et al. 1995). None of 
the regression results in Table 7.1 Columns 1 to 3 reported any correlations exceeding 0.8 suggesting therefore that our 
multivariate results do not suffer from any multicollinearity concerns. 
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 Table 7.2: Ordinary Least Squares regression of Governance, Firm and Country 
Characteristics on Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosure. 
 Bangladesh Malaysia Australia 
Variables Beta P-value Beta P-value Beta P-value 
Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Intercept 1.14 0.22 10.15 0.27 0.76 0.62 
BoD_Indit 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.39 
BoD_Sizeit 0.00 0.04** -0.02 0.00*** 0.00 0.42 
Big4Auditit   0.03 0.00***   
Audit_Committeit -0.02 0.03**     
Ceo Dualityit 0.03 0.03** 0.01 0.03**   
Firm Characteristics 
Top_5_ShareHit 0.11 0.09* 0.06 0.00*** -0.02 0.52 
ROAit -0.08 0.09* -0.04 0.63 -0.02 0.17 
LN_TAit 0.00 0.03** 0.00 0.24 0.02 0.07* 
Leverageit -0.05 0.00*** 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.76 
F_Ageit 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.06* 
Country Characteristics 
GDP_Capit 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.78 
Equity_Mktit 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.56 -0.00 0.88 
IFRS_Adoptit 0.03 0.00*** -0.02 0.52   
Corruptionit 0.00 0.89 -0.04 0.31 -0.02 0.94 
Investor_Protectionit -0.02 0.27 0.00 0.83 0.02 0.24 
Gini_coefficientit -0.02 0.44 -0.18 0.32 0.00 0.98 
Industry 
Cement 0.03 0.12     
Engineering 0.05 0.31     
Food & Allied 0.04 0.20     
Fuel & Power 0.09 0.04**     
Jute 0.01 0.57     
Textile 0.02 0.71     
Miscellaneous 0.08 0.08*     
Tannery Industry 0.05 0.36     
Pharmaceutical & 
Chemical 0.04 0.17 
    
IT Sector -0.02 0.71   0.04 0.38 
Communication   0.04 0.04**   
Consumer 
Discretionary 
  0.06 0.00*** -0.03 0.37 
Industrial   -0.02 0.58 0.05 0.18 
Materials   0.03 0.38 0.02 0.75 
Consumer Staples   0.04 0.05** -0.03 0.48 
Utilities   0.03 0.05** -0.03 0.57 
Energy   0.02 0.60 0.03 0.54 
Health Care   -0.05 0.04** 0.00 0.97 
Year Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.53 0.58 0.62 
F statistic (sig.) 9.92 11.95 12.73 
Observations 200 200 200 
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 ***, **, *,  = 1%, 5% and 10% significance with one-tailed significance level where direction of 
sign on coefficient predicted, otherwise two-tailed. 
Where: 
VDIit =Measured by voluntary disclosure index for each country of firm i for time 
period t. 
BoD_Indit =Percentage of independent directors on the board of firm i for time period t. 
BoD_Sizeit =Number of directors on the board of firm i for time period t. 
Big4 Auditit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is audited by a big four 
auditor of firm i for the time period t, otherwise 0. 
Audit_Committeeit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has an audit committee of 
firm i for time period t, otherwise 0. 
Ceo_ Dualityit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0.  
Top_5_ShareHit =Proportion of ordinary shares held by top five shareholders to total number 
of shares issued of firm i for time period t. 
ROAit =Net profit after tax divided by total assets of firm i for time period t 
LN_TAit =Natural log of total asset of firm i for time period t. 
Leverageit =Total debt divided by total assets of firm i for time period t. 
F_Ageit =Number of years in operation as a listed firm of firm i for time period t. 
GDP_Capit =Real Gross Domestic Product Cap divided by total population. 
Equity_Mktit =Stock market capitalisation ratio divided by Gross Domestic Product. 
Corruptionit =Corruption perception index score ranging from ‘0’ to ‘10’, where 0 point 
out a high level of alleged corruption and 10 point to entirely clean country.  
IFRS_Adoptit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm adopt IFRS between the 
period of 2006-2010 of firm i for the time period t, otherwise 0. 
Investor_Protectionit =Shareholder rights index, ranging from ‘0’ to ‘6’, where 0 indicates the 
weakest and 6 the strongest shareholder rights of firm i for time period t. 
Gini_Coefficientit =Gini index of income inequality ranging from ‘0’ to ‘1’, where 0 indicates 
perfect equality and 1 indicate perfect inequality. 
Industry_Dummyit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm operate in the specific 
industry sector of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0. 
Year_Dummyit =Series indicator variables controlling time temporal differences of reporting 
periods for firm-year observations with firm i scored 1 if financial data 
correspond to year t, 0 otherwise. 
ε it =Error term. 
The result of the regression analysis is reported in Table 7.2. The regression 
results are grouped into Columns 1 to 3 reporting results for Bangladesh in Column 
1, Malaysia in Column 2 and Australia in Column 3. Furthermore, for each country, 
the regression model is run in which all corporate governance characteristics, firm 
characteristics and country characteristics along with remaining industry and year 
variables are regressed against voluntary corporate governance disclosure. 
A review of Table 7.2 Column 1 suggests that on average, in terms of 
corporate governance characteristics, Bangladeshi firms with voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure (VDIit) have bigger boards (BoD_Sizeit) in place, more CEOs 
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 who were also board chairpersons (CEO_Dualityit) but less audit committees 
(Audit_Committeeit). On the other hand, in terms of firm characteristics, Bangladeshi 
firms with VDIit have generally broader shareholdings (Top_5_ShareHit) and are 
large in size. However, these same firms also had lower return on assets (ROAit) and 
lesser borrowings (Leverageit). In relation to country characteristics, these firms also 
tended to have adopted the IFRS reporting framework (IFRS_Adoptit). Finally, 
Bangladeshi firms with higher voluntary corporate governance disclosure scores 
(VDIit) were in the fuel & power and miscellaneous industries. A review of Table 7.2 
Column 2 shows that the model specified has an adjusted R2 of 53% suggesting that 
the variables in the model account for up to 53% of the variation in voluntary levels 
of corporate governance disclosure. 
A review of Table 7.2 Column 2 suggests that on average, in terms of 
corporate governance characteristics, Malaysian firms with voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure (VDIit) employed a Big 4 auditor (Big4Auditit), had CEOs that 
were also board Chairpersons (Ceo Dualityit) and had independent boards 
(BoD_Indit) although these boards tended to be small (BoD_Sizeit).21 On the other 
hand, in terms of firm characteristics, Malaysian firms with VDIit had broader 
shareholdings (Top_5_ShareHit). In relation to country characteristics, none of the 
variables were significantly associated with Malaysian firms with voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure (VDIit). Finally, Malaysian firms with higher 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure scores (VDIit) were in the communication, 
consumer discretionary, consumer staples, utilities and health care industries and less 
in the industrial industry. A review of Table 7.2 Column 2 shows that the model 
specified has an adjusted R2 of 58% suggesting that the variables in the model 
21  Since all the firms in Malaysia formed audit committee and the Audit_Committeeit variable is therefore constant, there is no 
result for the variable. 
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 account for up to 58% of the variation in voluntary levels of corporate governance 
disclosure. 
A review of Table 7.2 Column 3 suggests that on average, in terms of 
corporate governance characteristics, none of the variables used in the model were 
significant predictors.22 On the other hand, in terms of firm characteristics, 
Australian firms with VDIit are generally large (LN_TAit) and have been in operations 
longer (F_Ageit). In relation to country characteristics, none of the variables are 
significantly associated with Australian firms with voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure (VDIit). Finally, none of the industries are significantly associated with 
Australian firms who reported higher levels of voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure scores (VDIit). A review of Table 7.2 Column 3 shows that the model 
specified has an adjusted R2 of 62% suggesting that the variables in the model 
account for up to 62% of the variation in voluntary levels of corporate governance 
disclosure.23 
In terms of comparing the results between Bangladesh, Malaysia and 
Australia, Table 7.2 Columns 1 to 3 shows that high levels of voluntary corporate 
governance disclosures by firms in Bangladesh and Malaysia were primarily 
associated with corporate governance characteristics such as board size and CEO 
duality. These same firms were also, in terms of firm characteristics, significantly 
associated with shareholder concentration. Australian firms who disclosed higher 
levels of voluntary corporate governance disclosures (VDIit), on the other hand, 
22 Given that all firms in Australia employed a Big 4 auditor (Big_4), formed audit committees (Audit_Committee) and had no 
instances of a CEO being also the chairperson of the board (CEO_Duality), the values for all these variables is constant and 
there is no result for these variables. 
23    As a result of the multivariate analysis undertaken in Table 7.2, we also sought to determine whether our model suffered 
from any multicollinearity concerns. In this respect, we generated Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) from the regression 
results undertaken for each country and reviewed them for any relationships that exceeded 0.8 (Hair et al. 1995). None of 
the regression results in Table 7.2 Columns 1 to 3 reported any correlations exceeding 0.8 suggesting therefore that our 
multivariate results do not suffer from any multicollinearity concerns.  
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 tended to be large firms who had been in operation longer.24 Results therefore 
indicate that, from an agency theory perspective, the insider-outsider dilemma that 
has traditionally plagued all large firms and that can give rise to substantial agency 
costs (such as additional monitoring) are not predominately influencing the results. 
One interpretation of this is that, until an economy reaches a certain stage of maturity 
in terms of macro-economic development, micro factors such as agency costs do not 
tend to play a significant role in determining corporate governance disclosures. 
7.5 One Way ANOVA Tests 
As an additional test separate from the preceding multiple regressions, this 
section presents univariate results comparing the changes in means of the variables 
used in the study.  One-way ANOVA tests are ordinarily completed to determine 
whether or not the means of at least two groups are equal. In the case of the study, 
the intention is to determine whether the variables from one country are statistically 
different to the variables from the other two countries, i.e., whether the means of 
variables examined are significantly different between Bangladeshi, Malaysian and 
Australian firms. Table 7.3 presents the results of one-way ANOVA.  
  
24   The time period (i.e. 2006–2010) of this study transcends the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) that swept the world. Although 
Australia was largely unaffected by the GFC, to control for the effects of the GFC on the nominated drivers of mandatory 
and voluntary corporate governance disclosure in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia, another robustness test was 
performed where it is investigated whether firms (in each country) in the pre-GFC period had different corporate 
governance disclosure determinants than in the post-GFC period. The data are therefore partitioned between pre-GFC 
(2006–2007) and post-GFC (2008–2010) periods and regressions rerun. Regressions are also rerun using GFC as an 
indicator variable that equals 1 for fiscal years 2008–2010 and 0 for fiscal years 2006–2007. Results remain significantly 
similar to the main results reported in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 suggesting that the GFC did not change the drivers of mandatory 
and voluntary corporate governance disclosure in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. 
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 Table 7.3: One-way ANOVA Results 
 
Variables 
 Bangladesh Malaysia Australia 
F 
statistic p-value 
Lower 
bound 
CI 
Upper 
bound 
CI 
Lower 
bound 
CI 
Upper 
bound 
CI 
Lower 
bound 
CI 
Upper 
bound 
CI 
MDIit 694.25 0.00*** 0.53 0.55 0.81 0.84 97.94 99.10 
VDIit 171.52 0.00*** 0.62 0.64 0.89 0.90 0.87 0.88 
BoD_Sizeit 37.35 0.00*** 8.74 9.26 8.32 8.93 8.14 8.49 
BoD_Indit 214.04 0.00*** 16.68 18.29 91.19 94.42 65.51 69.75 
Big4Auditit 708.12 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.61 0.74 1.00 1.00 
Audit_Committeeit 28.43 0.00*** 0.83 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Ceo_Dualityit 410.11 0.00*** 0.80 0.90 0.14 0.26 0.00 0.00 
Top_5_ShareHit 160.59 0.00*** 0.37 0.39 0.59 0.64 0.47 0.52 
ROAit 18.66 0.23 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.14 0.28 
LN_TAit 8.76 0.13 22.24 22.94 22.04 22.67 21.54 21.92 
Leverageit 294.44 0.00*** 0.70 0.76 0.57 0.66 2.16 2.53 
F_Ageit 25.40 0.27 15.63 18.01 26.32 30.28 21.08 27.47 
GDP_Capit 60.96 0.77 52.69 40.31 34.38 31.62 49.27 90.73 
Equity_Mktit 449.60 0.00*** 9.06 9.98 32.90 41.86 21.18 30.10 
IFRS_Adopt 33.55 0.00*** 0.53 0.67 0.74 0.86 1.00 1.00 
Corruptionit 533.08 0.00*** 2.15 2.21 4.78 4.86 8.67 8.69 
Investor_Protectionit 454.65 0.00*** 2.97 3.07 3.82 3.91 3.97 4.09 
Gini_coefficientit 35.80 0.16 33.01 33.14 46.07 46.09 32.06 32.70 
 
***, **, *, = 1%, 5% and 10% significance. CI = Confidence interval.  
Where:  
MDIit =Measured by mandatory disclosure index for each country of firm i for time 
period t. 
VDIit =Measured by voluntary disclosure index for each country of firm i for time 
period t. 
BoD_Indit =Percentage of independent directors on the board of firm i for time period t. 
BoD_Sizeit =Number of directors on the board of firm i for time period t. 
Big4 Auditit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is audited by a big four 
auditor of firm i for the time period t, otherwise 0. 
Audit_Committeeit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has an audit committee of 
firm i for time period t, otherwise 0. 
Ceo_ Dualityit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0.  
Top_5_ShareHit =Proportion of ordinary shares held by top five shareholders to total number 
of shares issued of firm i for time period t. 
ROAit =Net profit after tax divided by total assets of firm i for time period t. 
LN_TAit =Natural log of total asset of firm i for time period t. 
Leverageit =Total debt divided by total assets of firm i for time period t. 
F_Ageit =Number of years in operation as a listed firm of firm i for time period t. 
GDP_Capit =Real Gross Domestic Product Cap divided by total population. 
Equity_Mktit =Stock market capitalisation ratio divided by Gross Domestic Product. 
Corruptionit =Corruption perception index score ranging from ‘0’ to ‘10’, where 0 point 
out a high level of alleged corruption and 10 point to entirely clean country.  
IFRS_Adoptit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm adopt IFRS between the 
period of 2006-2010 of firm i for the time period t, otherwise 0. 
Investor_Protectionit =Shareholder rights index, ranging from ‘0’ to ‘6’, where 0 indicates the 
weakest and 6 the strongest shareholder rights of firm i for time period t. 
Gini_Coefficientit =Gini index of income inequality ranging from ‘0’ to ‘1’, where 0 indicates 
perfect equality and 1 indicate perfect inequality. 
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 Table 7.3 reports the results of a one-way ANOVA test to determine if there 
are any significant differences in the variables predicting both voluntary and 
mandatory corporate governance disclosures between Bangladesh, Malaysia and 
Australia. 
An initial review of Table 7.3 reveals significant differences between all three 
countries differ in the extent of both their voluntary (VDIit) and mandatory (MDIit) 
disclosures. In terms of the predictor of variables of interest in the study, Bangladesh, 
Malaysia and Australia all have significantly different governance characteristics 
specifically both BoD_Sizeit and BoD_Indit variables. In relation to Big4Auditit, 
Audit_Committeeit and Ceo_Dualityit, it is noteworthy to mention that none of the 
audit firms in Bangladesh were Big Four auditors whereas all the audit firms in the 
final sample for Australian were Big Four auditors; all sampled firms in Malaysia 
and Australia utilised audit committees; and none of the CEOs in the Australian 
sampled firms were also Chairpersons for the board of directors. Consistent with 
significantly different governance characteristics, Table 7.3 also reports significantly 
different country characteristics.  
A review of Table 7.3 suggests that a number of variables do not differ 
significantly between the three countries. Such a determination is made principally 
by checking whether the confidence internals overlap between the variables and the 
countries within which the overlap occurs. For example, differences between 
Bangladesh and Malaysia are least pronounced in terms of ROAit and LN_TAit 
suggesting that firm characteristics do not differ significantly between these 
countries. In terms of insignificant differences between Bangladesh and Australia, 
these seem to be restricted to country characteristic variables (i.e., GDP_Capit and 
172 
 
 Gini_Coefficientit). An absence of difference in variables between Malaysia and 
Australia appear to be restricted only to F_Ageit.  
7.6 Supporting/Non-supporting of Hypotheses 
Table 7.4 summarizes each testable hypotheses formulated and examined in 
the study and the respective supporting/non-supporting of these hypotheses. 
Table 7.4: Supporting/Non-supporting of All Hypotheses 
Hypotheses Description Overall 
Support/Not-
support 
Support/Not-
support 
Bangladesh 
Support/Not-
support 
Malaysia 
Support/Not-
support 
Australia 
H1a Corporate governance 
characteristics of firms 
influence the extent of 
mandatory disclosure by 
publicly listed firms in 
Bangladesh, Malaysia 
and Australia 
Not supported Not supported Supported Not supported 
H1b Corporate governance 
characteristics of firms 
influence the extent of 
voluntary disclosure by 
publicly listed firms in 
Bangladesh, Malaysia 
and Australia 
Supported Supported Supported Not supported 
H2a Firm characteristics 
influence the extent of 
mandatory disclosure by 
publicly listed firms in 
Bangladesh, Malaysia 
and Australia 
Supported Supported Not supported Supported 
H2b Firm characteristics 
influence the extent of 
voluntary disclosure by 
publicly listed firms in 
Bangladesh, Malaysia 
and Australia 
Not supported Supported Not supported Not supported 
H3a Country characteristics 
influence the extent of 
mandatory disclosure by 
publicly listed firms in 
Bangladesh, Malaysia 
and Australia 
Not supported Not supported Not supported Not supported 
H3b Country characteristics 
influence the extent of 
voluntary disclosure by 
publicly listed firms in 
Bangladesh, Malaysia 
and Australia 
Not supported Not supported Not supported Not supported 
The main empirical results of the study have been documented in Table 
7.1 and Table 7.2 of Chapter Seven. Specifically, Table 7.1 reports the regression 
results examining the impact of all corporate governance characteristics (i.e., 
BoD_Indit, BoD_Sizeit, Big4Auditit, Audit _Committeeit and CEO_Dualityit), firm 
characteristics (i.e., Top_5_ShareHit, ROAit, LN_TAit, Leverageit and F_Ageit), 
173 
 
 country characteristics (i.e., Culit, GDP_Capit, Equity_Mktit, Corruptionit, 
IFRS_Adoptit, Investor_Protectionit and Gini_Coefficientit), industry and year 
dummies and the extent to mandatory corporate governance disclosures. Table 7.2, 
on the other hand, reports the regression results of similar predictor variables but 
against the extent of voluntary corporate governance disclosures. 
It was hypothesized in H1a that corporate governance characteristics of 
firms influence the extent of mandatory corporate governance disclosure by publicly 
listed firms in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. A review of Table 7.1 reveals 
that only the corporate governance characteristics of Malaysian firms were 
significantly associated with the extent of mandatory corporate governance 
disclosure. Specifically, Malaysian firms with independent boards of sufficient size 
and which employed a Big 4 auditor were significantly associated with the extent of 
mandatory corporate governance disclosure compared to firms in Bangladesh and 
Australia. Given that the significant results occur only for Malaysia and not for 
Bangladesh and Australia, H1a is therefore rejected.  
H1b hypothesized that corporate governance characteristics of firms 
influence the extent of voluntary corporate governance disclosure by publicly listed 
firms in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. A review of Table 7.2 reveals that three 
of the five corporate governance characteristics of Bangladeshi firms were 
significantly associated with the extent of voluntary corporate governance disclosure. 
Specifically, Bangladeshi firms with audit committees, sufficient-sized boards and 
CEO duality were significantly associated with the extent of voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure. Additionally, a review of Table 7.2 also reveals that four of 
the five corporate governance characteristics of Malaysian firms were significantly 
associated with the extent of voluntary corporate governance disclosure. Specifically, 
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 Malaysian firms with independent boards of a sufficient size who employed a Big 4 
auditor and with CEO duality were significantly associated with the extent of 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure. In the case of Australia, apart from 
constant values for Big 4 auditors, audit committees and CEO duality, none of the 
corporate governance variables were significantly associated with the extent of 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure. Given that the significant results occur 
for both Bangladesh and Malaysia (i.e., two out of three countries) and not Australia, 
H1b is therefore accepted.  
It was hypothesized in H2a that firm characteristics of firms influence the 
extent of mandatory corporate governance disclosure by publicly listed firms in 
Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. A review of Table 7.1 reveals that five of the 
six firm characteristics of Bangladeshi firms were significantly associated with the 
extent of mandatory corporate governance disclosure. Specifically, Bangladeshi 
firms with shareholder concentration, return on assets, firm size, borrowings and 
years in operation were significantly associated with the extent of mandatory 
corporate governance disclosure. Additionally, a review of Table 7.1 also reveals that 
all of the firm characteristics of Australian firms were significantly associated with 
the extent of mandatory corporate governance disclosure. Specifically, Australian 
firms with shareholder concentration, return on equity, return on assets, firm size, 
borrowings and years in operation were significantly associated with the extent of 
mandatory corporate governance disclosure. In the case of Malaysia, only two of the 
six firm characteristics were significant. Given that the significant results occur for 
both Bangladesh and Australia (i.e., two out of three countries) and not Malaysia, 
H2a is therefore accepted. 
175 
 
 It was hypothesized in H2b that firm characteristics influence the extent 
of voluntary corporate governance disclosure by publicly listed firms in Bangladesh, 
Malaysia and Australia. A review of Table 7.2 reveals that only the firm 
characteristics of Bangladeshi firms were significantly associated with the extent of 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure. Specifically, Bangladeshi firms with 
shareholder concentration, return on equity, return on assets, firm size and 
borrowings were significantly associated with the extent of voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure. For both Malaysian and Australian firms, only two of the six 
firm characteristics were significantly associated with the extent of voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure. Given that the significant results occur only for 
Bangladesh and not for Malaysia and Australia, H2b is therefore rejected. 
H3a hypothesized that country characteristic of firms influence the extent 
of mandatory corporate governance disclosure by publicly listed firms in 
Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. A review of Table 7.1 reveals that, apart from 
constant values for some of the variables, only one country characteristic (i.e., 
Investor_Protectionit) of the four country characteristics for Bangladeshi firms was 
significantly associated with the extent of mandatory corporate governance 
disclosure. Apart from constant values also for Malaysian and Australian firms, none 
of the country characteristics for these two countries were significantly associated 
with the extent of mandatory corporate governance disclosure. H3a is therefore 
rejected.  
H3b hypothesized that country characteristic of firms influence the extent 
of voluntary corporate governance disclosure by publicly listed firms in Bangladesh, 
Malaysia and Australia. A review of Table 7.2 reveals that, apart from constant 
values for some of the variables, only one country characteristic (i.e., IFRS adoption) 
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 of the four country characteristics for Bangladeshi firms was significantly associated 
with the extent of voluntary corporate governance disclosure. Apart from constant 
values also for Malaysian and Australian firms, none of the country characteristics 
for these two countries were significantly associated with the extent of voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure. H3b is therefore rejected.  
Although not formally hypothesized, a review of Table 7.1 indicates that, 
for Bangladeshi firms, four of the ten industries were significantly associated with 
the extent of mandatory corporate governance disclosures. In the case of Malaysian 
firms, three of the nine industries were significantly associated with the extent of 
mandatory corporate governance disclosures and finally, in terms of Australian 
firms, five of the nine industries were significantly associated with the extent of 
mandatory corporate governance disclosures. Clearly, regardless of country, the 
industry that a firm is operating in plays a significant role in the extent of mandatory 
corporate governance disclosures. In terms of voluntary corporate governance 
disclosures, results in Table 7.2 show that only two of the ten industries within 
Bangladesh were significantly associated with the extent of voluntary corporate 
governance disclosures. In the case of Malaysian firms however, all nine industries 
were significantly associated with the extent of voluntary corporate governance 
disclosures and finally, in terms of Australian firms, none of the nine industries were 
significantly associated with the extent of voluntary corporate governance 
disclosures. 
In terms of answering the research questions formulated in Chapter One 
of the study, the testable hypotheses H1a and H1b, H2a and H2b and H3a and H3b 
were developed and answered for research questions 2 to 4.  
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 Formal hypotheses were not developed for research question 1 which 
was more explorative in nature. However, univariate analysis reported in Tables 6.1 
to 6.3 provide some evidence. Key results from Table Tables 6.1 to 6.3 are 
reproduced in Table 7.5 below. 
Table 7.5: Relative Extent of Corporate Governance Disclosures 
Country MDIit VDIit 
Bangladesh 0.54 0.63 
Malaysia 0.83 0.89 
Australia 0.97 0.88 
 
A review of Table 7.5 highlights a number of observations. In terms of 
mandatory corporate governance disclosures (MDIit), Bangladeshi firms in total 
achieved a moderate score of 54% in terms of disclosing mandatory items in their 
annual reports with Malaysian and Australian firms achieving high levels of 
mandatory disclosure scores of 83% and 97% respectively. A review of the levels of 
voluntary corporate governance disclosures (VDIit) also indicates a similar trend. 
Bangladeshi firms in total achieved a moderate score of 63% in terms of disclosing 
voluntary items in their annual reports with Malaysian and Australian firms 
achieving high levels of mandatory disclosure scores of 89% and 88% respectively. 
Table 7.5 clearly shows that firms in Bangladesh lag behind Malaysia 
and Australia in terms of both mandatory and voluntary corporate governance 
disclosures with Malaysian firms, in turn, lagging behind Australia in the area of 
mandatory corporate governance disclosure. One possible reason for this is the 
economies and the institutional frameworks between these three countries which 
differ substantially. Given that Bangladesh is an emerging economy, it is reasonable 
to expect levels of overall disclosures to be lower compared to other developing (for 
e.g., Malaysia) and developed economies (e.g., Australia).  
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 7.7 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter reported the main empirical results of the study. Regression 
models are run to determine their impact on both mandatory and voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure of firms in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. Subsequently, 
results from one-way ANOVA tests were reported to account for the lack of intra-
firm differences for four variables. Finally, the acceptance/rejection of the study’s 
hypotheses was provided. 
Chapter Eight will outline the results of the robustness tests and sensitivity 
analysis of the study. Specifically, the full sample of the study will be partitioned by 
the variables found in Chapter Seven to have significant explanatory power in 
explaining the variation of either mandatory or voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure.  
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 CHAPTER EIGHT 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
8.1 Overview of the Chapter 
Chapter Seven reported the main empirical results of the study. Both key 
characteristics and full model characteristics were examined to determine their 
impact on both mandatory and voluntary corporate governance disclosure of firms in 
Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. Finally, the supporting/non-supporting of the 
study’s hypotheses was provided. 
Chapter Eight documents the additional analysis undertaken. Initially, the 
sample is partitioned to determine if there were any traits within the variables most 
significant from Chapter Seven in explaining the variation in mandatory corporate 
governance disclosure. In this respect, partitioning by board independence, board 
size, firm size, firm leverage and firm age was done. Subsequently, the sample is re-
partitioned to determine if there were any traits within the variables most significant 
from Chapter Seven in explaining the variation in voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure.  
8.2 Mandatory Corporate Governance Disclosure Sample 
For mandatory corporate governance disclosure (MDIit), the following 
additional analysis was undertaken: partitioning by board independence, board size, 
firm size, firm leverage and firm age. 
8.2.1 Partitioned by Board Independence 
Table 8.1 reports the regression results partitioned by board independence for 
Malaysian firms with the main multivariate results from Chapter Seven. Partitioning 
by board independence is undertaken to determine if the main results are influenced 
by the extent of board independence within the sampled firms. Specifically, Table 
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 8.1 examines whether high or low board independence (based on a 50% 
independence split point) is driving the main results. 
Table 8.1: Multiple Regressions - Mandatory Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Partitioning by Board Independence (BoD_Indit) 
 Malaysia 
 High Board Independence Low Board Independence 
Variables Beta p-value Beta p-value 
Intercept 1.65 0.31 9.45 0.23 
BoD_Indit 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
BoD_Sizeit -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
Audit_Committeit 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.00 
Ceo_ Dualityit 0.02 0.38 0.05 0.01 
Top_5_ShareHit 0.00 0.95 0.11 0.00 
ROAit 0.45 0.00 -0.06 0.47 
LN_TAit 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.30 
Leverageit 0.00 0.95 0.04 0.00 
F_Ageit 0.00 0.63 -7.93 0.77 
GDP_Capit -1.32 0.70 1.03 0.69 
IFRS_Adoptit 0.03 0.15 0.02 0.10 
Investor_Protectionit 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.56 
Gini_coefficientit -0.03 0.43 -0.21 0.23 
Communication 0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.38 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
0.07 0.01 0.00  
Industrial -0.01 0.35 -0.02 0.11 
Materials 0.04 0.10 -0.02 0.28 
Consumer Staples   0.04 0.00 
Utilities 0.03 0.11   
Energy   -0.01 0.61 
Health Care -0.02 0.49   
Year Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.61 0.68 
F statistic (sig.) 17.90 32.61 
Observations 90 110 
Where: 
MDIit =Measured by mandatory disclosure index for each country of firm i for time 
period t. 
BoD_Indit =Percentage of independent directors on the board of firm i for time period t. 
BoD_Sizeit =Number of directors on the board of firm i for time period t. 
Audit_Committeeit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has an audit committee of 
firm i for time period t, otherwise 0. 
Ceo_ Dualityit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0.  
Top_5_ShareHit =Proportion of ordinary shares held by top five shareholders to total number 
of shares issued of firm i for time period t. 
ROAit =Net profit after tax divided by total assets of firm i for time period t 
LN_TAit =Natural log of total asset of firm i for time period t. 
Leverageit =Total debt divided by total assets of firm i for time period t. 
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 F_Ageit =Number of years in operation as a listed firm of firm i for time period t. 
GDP_Capit =Real Gross Domestic Product Cap divided by total population. 
IFRS_Adoptit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm adopt IFRS between the 
period of 2006-2010 of firm i for the time period t, otherwise 0. 
Investor_Protectionit =Shareholder rights index, ranging from ‘0’ to ‘6’, where 0 indicates the 
weakest and 6 the strongest shareholder rights of firm i for time period t. 
Gini_Coefficientit =Gini index of income inequality ranging from ‘0’ to ‘1’, where 0 indicates 
perfect equality and 1 indicate perfect inequality. 
Industry_Dummyit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm operate in the specific 
industry sector of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0. 
Year_Dummyit =Series indicator variables controlling time temporal differences of reporting 
periods for firm-year observations with firm i scored 1 if financial data 
correspond to year t, 0 otherwise. 
The regression results in Table 8.1 provide additional support for the main 
results of the study. Results from Table 8.1 Columns 1 and 2 show that boards with 
both high and low levels of independence are significant predictors of mandatory 
corporate governance disclosures in Malaysia (p value of 0.00 for both). 
Furthermore, the coefficients in both Table 8.1 Columns 1 and 3 are both positive 
indicating that, independent boards firms in Malaysia, regardless of their level of 
independence, are associated with higher levels of mandatory corporate governance 
disclosures. The high adjusted R2 of 61% and 68% indicate that the regression model 
fits the data well with the majority of the variation in mandatory corporate 
governance disclosures levels explained by the variables used in Table 8.1. 
8.2.2 Partitioned by Board Size 
Table 8.2 reports the regression results partitioned by board size for 
Malaysian firms with the main multivariate results from Chapter Seven re-run. 
Partitioning by board size is undertaken to determine if the main results are 
influenced by the size of boards (i.e., number of members) within the sampled 
Malaysian firms. Specifically, Table 8.2 examines whether large or small boards 
(based on the median of members as a split point) are driving the main results. 
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 Table 8.2: Multiple Regressions - Mandatory Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Partitioning by Board Size (BoD_Sizeit) 
 Malaysia 
 Large Board Size Small Board Size 
Variables Beta p-value Beta p-value 
Intercept 15.25 0.13 -0.31 0.83 
BoD_Indit 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
BoD_Sizeit -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.03 
Audit_Committeit     
Big4Auditit 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.00 
Ceo_ Dualityit 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.86 
Top_5_ShareHit 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.11 
ROAit -0.07 0.62 -0.05 0.63 
LN_TAit 0.00 0.21 -0.01 0.01 
Leverageit 0.02 0.04 -0.05 0.00 
F_Ageit 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.52 
GDP_Capit 2.10 0.53 1.03 0.75 
IFRS_Adopt 0.00 0.91 -0.01 0.16 
Investor_Protectionit 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.90 
Gini_coefficientit -0.32 0.14 0.02 0.62 
Communication -0.11 0.00 0.01 0.49 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
  0.00 0.92 
Industrial -0.09 0.00 -0.05 0.00 
Materials -0.02 0.24 -0.07 0.01 
Consumer Staples -0.07 0.00 -0.02 0.32 
Utilities   0.01 0.70 
Energy -0.16 0.00 -0.02 0.27 
Health Care   -0.05 0.04 
Year Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.62 0.67 
F statistic (sig.) 33.54 36.35 
Observations 178 122 
Where: 
MDIit =Measured by mandatory disclosure index for each country of firm i for time 
period t. 
BoD_Indit =Percentage of independent directors on the board of firm i for time period t. 
BoD_Sizeit =Number of directors on the board of firm i for time period t. 
Big4 Auditit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is audited by a big four 
auditor of firm i for the time period t, otherwise 0. 
Audit_Committeeit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has an audit committee of 
firm i for time period t, otherwise 0. 
Ceo_ Dualityit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0.  
Top_5_ShareHit =Proportion of ordinary shares held by top five shareholders to total number 
of shares issued of firm i for time period t. 
ROAit =Net profit after tax divided by total assets of firm i for time period t 
LN_TAit =Natural log of total asset of firm i for time period t. 
Leverageit =Total debt divided by total assets of firm i for time period t. 
F_Ageit =Number of years in operation as a listed firm of firm i for time period t. 
GDP_Capit =Real Gross Domestic Product Cap divided by total population. 
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 IFRS_Adoptit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm adopt IFRS between the 
period of 2006-2010 of firm i for the time period t, otherwise 0. 
Investor_Protectionit =Shareholder rights index, ranging from ‘0’ to ‘6’, where 0 indicates the 
weakest and 6 the strongest shareholder rights of firm i for time period t. 
Gini_Coefficientit =Gini index of income inequality ranging from ‘0’ to ‘1’, where 0 indicates 
perfect equality and 1 indicate perfect inequality. 
Industry_Dummyit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm operate in the specific 
industry sector of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0. 
Year_Dummyit =Series indicator variables controlling time temporal differences of reporting 
periods for firm-year observations with firm i scored 1 if financial data 
correspond to year t, 0 otherwise. 
The regression results in Table 8.2 provide additional support for the main 
results of the study. Results from Table 8.2 Columns 1 and 2 shows that both large 
and small boards are significant predictors of mandatory corporate governance 
disclosures in Malaysia (p values of 0.02 and 0.03 respectively). Furthermore, the 
coefficients in both Table 8.2 Columns 1 and 2 are both negative indicating that, 
boards in Malaysia, regardless of their size, are associated with lower levels of 
mandatory corporate governance disclosures. The high adjusted R2 of 62% and 67% 
indicate that the regression model fits the data well with the majority of the variation 
in mandatory corporate governance disclosures levels explained by the variables 
used in Table 8.2. 
8.2.3 Partitioned by Firm Size 
Table 8.3 reports the regression results partitioned by firm size for both 
Bangladesh and Australian firms with the main multivariate results from Chapter 
Seven re-run. Partitioning by firm size is undertaken to determine if the main results 
are influenced by the size of firms within the sampled Bangladesh and Australian 
firms. Specifically, Table 8.3 examines whether large or small firms (based on the 
median total assets as a split point) are driving the main results. 
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 Table 8.3: Multiple Regressions - Mandatory Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Partitioning by Firm Size (LN_TAit) 
 
Where: 
 Bangladesh Australia 
 Large Firm Small Firm Large Firm Small Firm 
Variables Beta p-value Beta 
p-
value 
Beta p-
value 
Beta p-
value 
Intercept 3.05 0.64 -1.42 0.22 -71.12 0.74 100.00 0.87 
BoD_Indit 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.58 0.04 0.03 8.72 0.09 
BoD_Size 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.12 -0.21 0.46 9.70 0.32 
Audit_Committeit 0.07 0.00 0.12 0.00     
Big4Auditit         
Ceo_ Dualityit 0.09 0.01 -0.02 0.37     
Top_5_ShareHit -0.34 0.00 -0.30 0.02 -15.57 0.01 -9.97 0.07 
ROAit -0.26 0.12 -0.29 0.02 0.61 0.68 2.01 3.72 
LN_TAit 0.00 0.47 -0.01 0.06 1.57 0.13 -1.72 0.04 
Leverageit -0.01 0.74 0.01 0.84 3.49 0.00 -1.59 0.32 
F_Ageit 0.00 0.36 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.39 1.96 0.33 
GDP_Capit -1.23 0.73 -3.61 0.31 0.00 0.31 2.45 0.72 
Equity_MKTit     0.02 0.46 2.57 0.36 
Corruptionit     15.72 0.50 9.10 0.57 
IFRS_Adoptit -0.02 0.35 0.00 0.76     
Investor_Protectionit 0.01 0.42 0.01 0.41 -1.44 0.21 6.66 0.27 
Gini_coefficientit -0.08 0.68 0.08 0.03 -0.63 0.50 -3.08 0.47 
Cement -0.03 0.19 -0.17 0.00     
Engineering -0.01 0.88 -0.06 0.00     
Food & Allied 0.01 0.78 -0.01 0.81     
Fuel & Power 0.03 0.53 0.14 0.00     
Jute 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.08     
Information Technology 0.03 0.72 0.01 0.70 9.90 0.04   
Textile -0.05 0.26 -0.07 0.39     
Miscellaneous 0.10 0.12 0.04 0.13     
Tannery Industry 0.01 0.80 0.01 0.97     
Pharmaceutical & 
Chemical 
0.08 0.20 0.05 0.05     
Communication         
Consumer 
Discretionary 
        
Industrial     9.09 0.03 8.97 0.06 
Materials     5.21 0.18 3.57 0.35 
Consumer Staples     6.92 0.10 8.99 0.17 
Utilities     10.55 0.03 9.46 0.06 
Energy     15.88 0.00 17.87 0.01 
Health Care     14.89 0.00 15.92 0.03 
Year Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.60 0.55 0.58 0.62 
F statistic (sig.) 5.75 6.37 5.17 5.98 
Observations 185 115 99 101 
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 MDIit =Measured by mandatory disclosure index for each country of firm i for time 
period t. 
BoD_Indit =Percentage of independent directors on the board of firm i for time period t. 
BoD_Sizeit =Number of directors on the board of firm i for time period t. 
Big4 Auditit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is audited by a big four 
auditor of firm i for the time period t, otherwise 0. 
Audit_Committeeit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has an audit committee of 
firm i for time period t, otherwise 0. 
Ceo_ Dualityit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0.  
Top_5_ShareHit =Proportion of ordinary shares held by top five shareholders to total number 
of shares issued of firm i for time period t. 
ROAit =Net profit after tax divided by total assets of firm i for time period t 
LN_TAit =Natural log of total asset of firm i for time period t. 
Leverageit =Total debt divided by total assets of firm i for time period t. 
F_Ageit =Number of years in operation as a listed firm of firm i for time period t. 
GDP_Capit =Real Gross Domestic Product Cap divided by total population. 
Equity_Mktit =Stock market capitalisation ratio divided by Gross Domestic Product. 
Corruptionit =Corruption perception index score ranging from ‘0’ to ‘10’, where 0 point 
out a high level of alleged corruption and 10 point to entirely clean country.  
IFRS_Adoptit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm adopt IFRS between the 
periods of 2006-2010 of firm i for the time period t, otherwise 0. 
Investor_Protectionit =Shareholder rights index, ranging from ‘0’ to ‘6’, where 0 indicates the 
weakest and 6 the strongest shareholder rights of firm i for time period t. 
Gini_Coefficientit =Gini index of income inequality ranging from ‘0’ to ‘1’, where 0 indicates 
perfect equality and 1 indicate perfect inequality. 
Industry_Dummyit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm operate in the specific 
industry sector of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0. 
Year_Dummyit =Series indicator variables controlling time temporal differences of reporting 
periods for firm-year observations with firm i scored 1 if financial data 
correspond to year t, 0 otherwise. 
The regression results in Table 8.3 provide some insights into the differing 
impact that large and small firms have on mandatory corporate governance 
disclosures in Bangladesh and Australia. The results from Table 8.3 Column 2 show 
that large Bangladeshi firms are not significantly associated with mandatory 
corporate governance disclosures (p value 0.47). However, Table 8.3 Column 4 
reports that small Bangladeshi firms are significantly associated with lower levels of 
mandatory corporate governance disclosures (p value 0.06). Partitioning results 
therefore indicate that small firms in Bangladesh are driving the main results in 
Chapter Six (where firm size was a significant variable in mandatory corporate 
governance disclosures). This result is somewhat unsurprising as smaller firms, often 
with less resource, are often not able to fully comply with all regulatory 
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 requirements, including levels of mandatory corporate governance disclosures.  In 
terms of Australian firms, Table 8.3 Column Six show that large Australian firms are 
not significantly associated with mandatory corporate governance disclosures (p 
value 0.13). However, Table 8.3 Column 8 reports that small Australian firms are 
significantly associated with lower levels of mandatory corporate governance 
disclosures (p value 0.04). Partitioning results therefore indicate that small firms in 
Australia are driving the main results in Chapter Six (where firm size was a 
significant variable in mandatory corporate governance disclosures). 
The high adjusted R2 of 60% and 55% for Bangladesh and 58% and 62% for 
Australia indicate that the regression models utilized fit the data well with the 
majority of the variation in mandatory corporate governance disclosures levels 
explained by the variables used in Table 8.3. 
8.2.4 Partitioned by Firm Leverage 
Table 8.4 reports the regression results partitioned by firm leverage for both 
Bangladesh and Australian firms with the main multivariate results from Chapter 
Seven re-run. Partitioning by firm leverage is undertaken to determine if the main 
results are influenced by the borrowings of firms within the sampled Bangladesh and 
Australian firms. Specifically, Table 8.4 examines whether highly leveraged or non-
highly leveraged firms (based on the median leverage as a split point) are driving the 
main results. 
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 Table 8.4: Multiple Regressions - Mandatory Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Partitioning by Firm Leverage (Leverageit) 
 Bangladesh Australia 
 High Risk Low Risk High Risk Low Risk 
Variables 
Beta p-value Beta 
p-
valu
e 
Beta p-
value 
Beta p-
value 
Intercept 1.21 0.47 -0.69 0.69 185.27 0.00 233.65 0.19 
BoD_Indit 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.85 -0.07 0.05 
BoD_Sizeit 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.30 -0.12 0.15 -0.16 0.55 
Audit_Committeit 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.24     
Big4Auditit         
Ceo_ Dualityit -0.07 0.00 0.01 0.85     
Top_5_ShareHit -0.22 0.12 -0.53 0.00 0.61 0.50 -12.80 0.01 
ROAit -0.26 0.04 -0.17 0.25 1.27 0.00 1.42 0.31 
LN_TAit -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.83 1.18 0.00 3.09 0.00 
Leverageit -0.14 0.01 0.10 0.05 -0.63 0.03 -7.19 0.00 
F_Ageit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.08 0.01 0.02 0.50 
GDP_Capit -2.04 0.54 -2.01 0.75 -9.28 0.89 0.00 0.22 
Equity_MKTit   0.01 0.34 0.00 0.92 -0.01 0.49 
Corruptionit     -4.51 0.30 -20.26 0.29 
IFRS_Adoptit 0.00 0.83 -0.01 0.68     
Investor_Protectioni
t 
0.01 0.66 -0.01 0.76 -0.55 0.05 2.03 0.04 
Gini_coefficientit -0.01 0.90 0.04 0.44 1.81 0.00 -0.04 0.91 
Cement 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.99     
Engineering -0.04 0.04 0.02 0.75     
Food & Allied -0.06 0.03 0.07 0.24     
Fuel & Power   0.07 0.29     
Jute -0.01 0.89 0.09 0.21     
Information 
Technology 
0.06 0.03 0.13 0.04 -2.74 0.01   
Textile -0.05 0.04 0.03 0.62     
Miscellaneous 0.01 0.77 0.13 0.04     
Tannery Industry -0.02 0.55 -0.01 0.93     
Pharmaceutical & 
Chemical 
-0.03 0.26 0.07 0.28     
Communication         
Consumer 
Discretionary 
    -3.17 0.01 5.63 0.01 
Industrial         
Materials     -7.18 0.00 -6.07 0.02 
Consumer Staples     -2.64 0.01 -7.03 0.01 
Utilities     -4.19 0.00   
Energy     -2.69 0.00 5.16 0.03 
Health Care     -2.73 0.01 4.46 0.10 
Year Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.48 0.32 0.77 0.75 
F statistic (sig.) 4.26 2.72 27.71 14.99 
Observations 96 104 98 102 
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 Where:  
MDIit 
 
=Measured by mandatory disclosure index for each country of firm i for time 
period t. 
BoD_Indit =Percentage of independent directors on the board of firm i for time period t. 
BoD_Sizeit =Number of directors on the board of firm i for time period t. 
Big4 Auditit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is audited by a big four 
auditor of firm i for the time period t, otherwise 0. 
Audit_Committeeit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has an audit committee of 
firm i for time period t, otherwise 0. 
Ceo_ Dualityit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0.  
Top_5_ShareHit =Proportion of ordinary shares held by top five shareholders to total number 
of shares issued of firm i for time period t. 
ROAit =Net profit after tax divided by total assets of firm i for time period t 
LN_TAit =Natural log of total asset of firm i for time period t. 
Leverageit =Total debt divided by total assets of firm i for time period t. 
F_Ageit =Number of years in operation as a listed firm of firm i for time period t. 
GDP_Capit =Real Gross Domestic Product Cap divided by total population. 
Equity_Mktit =Stock market capitalisation ratio divided by Gross Domestic Product. 
Corruptionit =Corruption perception index score ranging from ‘0’ to ‘10’, where 0 point 
out a high level of alleged corruption and 10 point to entirely clean country.  
IFRS_Adoptit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm adopt IFRS between the 
period of 2006-2010 of firm i for the time period t, otherwise 0. 
Investor_Protectionit =Shareholder rights index, ranging from ‘0’ to ‘6’, where 0 indicates the 
weakest and 6 the strongest shareholder rights of firm i for time period t. 
Gini_Coefficientit =Gini index of income inequality ranging from ‘0’ to ‘1’, where 0 indicates 
perfect equality and 1 indicate perfect inequality. 
Industry_Dummyit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm operate in the specific 
industry sector of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0. 
Year_Dummyit =Series indicator variables controlling time temporal differences of reporting 
periods for firm-year observations with firm i scored 1 if financial data 
correspond to year t, 0 otherwise. 
The regression results in Table 8.4 provide additional support for the main 
results of the study. The regression results in Table 8.4 provide insights into the 
impact that highly leveraged and non-highly leveraged firms in Bangladesh and 
Australia have on mandatory corporate governance disclosures. The results from 
Table 8.3 Columns 2 and 4 show that both highly leveraged and non-highly 
leveraged firms in Bangladesh are significant predictors of mandatory corporate 
governance disclosures (p values 0.01 and 0.05 respectively). Furthermore, the 
coefficient for highly leveraged firms is negative suggesting that Bangladeshi firms 
with high borrowings tend to engage in less mandatory corporate governance 
disclosures. However, the coefficient for not highly leveraged firms is positive 
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 suggesting that Bangladeshi firms with low borrowings tend to engage in more 
mandatory corporate governance disclosures. The adjusted R2 of 48% and 32% for 
Bangladesh indicate that a great deal of the variation in mandatory corporate 
governance disclosures levels is explained by the variables used in Table 8.4.  
In relation to Australian firms, results from Table 8.3 Columns 6 and 8 show 
that both highly leveraged and non-highly leveraged firms are significant predictors 
of mandatory corporate governance disclosures (p values 0.03 and 0.00 respectively). 
Furthermore, the coefficients in both Table 8.4 Columns 5 and 6 are both negative 
indicating that, firms in Australia, regardless of their level of borrowings, are 
associated with higher levels of mandatory corporate governance disclosures. The 
adjusted R2 of 77% and 75% for Australia indicate that a great deal of the variation 
in mandatory corporate governance disclosures levels is explained by the variables 
used in Table 8.4. 
8.2.5 Partitioned by Firm Age 
Table 8.5 reports the regression results partitioned by firm age for both 
Bangladesh firms with the main multivariate results from Chapter Seven re-run. 
Partitioning by firm age is undertaken to determine if the main results are influenced 
by the duration of operations of firms within the sampled Bangladesh firms. 
Specifically, Table 8.5 examines whether older or younger leveraged firms (based on 
the median age as a split point) are driving the main results. 
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 Table 8.5: Multiple Regressions - Mandatory Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Partitioning by Firm Age (F_Ageit) 
 Bangladesh 
 Older Younger 
Variables Beta p-value Beta p-value 
Intercept -0.54 0.49 1.40 0.01 
BoD_Indit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 
BoD_Sizeit 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.98 
Audit_Committeit 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.00 
Big4Auditit     
Ceo_ Dualityit -0.02 0.29 -0.01 0.63 
Top_5_ShareHit -0.20 0.01 -0.09 0.48 
ROAit -0.04 0.84 -0.50 0.00 
LN_TAit 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 
Leverageit 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.89 
F_Ageit 0.00 0.16 -0.01 0.00 
GDP_Capit -4.90 0.89 -1.30 0.70 
IFRS_Adoptit -0.01 0.24 0.03 0.07 
Investor_Protectionit 0.01 0.38 0.00 0.76 
Gini_coefficientit 0.02 0.30 -0.02 0.16 
Cement   0.04 0.24 
Engineering -0.08 0.02 -0.01 0.54 
Food & Allied 0.01 0.55 -0.03 0.27 
Fuel & Power 0.03 0.48   
Jute 0.01 0.87   
Information Technology   0.05 0.10 
Textile -0.03 0.37 -0.02 0.49 
Miscellaneous 0.03 0.32 0.06 0.21 
Tannery Industry   -0.01 0.91 
Pharmaceutical & 
Chemical 
-0.04 0.29 0.13 0.00 
Year Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.60 0.50 
F statistic (sig.) 11.68 5.12 
Observations 95 105 
Where: 
MDIit =Measured by mandatory disclosure index for each country of firm i for time 
period t. 
BoD_Indit =Percentage of independent directors on the board of firm i for time period t. 
BoD_Sizeit =Number of directors on the board of firm i for time period t. 
Big4 Auditit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is audited by a big four 
auditor of firm i for the time period t, otherwise 0. 
Audit_Committeeit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has an audit committee of 
firm i for time period t, otherwise 0. 
Ceo_ Dualityit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0.  
Top_5_ShareHit =Proportion of ordinary shares held by top five shareholders to total number 
of shares issued of firm i for time period t. 
ROAit =Net profit after tax divided by total assets of firm i for time period t 
LN_TAit =Natural log of total asset of firm i for time period t. 
Leverageit =Total debt divided by total assets of firm i for time period t. 
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 F_Ageit =Number of years in operation as a listed firm of firm i for time period t. 
GDP_Capit =Real Gross Domestic Product Cap divided by total population. 
IFRS_Adoptit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm adopt IFRS between the 
periods of 2006-2010 of firm i for the time period t, otherwise 0. 
Investor_Protectionit =Shareholder rights index, ranging from ‘0’ to ‘6’, where 0 indicates the 
weakest and 6 the strongest shareholder rights of firm i for time period t. 
Gini_Coefficientit =Gini index of income inequality ranging from ‘0’ to ‘1’, where 0 indicates 
perfect equality and 1 indicate perfect inequality. 
Industry_Dummyit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm operate in the specific 
industry sector of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0. 
Year_Dummyit =Series indicator variables controlling time temporal differences of reporting 
periods for firm-year observations with firm i scored 1 if financial data 
correspond to year t, 0 otherwise. 
The regression results in Table 8.5 provide additional support for the main 
results of the study. Results from Table 8.1 Column 2 show that younger firms are 
significant predictors of mandatory corporate governance disclosures in Bangladesh 
(p value 0.00). Furthermore, the coefficient in Table 8.1 Column 3 is negative 
indicating that, younger firms in Bangladesh are associated with lower levels of 
mandatory corporate governance disclosures. This could be due to either seeking 
competitive advantages or not having the resourcing to be able to fully comply with 
the mandatory corporate governance disclosure requirements in Bangladesh. The 
high adjusted R2 of 60% and 50% indicate that the regression model fits the data well 
with the majority of the variation in mandatory corporate governance disclosures 
levels explained by the variables used in Table 8.5. 
8.3 Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosure Sample 
Given the main results in Chapter Seven, additional analysis was undertaken 
to determine if any of the results (for any country where the variable was significant) 
were driven by specific traits of the variables found to be significant predictors of 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure. Specifically, for voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure (VDIit), the following additional analysis was undertaken: 
partitioning by board size and firm return on equity. 
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 8.3.1 Partitioned by Board Size 
Table 8.6 reports the regression results partitioned by board size for both 
Bangladeshi and Malaysian firms with the main multivariate results from Chapter 
Seven re-run. Partitioning by board size is undertaken to determine if the main 
results are influenced by the number of board members within the sampled firms of 
these two countries. Specifically, Table 8.6 examines whether large or small boards 
(based on a median split point) are driving the main results. 
Table 8.6: Multiple Regressions - Voluntary Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Partitioning by Board Size (BoD_Sizeit) 
 Bangladesh Malaysia 
 Large Board Small Board Large Board Small Board 
Variables Beta p-value Beta p-value 
Beta p-value Beta p-
value 
Intercept 1.02 0.00 1.70 0.01 11.16 0.26 0.77 0.61 
BoD_Indit 0.00 0.00 -4.51 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BoD_Sizeit -0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.06 0.00 0.59 
Audit_Committeit -0.05 0.00 0.01 0.78     
Big4Auditit         
Ceo_ Dualityit -0.01 0.04 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.47 
Top_5_ShareHit 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.75 
ROAit -0.36 0.00 0.13 0.12 0.07 0.53 0.11 0.34 
LN_TAit 0.00 0.17 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.68 -0.08 0.01 
Leverageit -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.78 0.05 0.00 -0.04 0.01 
F_Ageit 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.57 
GDP_Capit -5.39 0.35 -4.59 0.98 1.17 0.72 -2.31 0.50 
Equity_MKTit         
Corruptionit         
IFRS_Adoptit 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.18 -0.01 0.17 
Investor_Protectionit -0.01 0.06 0.00 0.89 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.57 
Gini_coefficientit -0.01 0.09 -0.03 0.10 -0.22 0.31 0.01 0.70 
Cement 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.31     
Engineering -0.08 0.00 0.09 0.00     
Food & Allied   0.09 0.00     
Fuel & Power   0.12 0.00     
Jute   0.01 0.81     
Information Technology   -0.02 0.27     
Textile   0.05 0.08     
Miscellaneous   0.09 0.00     
Tannery Industry   0.11 0.00     
Pharmaceutical & 
Chemical 
  0.12 0.00     
Communication     0.00 0.94 0.04 0.01 
Consumer Discretionary     0.10 0.00 0.01 0.42 
Industrial     0.00 0.91 -0.04 0.01 
Materials     0.08 0.00 -0.06 0.03 
Consumer Staples     0.05 0.01 0.00 0.99 
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 Where: 
VDIit =Measured by voluntary disclosure index for each country of firm i for time 
period t. 
BoD_Indit =Percentage of independent directors on the board of firm i for time period t. 
BoD_Sizeit =Number of directors on the board of firm i for time period t. 
Big4 Auditit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is audited by a big four 
auditor of firm i for the time period t, otherwise 0. 
Audit_Committeeit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has an audit committee of 
firm i for time period t, otherwise 0. 
Ceo_ Dualityit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0.  
Top_5_ShareHit =Proportion of ordinary shares held by top five shareholders to total number 
of shares issued of firm i for time period t. 
ROAit =Net profit after tax divided by total assets of firm i for time period t 
LN_TAit =Natural log of total asset of firm i for time period t. 
Leverageit =Total debt divided by total assets of firm i for time period t. 
F_Ageit =Number of years in operation as a listed firm of firm i for time period t. 
GDP_Capit =Real Gross Domestic Product Cap divided by total population. 
Equity_Mktit =Stock market capitalisation ratio divided by Gross Domestic Product. 
Corruptionit =Corruption perception index score ranging from ‘0’ to ‘10’, where 0 point 
out a high level of alleged corruption and 10 point to entirely clean country.  
IFRS_Adoptit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm adopt IFRS between the 
period of 2006-2010 of firm i for the time period t, otherwise 0. 
Investor_Protectionit =Shareholder rights index, ranging from ‘0’ to ‘6’, where 0 indicates the 
weakest and 6 the strongest shareholder rights of firm i for time period t. 
Gini_Coefficientit =Gini index of income inequality ranging from ‘0’ to ‘1’, where 0 indicates 
perfect equality and 1 indicate perfect inequality. 
Industry_Dummyit =Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm operate in the specific 
industry sector of firm i for time period t, otherwise 0. 
Year_Dummyit =Series indicator variables controlling time temporal differences of reporting 
periods for firm-year observations with firm i scored 1 if financial data 
correspond to year t, 0 otherwise. 
The regression results from Table 8.6 Columns 2 and 4 show that both large 
and small boards of Bangladeshi firms are significantly associated with voluntary 
corporate governance disclosures (p values 0.00 for both Columns). Furthermore, the 
coefficients in Table 8.1 Columns 1 and 3 are both negative indicating that firms 
with both large and small boards in Bangladesh are associated with lower levels of 
voluntary corporate governance disclosures. In relation to the partitioning tests for 
Malaysian boards, Table 8.6 Column 6 reports that large boards are significantly 
Utilities       0.02 0.09 
Energy     -0.05 0.06 0.00 0.94 
Health Care         
Year Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.72 0.77 0.79 0.71 
F statistic (sig.) 22.28 15.70 18.29 11.01 
Observations 73 127 106 94 
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 associated with voluntary corporate governance disclosures (p value 0.06). 
Furthermore, the coefficient in Table 8.1 Column 5 is negative indicating that firms 
with large boards in Malaysia are associated with lower levels of voluntary corporate 
governance disclosures. Partitioning results therefore indicate that large boards in 
Malaysia are driving the main results in Chapter Seven (where board size was a 
significant variable in voluntary corporate governance disclosures). The high 
adjusted R2 of 77% and 72% for Bangladesh and 71% and 79% for Malaysia indicate 
that the regression models utilized fit the data well with the majority of the variation 
in voluntary corporate governance disclosures levels explained by the variables used 
in Table 8.6. 
8.4 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter provided additional analysis to the main results in Chapter 
Seven. In this respect, the final usable sample was partitioned a number of different 
ways depending on the variables which were found to be significant predictors of 
both mandatory and voluntary corporate governance disclosures for Bangladesh, 
Malaysia and Australia in Chapter Seven. 
Chapter Nine will outline the significance and implications of the results from 
the study and its overall conclusions. Consequently, the major contributions and 
limitations will be detailed followed by a brief summarization of the study. 
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 CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION 
9.1 Overview of the Chapter 
This chapter summarizes the study’s major conclusions and implications 
together with inherent limitations and future research opportunities in this area.  
Chapter Nine proceeds with an overview of the study followed by the main findings. 
The significance of the results is then documented with the limitations identified. 
Finally, a summary of the study is provided at the end of the chapter.  
9.2 Study Overview 
This thesis, using both cross-sectional and panel data, examines the drivers of 
voluntary and mandatory corporate governance disclosure within the annual reports 
of publicly listed firms in Bangladesh (an emerging economy), Malaysia (a 
developing economy) and Australia (a developed economy) with corporate 
governance regulations enacted in their respective countries. Using institutional and 
agency theories as the theoretical constructs, a corporate governance disclosure score 
(both mandatory and voluntary) is formulated for each country and a number of 
predictor variables hypothesized to influence the extent of mandatory and voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure practices of firms regressed against the formulated 
score. The final usable sample provided 600 firm-year observations for analysis with 
200 data points obtained from each country over the period 2006 to 2010. Annual 
reports of listed firms are the key source to examine the extent of disclosure. These 
were selected as listed firms annual financial and non-financial statements are 
considered to be the major source of information disclosure for various user groups 
including shareholders, creditors, employees, suppliers, financial analysts, 
stockbrokers and government agencies who do not have the power to demand special 
purposed financial reports from these firms.  
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 As a key component of the study is panel analysis, the time period selected 
for observation comprises all firms registered on the Dhaka Stock Exchange, Bursa 
Malaysia Berhad and ASX continuously across the observation window of 2006 to 
2010 calendar years (a five-year time-frame). This period is selected as it transcends 
a key period in the global financial accounting and corporate governance landscape; 
specifically the Global Financial Crisis. Consistent with prior empirical research, 
financial institutions, banks and stock brokerages are excluded from the sample (Gul 
and Leung 2004). 
The overall variable of interest in the study is the extent of corporate 
governance disclosure. The extent of corporate governance disclosure is measured 
using voluntary and mandatory disclosure indices. The study investigates the 
likelihood of corporate governance characteristics, firm characteristics and country 
characteristics being key predictor (i.e., independent) variables affecting the levels of 
both mandatory and voluntary disclosures in Bangladeshi, Malaysian and Australian 
capital markets. In addition to the corporate governance characteristics, firm 
characteristics and country characteristics, the study also incorporates an industry 
control variable into the statistical analysis consistent with prior research suggesting 
that industry type influences the level of disclosure exhibited by firms (Ball and 
Foster 1982; Cooke 1991; Meek, Roberts and Gray 1995; Wallace, Kamal and 
Araceli 1994; Watts and Zimmerman 1990) 
The association between the predictor/control variables and the corporate 
governance disclosure scores are analysed using univariate, bivariate and 
multivariate analysis. Specifically, in terms of univariate analysis, standard 
descriptive statistics (such as mean, standard deviation, mode, minimum and 
maximum) are generated and correlation analyses (Pearson correlations) are 
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 reported. The multivariate analysis of the study is conducted using Ordinary Least 
Squares linear regression.  The regression results also control for cross-sectional 
differences with the inclusion of year dummy variables. 
9.3 Summary of Empirical Findings 
The study focuses on three factors which may influence the level of voluntary 
and mandatory disclosures: (1) corporate governance characteristics; (2) firm 
characteristics: and (3) country-specific characteristics. 
In line with the research objectives, the study seeks to investigate the following 
research questions;  
RQ1: What is the relative extent of disclosure (as measured by the level of corporate 
governance mandatory and voluntary disclosures index in annual reports) by 
publicly listed firms in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia with the corporate 
governance guidelines enacted in their respective countries? 
In terms of both mandatory and voluntary corporate governance disclosures, 
Australian listed firms are found to exhibit higher levels of overall compliance 
followed by Malaysian and Bangladeshi listed companies. Specifically, in terms of 
mandatory disclosure requirements, Australian firms scored 97% followed by 
Malaysian (83%) and Bangladeshi (54%) firms. This would suggest that enforcement 
of compliance is more rigid in developed countries, leading to greater compliance. It 
may also be that penalties are greater and more difficult to avoid in developed 
countries.  
In terms of voluntary disclosure requirements, Malaysian firms scored 89% 
followed very closely by Australian (88%) and Bangladeshi (63%) firms. For 
voluntary disclosure, Bangladesh continues to lag both other countries, however 
Malaysian (0.89) and Australian (0.88) companies exhibit almost identical levels of 
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 disclosure. Both of the latter have well developed equity markets and it could be 
speculated that this leads to greater pressure to voluntarily disclose information. 
Empirical findings from the results of regressions analysis also reveal that other 
factors are important in effecting the level of disclosures for Bangladeshi, Malaysian 
and Australian firms respectively. They suggest that firm level governance and firm 
characteristics may impact differently dependent on the stage of development of the 
country. For mandatory disclosure, emerging economies such as Bangladesh, with 
underdeveloped markets and regulation rely heavily on stakeholder groups to enforce 
disclosures - hence the strong association with dispersed ownership and high levels 
of leverage found in this study. In this case shareholder and debt holder activism is 
likely to produce the best results. For developing counties such as Malaysia with 
more established regulation the drivers move to firm level governance arrangements. 
For developed economies such as Australia with 97% compliance to regulation, 
results are difficult to read. There is a potentially spurious result as there was 97% 
compliance with the mandatory regulation renders the sample of non-compliance 
companies too small to isolate drivers. For voluntary disclosures the situation above 
is largely repeated for emerging and developing countries and in developed countries 
only size and age (political costs) influencing disclosure. 
RQ2: What are the corporate governance-specific characteristics which influence the 
extent of voluntary and mandatory disclosure by publicly listed firms in Bangladesh, 
Malaysia and Australia? 
The empirical results from the main analysis of the annual report data reveal 
that the factors that influence the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
related to corporate governance characteristics for listed companies in Bangladesh, 
Malaysia and Australia are different. The study firstly measured the impact of 
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 corporate governance characteristics taking into account board independence, board 
size, CEO duality, Big4 auditor and audit committee.  
According to the analysis, the influence on the level of mandatory corporate 
governance disclosure in Bangladeshi firms are almost entirely firm related. In 
contrast, the Malaysian results tended to emphasise governance characteristics 
including firms with a Big 4 auditor (Big4Auditit) and director independence 
(BoD_Indit) are significant. A surprising finding is that for Malaysia, CEO duality 
increased disclosure. In terms of the Australian firm’s mandatory corporate 
governance disclosure, although most firm related variables are significant, this is a 
potentially spurious result as there was 97% compliance with the mandatory 
regulation and the sample of non-compliance companies is rendered too small to 
isolate drivers. 
With respect to voluntary corporate governance disclosure, those Bangladeshi 
firms with high disclosure have established larger boards (BoD_Sizeit), had more 
CEOs who were also board chairpersons (CEO_Dualityit) but lower audit committee 
(Audit_Committeeit) representation. For voluntary corporate governance disclosure in  
Malaysia, firms with higher disclosure generally hired a Big 4 auditor (Big4Auditit) 
and had independent boards (BoD_Indit) even though these boards be likely to be 
small (BoD_Sizeit). Whereas for Australian firms with high voluntary corporate 
governance, disclosure none of the variables used in the model were found to be 
significant. 
RQ3: What are the firm-specific characteristics which influence the extent of 
voluntary and mandatory disclosure by publicly listed firms in Bangladesh, Malaysia 
and Australia? 
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 The empirical results from the main analysis of the annual report data reveal 
the factors that influence the extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure related to 
firm characteristics for listed companies in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. The 
study measured firm characteristics including ownership concentration, firm’s return 
on assets, firm’s return on equity, leverage, firm size and firm age. 
Bangladeshi firms with high levels of mandatory corporate governance 
disclosure are strongly influenced by firm characteristics including an association 
with larger companies (LN_TAit), utilizing debt to aid in financial operation 
(Leverageit) and have been in operations as a listed company for a longer period of 
time (F_Ageit). These same firms also had weak ownership concentration 
(Top_5_ShareHit) and poorer return on assets (ROAit). Malaysian firms with high 
mandatory corporate governance disclosure are less impacted by firm characteristics 
with only greater ownership concentration (Top_5_ShareHit) having an influence. 
All measures were significant for the Australian firms with higher mandatory 
corporate governance disclosure being positively associated with return on assets 
(ROAit), size (LN_TAit), debt levels (Leverageit) and age (F_Ageit). These same 
firms had less concentrated narrow ownership (Top_5_ShareHit). However while 
most firm related variables show as significant, this is a potentially spurious result as 
there was 97% compliance with the mandatory regulation and the sample of non-
compliance companies is rendered too small to isolate drivers. 
For voluntary corporate governance disclosures Bangladeshi firms with high 
levels have greater ownership concentration (Top_5_ShareHit) and are large in size. 
However, results also show these same firms also had significantly lower return on 
assets (ROAit) and leverage (Leverageit). Malaysian firms with high levels of 
voluntary corporate governance disclosure are again less impacted by firm variables, 
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 however on average had more concentrated ownership (Top_5_ShareHit) with other 
variables being insignificant. For Australian firms only size (LN_TAit) and age 
(F_Ageit) were significantly associated with voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure suggesting the importance of political costs in voluntary disclosure in 
developed economies. 
RQ4: What are the country-specific characteristics which influence the extent of 
voluntary and mandatory disclosure of publicly listed firms in Bangladesh, Malaysia 
and Australia? 
The study measured country characteristics by culture, GDP per capita, 
equity market, IFRS adoption, corruption, investor protection and Gini coefficient. 
Only Bangladesh registered significant results for these variables, with investor 
protection (Investor_Protectionit) positively associated with mandatory disclosure 
and the IFRS reporting framework (IFRS_Adoptit) with voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure.  
For the industry control variable, Bangladeshi firms with higher mandatory 
corporate governance disclosure scores are most prevalent in the engineering, food & 
allied, fuel & power, shoes (Jute) and information technology industries. Similar 
Malaysian firms are most prevalent in the communication, consumer discretionary, 
consumer staples and utilities industries while for Australia, they are in the consumer 
discretionary, utilities, energy and health care industries. 
Some differences exist for voluntary disclosure and industry. Bangladeshi 
firms with higher voluntary corporate governance disclosure scores are in the fuel & 
power and miscellaneous industries. Malaysian listed companies were significantly 
associated with communication, consumer discretionary, materials, consumer staples, 
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 utilities, energy and health care industries. Whereas no industry segment was 
significant for Australian firms. 
In an effort to focus the results from this study as discussed above, the 
following Table 9.1 is prepared. 
Table 9.1: Summary Table of Results 
Mandatory Corporate Governance 
Disclosures 
Voluntary Corporate Governance 
Disclosures 
Bangladesh Bangladesh 
Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Audit committee (Audit_Commiteeit) 
Firm Characteristics 
Firm size (LN_TAit), leverage 
(Leverageit), firm age (F_Age), 
concentrated shareholdings 
(Top_5_ShareHit) 
Country Characteristics  
Shareholder rights (Investor_Protectionit) 
Corporate Governance 
Characteristics 
Board size (BoD_Sizeit), 
(CEO_Dualityit) Firm Characteristics 
Shareholdings (Top_5_ShareHit) 
Country Characteristics  
IFRS adoption (IFRS_Adoptit). 
Malaysia Malaysia 
Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Big 4 auditor (Big4Auditit), independent 
boards (BoD_Indit), CEO duality (Ceo 
Dualityit) 
Firm Characteristics 
Shareholdings (Top_5_ShareHit) 
Country Characteristics  
None of the variables were significantly 
associated for Malaysian firms with 
mandatory corporate governance 
disclosure 
Corporate Governance 
Characteristics 
Big 4 auditor (Big4Auditit), (Ceo 
Dualityit), independent boards 
(BoD_Indit). 
Firm Characteristics 
Shareholdings (Top_5_ShareHit)  
Country Characteristics  
None of the variables were significantly 
associated for Malaysian firms with 
voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure 
Australia Australia 
Corporate Governance Characteristics 
None of the variables used in the model 
were significant. 
Firm Characteristics 
Return on assets (ROAit), firm size 
(LN_TAit), leverage (Leverageit), firm 
age (F_Ageit) 
Country Characteristics  
None of the variables were significantly 
associated for Malaysian firms with 
mandatory corporate governance 
disclosure 
Corporate Governance 
Characteristics 
None of the variables used in the model 
were significant. 
Firm Characteristics 
firm size (LN_TAit), firm age (F_Ageit) 
Country Characteristics  
None of the variables were significantly 
associated for Malaysian firms with 
voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure 
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 9.4 Major Contributions of the Study 
The study examines the association between corporate governance and the 
extent of disclosure in annual reports of publicly listed firms in Bangladesh, 
Malaysia and Australia. The study makes several contributions to the extant 
literature.  
First, the study provides a contemporaneous update of the extent of 
disclosures by firms in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia with the Corporate 
Governance Guidelines issued in their respective countries. The update reflects upon 
the progress in Bangladesh and Malaysia in terms of emerging/developing 
economies with sound corporate governance principles and processes. Second, the 
results  shed light on the determinants of disclosure of listed firms in the three 
aforementioned countries with their respective Corporate Governance Guidelines 
thereby providing important insights into the characteristics of firms either 
complying or not complying with their respective Corporate Governance Guidelines 
(after controlling for economic differences between the three countries). In addition, 
results also provide evidence concerning the existence, extent and variation of 
corporate governance practices across economic jurisdictions over time. Third, given 
that the study adopts a corporate governance disclosure score and published studies 
often utilize a composite dichotomous score, results provide important 
methodological contributions to the corporate governance literature. Fourth, given 
that the study uses a richer dataset across three countries at different stages of 
economic development, results will have cross-country and cross-economic 
contributions (and therefore, higher generalizability). Fifth, given that the study 
adopts institutional theory as the primary underpinning theoretical framework, results 
provide evidence about institutional theory’s relevance in influencing the extent of 
corporate disclosure. 
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 Overall, the aforementioned contributions of the study will therefore benefit 
other emerging economies, regulators, capital market participants, scholars, 
management, key stakeholders such as shareholders and debt holders and other key 
corporate governance mechanisms such as the board of directors, audit committees, 
internal audit function and the external audit attestation functions. 
Although former research shows both the existence, and growth in the past 
decade, of corporate governance disclosure, numerous empirical questions about the 
significance of disclosure of information to the financial reporting process remain 
unanswered (Agrawal and Chadha. 2005). This study assists in broadening such 
understanding, particularly within the context of the Bangladesh, Malaysia and 
Australian capital market. For example, the study utilizes alternative results of 
robustness and sensitivity analysis. Also, findings from the study provide updated 
evidence on the existence and extent of information disclosure practices amongst 
publicly listed firms across a panel period. 
The study also helps in addressing one of many unanswered empirical 
questions related to determinant factors influencing disclosure level, whilst also 
increasing the understanding of the influence of these factors. Specifically, analysis 
develops insights into, and identifies, key determinants of disclosure. Much empirical 
research to date has sought to determine the presence and extent of disclosure 
practices using a range of methods in developing countries (Akhtaruddin 2005; 
Barako and Dulacha 2007; Dulacha 2007). Very little research, however, seeks to 
identify the key drivers of disclosure in developing countries (Akhtaruddin 2005; 
Barako and Dulacha 2007; Dulacha 2007). To the researcher’s best knowledge, this 
is the first study to provide a comprehensive examination of the relationship between 
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 corporate governance and disclosure practices in Bangladesh, Malaysia and 
Australian capital market setting (internationally).  
In regard to the study specifically, the study provides evidence of the impact 
of corporate governance mechanisms on disclosure to a wider range of firm’s size. 
The study contrasts with a number of prior studies (Aktaruddin et al. 2009; Alam 
1989; Brownlee 1990; Chau and Gray 2002; Eng and Mak 2003; Haniffa and Cooke 
2002; Ho and Wong 2001; Hongxia and Qi 2008; Ibrahim, Haron and Ariffin 2000) 
which have generally only considered larger firms by market capitalization. This 
study provides evidence on whether the impact of disclosure can be generalized 
across all listed firms. 
 Importantly, this study provides broader evidence on the influence of 
specific structural and operational characteristics (i.e., corporate governance, firm 
and country characteristics) on corporate governance disclosure.  Findings, therefore, 
help identify specific features researchers examining the influential factors may seek 
to examine/include in future research. 
The study also provides contributions to the understanding of the capital 
market from three different institutional settings that are beneficial to key 
stakeholders (e.g., regulators). For instance, findings will help regulators determine 
which structural and operational features of corporate governance are best likely to 
lead to improvements in quality of disclosure reporting. This information can then 
enable regulators assess whether corporate governance guidelines (mandatory and 
voluntary) are likely to have benefits to firms and society, or will burden firms with 
unnecessary costs. In this case governance related factors were found to be most 
influential on disclosure in developing countries but of less importance in emerging 
and developed. These findings can benefit regulators in revising existing policies to 
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 ensure the desired outcome is achieved, or to help in development of new policies to 
reinforce present standards governing corporate governance disclosure.  
Overall, this study provides important insights and highlights avenues for 
future research. With any positivist empirical study, however, this research is not 
without limitations. 
9.5 Limitations and Future Research 
While the study has a number of strengths, it is not without limitations. First, 
based on the nature of this research, data for the dependent, independent and control 
variables are collected from publicly available information, specifically annual 
reports. The annual report (i.e., content analysis) research entails a sample of 
companies listed on the stock exchanges of Bangladesh, Malaysia and Australia. In 
order to analyse the hypotheses of the study, data for the variables employed to 
calculate the extent of corporate governance disclosures and related variables are 
collected only from annual report disclosures. It is possible that other measure for 
variables exist within firms and that these proxies could be collected via interviews 
and questionnaires. Reliance on data from annual reports to generate conclusions 
about the extent of disclosures also raises a question about the accuracy of the 
information disclosed by the preparers of annual reports. As a result, the study 
assumes that firms are being accurate in disclosing the information included in their 
annual report. Second, the study uses data from public firms and private firms are 
excluded from the sample. Therefore, the results of the study may not be 
generalizable to non-listed firms and also to countries with different institutional 
settings. Third, the observation window for the study spans 2006 to 2010 and as 
such, the results may not be generalizable to periods prior to 2006 and post-2010.  
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 9.6 Suggestions for Future Research  
Empirical findings from the study suggest a number of opportunities for 
future research. For example, future research could investigate other methods for 
measuring corporate governance disclosure. Specifically, in terms of data collection, 
alternative methods such as interviews, surveys and questionnaires may assist in 
better defining and measuring the extent of disclosure.  
The study used a five year observation widow (i.e., 2006 to 2010). Future 
research may employ different time frame, longer or shorter observation periods, or 
periods to traverse a specific event (e.g., Asian Financial Crisis, Enron collapse). 
Such research will assist in building a more comprehensive understanding of the 
influence of the extent of disclosure on actual firm performance. 
Also, the study performs a comparative study; countries are selected from 
three stages of economic development (i.e., emerging, developing and developed). 
Future research can conduct study on corporate governance and the disclosure 
association in another domestic, regional or broader international setting. For 
instance, scholars could conduct related research to the study by choosing countries 
with different institutional settings (e.g., code law versus common law, litigation 
risk, institutional ownership and cultural difference). Finally, the study applies 
specific features of corporate governance mechanism on the effectiveness of 
disclosure practice. Future research may also utilize different features of corporate 
governance mechanism (e.g., remuneration committee; director age; presence of 
female directors on the board) to determine the influential factors of information 
disclosure. 
Future research in this area could also examine the relationship between the 
two types of mandatory and voluntary corporate governance disclosures in an effort 
to identify, among other things, the degree of commonality between them and their 
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 determinants. Finally, scholars may also wish to examine intra-firm data on factors 
such as stakeholder/debtholders influences and organizational policy and procedures 
to determine the degree of their impact on mandatory and voluntary corporate 
governance disclosures. 
9.7 Summary of the Study 
Regulators, investors, corporate management and scholars focus on the 
importance of information disclosure. However, empirical research of this concept 
continues to develop with findings from past empirical studies on disclosure 
practices often conflicting. Variations have emerged in the compliance levels of 
companies, factors influencing such disclosure, the overall fit of the models utilized, 
the coefficients of determination and the significance or otherwise of the results. 
Additionally, results also vary from country to country. Studies have also focused 
more disclosure practices in developed countries rather than developing ones.  
This study utilizes agency and institutional theories as the theoretical 
framework. It develops a corporate governance disclosure score (both mandatory and 
voluntary) together with  a number of predictor variables hypothesized to influence 
corporate governance disclosure practices of firms regressed against the formulated 
corporate governance score. The final sample for each country provides 200 firm-
year observations over the period 2006 to 2010 resulting in a total of 600 firm-year 
observations. The extent of mandatory and voluntary disclosure of listed firms in 
their annual reports is found to be associated to different degrees with three groups of 
variables; corporate governance characteristics, firm characteristics and country 
characteristics. In terms of mandatory corporate governance disclosure results shows 
that high levels of mandatory corporate governance disclosures of firms in 
Bangladesh and Australia were primarily associated with company characteristics 
210 
 
 such as shareholder concentration, return on assets, large firms, high borrowings and 
firm age. Malaysian firms that tended to engage in greater levels of mandatory 
corporate governance disclosures, conversely, were significantly associated with 
corporate governance characteristics such as board independence, size and Big 4 
auditors. These results were similar for voluntary corporate governance disclosure in 
these countries. Australian firms with higher levels of voluntary corporate 
governance disclosures, tended to be large firms who had been in operation longer.  
Results of the study have clear implications for regulators, investors, 
corporate management and scholars. The significance of variables identified in the 
study clearly indicates the importance of some of these variables as determinants of 
corporate governance disclosure. 
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